- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:97.10-97.16
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca discusses the nature of human vice, noting how mistakes in living are perversely enjoyed unlike in other arts, and argues, with reference to Epicurus, that evil deeds are immediately accompanied by a 'natural punishment' of constant anxiety and fear from one's own conscience.
Omne tempus Clodios, non omne Catones feret. Ad deteriora faciles sumus, quia nec dux potest nec comes deesse,1 et res ipsa etiam sine duce, sine comite procedit. Non pronum est tantum ad vitia, sed praeceps, et quod plerosque inemendabiles facit, omnium aliarum artium peccata artificibus pudori sunt offenduntque deerrantem, vitae peccata delectant.
Every age will produce Clodii, but not every age will produce Catones. We are prone to worse things, because neither a leader nor a companion can be lacking, and the thing itself proceeds even without a leader, without a companion. It is not merely a slope toward vices, but a precipice, and what makes most people incurable is that while in all other arts mistakes are a source of shame to the practitioners and offend the one who goes astray, the mistakes of life delight us.
Non gaudet navigio gubernator everso, non gaudet aegro medicus elato, non gaudet orator, si patroni culpa reus cedidit; at contra omnibus crimen suum voluptati est. Laetatur ille adulterio, in quod inritatus est ipsa difficultate. Laetatur ille circumscriptione furtoque, nec ante illi culpa quam culpae fortuna displicuit. Id prava consuetudine evenit.
The pilot does not rejoice in a shipwreck, the doctor does not rejoice in the death of his patient, the orator does not rejoice if the defendant has lost his case through the fault of his advocate; but on the contrary, everyone’s own crime is a pleasure to him. One man rejoices in adultery, to which he was stimulated by the very difficulty of it. Another rejoices in fraud and theft, and the fault does not displease him until the consequence of the fault displeases him. This happens through evil habit.
Alioquin ut scias2 subesse animis etiam in pessima abductis boni sensum nec ignorari turpe, sed neglegi; omnes peccata dissimulant et, quamvis feliciter cesserint, fructu illorum utuntur, ipsa subducunt. At bona conscientia prodire vult et conspici; ipsas nequitia tenebras timet.
Moreover, so that you may know that a sense of the good underlies minds even when they are drawn away into the worst states, and that what is shameful is not ignored but neglected: everyone conceals their sins and, however successfully they turn out, they enjoy the fruit of them but withdraw the sins themselves. But a good conscience wants to come forward and be seen; wickedness fears the very darkness.
Eleganter itaque ab Epicuro dictum puto: "potest nocenti contingere, ut lateat,3 latendi fides non potest," aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse iudicas sensum: "ideo non prodest latere peccantibus, quia latendi etiam si felicitatem habent, fiduciam non habent." Ita est: tuta scelera esse possunt, secura esse non possunt.
Therefore, I think it was elegantly said by Epicurus: “it can happen to the guilty to remain hidden, but the confidence of remaining hidden cannot,” or if you judge that this meaning can be better explained in this way: “therefore it is of no benefit to sinners to remain hidden, because even if they have the good fortune of remaining hidden, they do not have the confidence of it.” It is so: crimes can be safe, but they cannot be secure.
Hoc ego repugnare sectae nostrae, si sic expediatur, non iudico. Quare? Quia prima illa et maxima peccantium est poena peccasse, nec ullum scelus, licet illud fortuna exornet muneribus suis, licet tueatur ac vindicet, inpunitum est, quoniam sceleris in scelere supplicium est.4 Sed nihilominus et hae illam secundae poenae premunt ac secuntur, timere semper et expavescere et securitati diffidere. Quare ego hoc supplicio nequitiam liberem? Quare non semper illam in suspenso relinquam?
I do not judge this to be repugnant to our sect, if it is explained in this way. Why? Because that first and greatest punishment of sinners is to have sinned, and no crime, though fortune adorns it with her gifts, though she protects and vindicates it, is unpunished, since the punishment of crime is in the crime itself. But nevertheless, these second punishments also press upon and follow that first one: to fear always, to tremble, and to distrust security. Why should I free wickedness from this punishment? Why should I not always leave it in suspense?
Illic dissentiamus cum Epicuro, ubi dicit nihil iustum esse natura et crimina vitanda esse, quia vitari metus non posse; hic consentiamus mala facinora conscientia flagellari et plurimum illi tormentorum esse eo, quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat, quod sponsoribus securitatis suae non potest credere. Hoc enim ipsum argumentum est, Epicure, natura nos a scelere abhorrere, quod nulli non etiam inter tuta timor est. Multos fortuna liberat poena, metu neminem.
Let us dissent from Epicurus in that point where he says that nothing is just by nature and that crimes are to be avoided because the fear of them cannot be avoided; but let us agree in this, that evil deeds are scourged by conscience and that its greatest torment lies in this, that a perpetual anxiety urges and lashes it, because it cannot trust the guarantors of its security. For this very thing is the proof, Epicurus, that we naturally shrink from crime, that there is no one who does not feel fear even in safety. Fortune frees many from punishment, but no one from fear.
Quare nisi quia infixa nobis eius rei aversatio est, quam natura damnavit? Ideo numquam fides latendi fit etiam latentibus, quia coarguit illos conscientia et ipsos sibi ostendit. Proprium autem est nocentium trepidare. Male de nobis actum erat, quod multa scelera legem et vindicem effugiunt et scripta supplicia, nisi illa naturalia et gravia de praesentibus solverent5 et in locum patientiae timor cederet. VALE.
Why is this, except because there is implanted in us an aversion to that thing which nature has condemned? Therefore, confidence of remaining hidden never comes even to those who are hidden, because conscience convicts them and shows them to themselves. But it is characteristic of the guilty to tremble. It would have gone badly with us, since many crimes escape the law, the avenger, and written punishments, unless those natural and heavy punishments paid the penalty in ready money, and in place of suffering the punishment came fear. FAREWELL.
- 97.10quia nec dux potest nec comes deesse
The impersonal verb 'potest' is joined with the infinitive 'deesse'. It means 'neither a leader (dux) nor a companion (comes) can be lacking', indicating the psychological tendency of humans to easily find leaders or companions when pursuing worse paths.
- 97.12Alioquin ut scias
This construction introduces a purpose clause ('ut scias'), but the main clause is omitted as an idiomatic ellipse. It functions as 'otherwise, in order that you may know (behold the following fact)', introducing the obvious truth that everyone tries to hide their sins as evidence of an underlying moral sense.
- 97.13potest nocenti contingere, ut lateat
The clause 'ut lateat' acts as the subject of the impersonal verb 'contingere' (to happen, to be possible), with 'nocenti' as the dative object. It translates to: 'it can happen to the guilty to remain hidden'.
- 97.14quoniam sceleris in scelere supplicium est
This phrase encapsulates the Stoic ethical doctrine that the act itself contains its own reward or punishment: 'since the punishment of crime is in the crime itself'. The genitive 'sceleris' (of crime) modifies 'supplicium' (punishment).
- 97.16nisi illa naturalia et gravia de praesentibus solverent
The idiomatic commercial/legal phrase 'de praesentibus (solvere)' means 'to pay in ready money' or 'immediately'. Seneca uses this commercial metaphor to state that natural punishments (inner anxiety) are paid immediately on the spot, rather than waiting for future legal trials.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (2, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-22 AI review — translation 1
