- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:2.14.7.9-2.14.7.19
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
This section explains the definition and legal effects of fraud in agreements, the interpretation of certain words as stipulations, the validity of specific agreements (e.g., regarding deposits and inheritance), and the modern rules concerning majority consensus among creditors.
[ULPIANUS libro quarto ad edictum.]
[ULPIAN, On the Edict, book 4]
Dolo malo ait praetor pactum se non seruaturum.1 dolus malus fit calliditate et fallacia: et ut ait Pedius, dolo malo pactum fit, quotiens circumscribendi alterius causa aliud agitur et aliud agi simulatur.
The praetor says that he will not uphold a pact made with malicious fraud. Malicious fraud is committed by cunning and deceit; and as Pedius says, a pact is made with malicious fraud whenever, for the purpose of cheating another, one thing is done and another is feigned to be done.
Sed si fraudandi causa pactum factum dicatur, nihil praetor adicit: sed eleganter Labeo ait hoc aut iniquum esse, aut superuacuum. iniquum, si quod semel remisit creditor debitori suo bona fide, iterum hoc conetur destruere: superuacuum, si deceptus hoc fecerit, inest enim dolo et fraus.
But if a pact is said to have been made for the purpose of defrauding, the praetor adds nothing; but Labeo elegantly says that this is either unfair or superfluous. Unfair, if what a creditor has once released to his debtor in good faith, he should try to destroy this again; superfluous, if he did this having been deceived, for fraud is also inherent in malicious intent.
Siue autem ab initio dolo malo pactum factum est siue post pactum dolo malo aliquid factum est, nocebit exceptio2 propter haec uerba edicti 'neque fiat’.
Moreover, whether the pact was made with malicious fraud from the beginning or whether after the pact something was done with malicious fraud, the exception will be prejudiced because of these words of the edict ‘nor that it be done’.
Quod fere nouissima parte3 pactorum ita solet inseri 'rogauit Titius, spopondit Maeuius', haec uerba non tantum pactionis loco accipiuntur, sed etiam stipulationis: ideoque ex stipulatu nascitur actio, nisi contrarium specialiter adprobetur, quod non animo stipulantium hoc factum est, sed tantum paciscentium.
As for what is usually inserted in almost the very last part of pacts, like this: “Titius asked, Maevius promised,” these words are accepted not only in place of an agreement, but also of a stipulation; and therefore an action on stipulation arises, unless the contrary is specifically proved, that this was done not with the intention of stipulating, but only of agreeing.
Si paciscar, ne pro iudicatia uel incensarum aedium agatur, hoc pactum ualet.
If I agree that an action should not be brought for a judgment debt or for burnt buildings, this pact is valid.
Si paciscar, ne operis noui nuntiationem exsequar, quidam putant non ualere pactionem, quasi in ea re praetoris imperium uersetur: Labeo autem distinguit, ut si ex re familiari operis noui nuntiatio sit facta, liceat pacisci, si de re publica, non liceat: quae distinctio uera est. et in ceteris igitur omnibus ad edictum praetoris pertinentibus, quae non ad publicam laesionem, sed ad rem familiarem respiciunt, pacisci licet: nam et de furto pacisci lex permittit.
If I agree that I will not prosecute a notice of a new work, some think that the agreement is not valid, as if the praetor’s authority were involved in that matter; Labeo, however, distinguishes, so that if the notice of a new work was made on account of private property, it is lawful to agree, but if on account of a public matter, it is not lawful; which distinction is true. Therefore, also in all other matters pertaining to the praetor’s edict, which concern not public injury, but private property, it is lawful to agree; for even regarding theft, the law permits to agree.
Sed et si quis paciscatur, ne depositi agat, secundum Pomponium ualet pactum. item si quis pactus sit, ut ex causa depositi omne periculum praestet, Pomponius ait pactionem ualere nec quasi contra iuris formam factam non esse seruandam.4
But also if anyone agrees that he will not bring an action on deposit, according to Pomponius, the pact is valid. Likewise, if anyone has agreed that he will bear all risk arising from a deposit, Pomponius says that the pact is valid and that it should not be disregarded as if it were made against the rule of law.
Et generaliter quotiens pactum a iure communi remotum est, seruari hoc non oportet: nec legari, nec iusiurandum de hoc adactum ne quis agat seruandum Marcellus libro secundo digestorum scribit: et si stipulatio sit interposita de his, pro quibus pacisci non licet, seruanda non est, sed omnimodo rescindenda.
