- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:2.14.27.pr-2.14.27.10
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
Paulus examines the effects of agreements not to sue made between a joint creditor and a debtor, the application of such agreements to sureties, the subsequent modification of pacts, the invalidity of agreements with shameful causes, and the scope of agreements in alternative or general obligations.
[PAULUS libro tertio ad edictum.]
[PAULUS, On the Edict, book 3]
Si unus ex argentariis sociis cum debitore pactus sit, an etiam alteri noceat exceptio? Neratius Atilicinus Proculus, nec si in rem pactus sit,1 alteri nocere: tantum enim constitutum, ut solidum alter petere possit. idem Labeo: nam nec nouare alium posse, quamuis ei recte soluatur: sic enim et his, qui in nostra potestate sunt, recte solui quod crediderint, licet nouare non possint. quod est uerum. idemque in duobus reis stipulandi dicendum est.
If one of partner bankers has made an agreement with a debtor, does the exception also prejudice the other? Neratius, Atilicinus, and Proculus state that even if he made an agreement in rem, it does not prejudice the other; for it was only established that the one could demand the whole. Labeo is of the same opinion; for another cannot novate, even though payment is rightly made to him; for likewise, to those who are in our power, what they have trusted is rightly paid, although they cannot novate. Which is true. And the same must be said in the case of two joint stipulators.
Si cum reo ad certum tempus pactio facta sit, ultra neque reo neque fideiussori prodest. quod si sine persona sua reus pepigerit, ne a fideiussore petatur, nihil id prodesse fideiussori quidam putant, quamquam id rei intersit: quia ea demum competere ei debeat exceptio, quae et reo. ego didici prodesse fideiussori exceptionem: non sic enim illi per liberam personam adquiri, quam ipsi, qui pactus sit, consuli uidemur.2 quo iure utimur.
If an agreement has been made with the debtor for a certain time, it does not benefit either the debtor or the surety beyond that time. But if the debtor, without reference to his own person, has agreed that demand should not be made from the surety, some think that this benefits the surety in no way, although it is of interest to the debtor; because only that exception ought to belong to him which also belongs to the debtor. I have learned that the exception does benefit the surety; for we are seen not so much to acquire for him through a free person, as to consult the interest of the one who made the agreement. Which is the law we use.
Pactus, ne peteret, postea conuenit ut peteret: prius pactum per posterius elidetur, non quidem ipso iure, sicut tollitur stipulatio per stipulationem, si hoc actum est, quia in stipulationibus ius continetur, in pactis factum uersatur: et ideo replicatione exceptio elidetur. eadem ratione contingit, ne fideiussoribus prius pactum prosit. sed si pactum conuentum tale fuit, quod actionem quoque tolleret, uelut iniuriarum, non poterit, postea paciscendo ut agere possit, agere: quia et prima actio sublata est et posterius pactum ad actionem parandam inefficax est: non enim ex pacto iniuriarum actio nascitur, sed ex contumelia. idem dicemus et in bonae fidei contractibus, si pactum conuentum totam obligationem sustulerit, ueluti empti: non enim ex nouo pacto prior obligatio resuscitatur, sed proficiet pactum ad nouum contractum. quod si non ut totum contractum tolleret, pactum conuentum intercessit, sed ut imminueret, posterius pactum potest renouare primum contractum. quod et in specie dotis actionis procedere potest. puta pactam mulierem, ut praesenti die dos redderetur, deinde pacisci, ut tempore ei legibus dato dos reddatur: incipiet dos redire ad ius suum.3 nec dicendum est deteriorem condicionem dotis fieri per pactum: quotiens enim ad ius, quod lex naturae eius tribuit, de dote actio redit, non fit causa dotis deterior, sed formae suae redditur. haec et Scaeuolae nostro placuerunt.
Having agreed not to demand, he afterwards agreed that he might demand: the prior agreement is extinguished by the subsequent one, not indeed by operation of law, as a stipulation is destroyed by a stipulation if this was intended, because in stipulations law is contained, while in agreements fact is involved; and therefore the exception is excluded by a replication. By the same reasoning, it happens that the prior agreement does not benefit the sureties. But if the agreement made was such as to destroy the action as well, such as that of injuries, he will not be able to bring an action afterwards by agreeing that he may bring one; because both the first action was destroyed and the subsequent agreement is ineffective for producing an action; for an action of injuries does not arise from an agreement, but from insult. We shall say the same also in contracts of good faith, if the agreement made has destroyed the whole obligation, such as that of purchase; for the prior obligation is not revived by a new agreement, but the agreement will benefit toward a new contract. But if the agreement did not interpose to destroy the whole contract, but to diminish it, a subsequent agreement can renew the first contract. Which can also proceed in the case of an action for dowry. Suppose a woman agreed that her dowry should be returned on the present day, and then agreed that the dowry should be returned at the time given to her by the laws: the dowry will begin to return to its own law. Nor must it be said that the condition of the dowry is made worse by the agreement; for whenever the action for dowry returns to the law which its nature grants, the cause of the dowry is not made worse, but is restored to its own form. These things also pleased our Scaevola.
Illud nulla pactione effici potest, ne dolus praestetur: quamuis si quis paciscatur ne depositi agat, ui ipsa id pactus uideatur, ne de dolo agat: quod pactum proderit.
