- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:12.6.64.pr
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
This text explains why a master cannot recover a payment made to a manumitted slave for a debt owed during slavery, even if paid under a mistake of law, by drawing an analogy between natural law and the law of nations.
[TRYPHONINUS libro septimo disputationum.]
[TRYPHONINUS, in his seventh book of Disputations.]
Si quod dominus seruo debuit, manumisso1 soluit, quamuis existimans ei aliqua teneri2 actione, tamen repetere non poterit, quia naturale adgnouit debitum: ut enim libertas naturali iure continetur et dominatio ex gentium iure introducta est, ita3 debiti uel non debiti ratio in condictione naturaliter intellegenda est.
If a master pays what he owed to his slave after the slave has been manumitted, even though he believes that he is bound to him by some action, he will nevertheless not be able to recover it, because he has recognized a natural debt. For just as freedom is contained in natural law and mastership was introduced by the law of nations, so the concept of what is due or not due must be understood naturally in a condictio.
- 12.6.64.prmanumisso
Dative singular of the perfect passive participle, serving as the indirect object of soluit. It is used substantively to mean "to the manumitted person", indicating the status of the former slave at the time of payment.
- 12.6.64.prteneri
Present passive infinitive. It is used in an accusative with infinitive construction (indirect statement) dependent on the participle existimans ("thinking"), with the subject accusative se ("that he himself") being omitted. aliqua actione ("by some action") is an ablative of means.
- 12.6.64.prut... ita
Correlative adverbs meaning "just as... so...". It contrasts the legal origins of freedom (natural law) and mastership (law of nations) to lead to the conclusion that the determination of whether a debt exists or not in a condictio must also be understood based on natural law.