And generally, whenever a pact departs from common law, this ought not to be observed; and Marcellus writes in the second book of the Digests that neither can it be bequeathed, nor must an oath exacted concerning this, that one will not sue, be observed; and if a stipulation is interposed concerning those things about which it is not lawful to agree, it must not be observed, but must be completely rescinded.
Si ante aditam hereditatem paciscatur quis cum creditoribus ut minus soluatur, pactum ualiturum est.
If, before the inheritance is accepted, anyone agrees with the creditors that less should be paid, the pact will be valid.
Sed si seruus sit, qui paciscitur, priusquam libertatem et hereditatem apiscatur, quia sub condicione heres scriptus fuerat, non profuturum pactum Uindius scribit: Marcellus autem libro octauo decimo digestorum et suum heredem et seruum necessarium pure scriptos, paciscentes priusquam se immisceant5 putat recte pacisci, quod uerum est. idem et in extraneo herede: qui si mandatu creditorum adierit, etiam mandati putat eum habere actionem. sed si quis, ut supra rettulimus, in seruitute pactus est, negat Marcellus, quoniam non solet ei proficere, si quid in seruitute egit, post libertatem: quod in pacti exceptione admittendum est. sed an uel doli ei prosit exceptio, quaeritur. Marcellus in similibus speciebus licet antea dubitauit, tamen admisit: ut puta filius familias heres institutus pactus est cum creditoribus et emancipatus adiit hereditatem: et dicit doli eum posse uti exceptione. idem probat, et si filius uiuo patre cum creditoribus paternis pactus sit: nam et hic doli exceptionem profuturam. immo et in seruo doli exceptio non est respuenda.
But if it is a slave who agrees, before he obtains freedom and the inheritance, because he had been appointed heir under a condition, Vindius writes that the pact will not benefit him; Marcellus, however, in the eighteenth book of the Digests, believes that both a self-successor and a necessary slave-heir appointed unconditionally rightly agree if they agree before they intermeddle with the estate, which is true. The same also in the case of an external heir; who, if he enters the inheritance by mandate of the creditors, he thinks that he also has an action on mandate. But if anyone, as we reported above, made an agreement while in slavery, Marcellus denies that it benefits him, since whatever he did in slavery is not accustomed to benefit him after freedom; which must be admitted in the case of the exception of pact. But it is asked whether at least the exception of fraud benefits him. Marcellus in similar cases, although he previously doubted, yet admitted it; for example, a son-in-power appointed heir agreed with the creditors and, having been emancipated, entered upon the inheritance; and he says that he can use the exception of fraud. He approves the same also if the son, during the father’s lifetime, agreed with the father’s creditors; for here too the exception of fraud will benefit him. Nay, indeed, even in the case of a slave, the exception of fraud is not to be rejected.
Hodie tamen ita demum pactio huiusmodi creditoribus obest, si conuenerint in unum et communi consensu declarauerint, quota parte debiti contenti sint: si uero dissentiant, tunc praetoris partes necessariae sunt, qui decreto suo sequetur maioris partis uoluntatem.
Today, however, an agreement of this kind is prejudicial to the creditors only if they have assembled together and by common consent have declared with what share of the debt they are satisfied; but if they disagree, then the intervention of the praetor is necessary, who by his decree will follow the will of the majority.
- 2.14.7.9pactum se non seruaturum
The pronoun 'se' is the subject accusative of the infinitive 'seruaturum [esse]' in the Accusative with Infinitive construction, referring reflexively back to the subject of the main clause, 'praetor'.
- 2.14.7.11nocebit exceptio
The term 'exceptio' refers to the exception of the pact (exceptio pacti). 'nocebit' (will cause harm) indicates that the presence of fraud makes this defense prejudicial or ineffective for the party asserting the pact.
- 2.14.7.12Quod fere nouissima parte
The word 'Quod' at the beginning of the sentence is a relative connector (meaning 'as for the fact that' or 'regarding that which'), introducing the common contractual clause as the premise for the main clause.
- 2.14.7.15nec quasi contra iuris formam factam non esse seruandam
The double negation formed by 'nec' and 'non esse seruandam' (nor... not to be observed) yields a strong positive meaning: the agreement must be upheld and cannot be set aside on the ground of violating legal forms.
- 2.14.7.18paciscentes priusquam se immisceant
The present participle 'paciscentes' modifies 'suum heredem et seruum necessarium'. The subject of the subjunctive verb 'se immisceant' (intermeddling with the estate) in the clause introduced by 'priusquam' is identical to the logical subject of the participle.