That cannot be brought about by any agreement, that fraud should not be answered for; although if anyone agrees not to bring an action of deposit, by the very force of the act he is seen to agree not to bring an action for fraud; which agreement will benefit.
Pacta, quae turpem causam continent, non sunt obseruanda: ueluti si paciscar ne furti agam uel iniuriarum, si feceris: expedit enim timere furti uel iniuriarum poenam: sed post admissa haec pacisci possumus. item ne experiar interdicto unde ui, quatenus publicam causam contingit, pacisci non possumus. et in summa, si pactum conuentum a re priuata remotum sit, non est seruandum: ante omnia enim animaduertendum est, ne conuentio in alia re facta aut cum alia persona in alia re aliaue persona noceat.
Agreements which contain an shameful cause are not to be observed; as if I agree not to bring an action for theft or injuries, if you commit them; for it is expedient to fear the penalty of theft or injuries; but we can agree after these have been committed. Likewise, we cannot agree not to sue under the interdict unde vi, as far as it touches a public cause. And in short, if the agreement made is removed from private affairs, it is not to be observed; for before all things it must be observed, lest an agreement made in another matter or with another person should prejudice in another matter or another person.
Si cum decem mihi deberes, pepigero, ne a te uiginti petam: in decem prodesse tibi pacti conuenti uel doli exceptionem placet. item si cum uiginti deberes, pepigerim, ne decem petam: efficeretur per exceptionem mihi opponendam, ut tantum reliqua decem exigere debeam.
If, when you owed me ten, I agreed not to demand twenty from you: it is held that the exception of the agreement or of fraud benefits you in the ten. Likewise, if when you owed twenty, I agreed not to demand ten: it would be brought about by the exception to be opposed to me, that I ought to demand only the remaining ten.
Sed si stipulatus decem aut Stichum de decem pactus sim et petam Stichum aut decem: exceptionem pacti conuenti in totum obstaturam: nam ut solutione et petitione et acceptilatione unius rei4 tota obligatio solueretur, ita pacto quoque conuento de una re non petenda interposito totam obligationem summoueri. sed si id actum inter nos sit, ne decem mihi, sed Stichus praestetur: possum efficaciter de Sticho agere, nulla exceptione opponenda. idem est et si de Sticho non petendo conuenerit.
But if, having stipulated for ten or Stichus, I agreed not to demand ten, and I demand Stichus or ten: the exception of the agreement will block the whole; for just as by payment, demand, and release of one thing the entire obligation is dissolved, so also by an agreement made not to demand one thing the entire obligation is removed. But if it was agreed between us that not ten, but Stichus should be performed to me: I can effectively bring an action for Stichus, no exception being opposed. The same is true also if it was agreed not to demand Stichus.
Sed si generaliter mihi hominem debeas et paciscar, ne Stichum petam: Stichum quidem petendo pacti exceptio mihi opponetur, alium autem hominem si petam, recte agam.
But if you owe me a slave generally, and I agree not to demand Stichus: if I demand Stichus, the exception of the agreement will be opposed to me, but if I demand another slave, I shall act rightly.
Item si pactus, ne hereditatem peterem, singulas res ut heres petam: ex eo, quod pactum erit, pacti conuenti exceptio aptanda erit, quemadmodum si conuenerit ne fundum peterem et usum fructum petam, aut ne nauem aedificiumue peterem et dissolutis his singulas res petam: nisi specialiter aliud actum est.
Likewise, if having agreed not to demand an inheritance, I demand individual things as heir: from that which was agreed, the exception of the agreement must be applied, just as if it was agreed not to demand land and I demand the usufruct, or not to demand a ship or a building and, these being dissolved, I demand the individual parts; unless something else was specifically agreed.
Si acceptilatio inutilis fuit, tacita pactione id actum uidetur, ne peteretur.
If a release was invalid, it is seen to have been agreed by a tacit agreement that demand should not be made.
Seruus hereditarius heredi post adituro nominatim pacisci non potest, quia nondum is dominus sit: sed si in rem pactum conuentum factum sit, heredi adquiri potest.
A slave belonging to an inheritance cannot make an agreement by name for an heir who is to enter afterwards, because he is not yet the owner; but if the agreement was made in rem, it can be acquired for the heir.
- 2.14.27.prnec si in rem pactus sit
Explains the interpretation that even an agreement "in rem" does not prejudice other joint creditors. This addresses an exceptional treatment in joint creditor relations, where agreements are typically divided into those personal to the creditor (in personam) and those affecting the claim itself (in rem).
- 2.14.27.1non sic enim illi per liberam personam adquiri, quam ipsi, qui pactus sit, consuli uidemur
Using the comparative structure non sic... quam..., this explains why the surety benefits from the exception not as an "acquisition of rights through a third party," but as a "consideration for the benefit of the debtor who agreed." consuli is a passive infinitive dependent on uidemur.
- 2.14.27.2incipiet dos redire ad ius suum
Here ius suum refers to "its own original legal status," indicating that the payment date altered by the agreement reverts to the default statutory rules.
- 2.14.27.6acceptilatione unius rei
In an alternative obligation, just as performance, demand, or release (acceptilatio) of one of the items extinguishes the entire obligation, so does an agreement not to demand one item extinguish the whole.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-07-12) · Revision history (3, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 2
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1