- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:92.1-92.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-07
The author argues that a happy life depends solely on perfected reason, rejecting other schools' attempts to include pleasure or external goods in the supreme good, and insists that the noble human soul should not be degraded into a discordant monster like Scylla.
Puto, inter me teque conveniet externa corpori adquiri, corpus in honorem animi coli, in animo esse partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale1 nobis datas. In hoc principali est aliquid inrationale, est et rationale. Illud huic servit, hoc unum est, quod alio non refertur, sed omnia ad se refert. Nam illa quoque divina ratio omnibus praeposita est, ipsa sub nullo est; et haec autem nostra eadem est, quia ex illa est.
I think there will be agreement between me and you that external things are acquired for the body, the body is cultivated in honor of the soul, and in the soul there are ministering parts, through which we are moved and nourished, given to us on account of the ruling part itself. In this ruling part, there is something irrational, and there is also the rational. The former serves the latter; the latter is the one thing which is not referred to anything else, but refers all things to itself. For that divine reason too has been set over all things, and is itself under nothing; and this of ours is the same, because it is from that.
Si de hoc inter nos convenit, sequitur ut de illo quoque conveniat, in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Haec enim sola non submittit animum, stat contra fortunam; in quolibet rerum habitu securos servat. Id autem unum bonum est, quod numquam defringitur. Is est, inquam, beatus quem nulla res minorem facit; tenet summa, et ne ulli quidem nisi sibi innixus. Nam qui aliquo auxilio sustinetur, potest cadere. Si aliter est, incipient multum in nobis valere non nostra. Quis autem vult constare fortunam aut quis se prudens ob aliena miratur?
If there is agreement between us on this point, it follows that there is agreement on that point too: that the happy life is placed in this one thing, that perfect reason be in us. For this alone does not submit the mind, it stands against fortune, and keeps us secure in any condition of things. And that is the unique good which is never broken. He is happy, I say, whom nothing makes lesser; he holds the highest, leaning upon no one but himself. For he who is sustained by some help can fall. If it is otherwise, things not our own will begin to have great power in us. But who wants fortune to be constant, or what wise man admires himself because of alien things?
Quid est beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene iudicati2 tenax. Ad haec quomodo pervenitur? Si veritas tota perspecta est; si servatus est in rebus agendis ordo, modus, decor, innoxia voluntas ac benigna, intenta rationi nec umquam ab illa recedens, amabilis simul mirabilisque. Denique ut breviter tibi formulam scribam, talis animus esse sapientis viri debet, qualis deum deceat.
What is a happy life? Security and perpetual tranquility. This will be given by greatness of mind, and by constancy tenacious of what has been well judged. How is this arrived at? If the whole truth has been thoroughly seen; if in actions order, measure, propriety, and a harmless and benign will are preserved, intent upon reason and never departing from it, at once lovable and admirable. Finally, to write a brief formula for you, such ought to be the mind of the wise man, as would befit a god.
Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt? Nam si possunt aliquid non honesta conferre ad optimum statum, in his erit beata vita, sine quibus honesta.3 Et quid turpius stultiusve quam bonum rationalis animi ex inrationalibus nectere?
What can he desire, to whom all honorable things happen? For if non-honorable things can contribute anything to the best state, the happy life will consist in those things without which the honorable exists. And what is more shameful or foolish than to knit the good of the rational mind from irrational things?
Quidam tamen augeri summum bonum iudicant, quia parum plenum sit fortuitis repugnantibus. Antipater quoque inter magnos sectae huius auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum. Vides autem quale sit die non esse contentum, nisi aliquis igniculus adluxerit. Quod potest in hac claritate solis habere scintilla momentum?
Yet some judge that the supreme good can be increased, because it is insufficiently full when fortuitous things are opposing. Antipater also, among the great founders of this sect, says that he attributes something to external things, but very little indeed. But you see what kind of thing it is not to be content with the day unless some tiny fire shines. What weight can a spark have in this brightness of the sun?
Si non es sola honestate contentus, necesse est aut quietem adici velis, quam ἀοχλησίαν vocant Graeci, aut voluptatem. Horum alterum utcumque recipi potest. Vacat enim animus molestia liber ad inspectum universi, nihilque illum avocat a contemplatione naturae. Alterum illud, voluptas, bonum pecoris est. Adicimus rationali inrationale, honesto inhonestum. Ad hanc vitam facit titillatio corporis; quid ergo dubitaris dicere bene esse homini, si palato bene est?
If you are not content with honor alone, it is necessary that you wish either peace to be added, which the Greeks call aochlesia, or pleasure. The former of these can somehow be admitted. For the mind is free, liberated from trouble, for the inspection of the universe, and nothing calls it away from the contemplation of nature. That other one, pleasure, is the good of cattle. We add the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable. To this life, the tickling of the body contributes; why then do you hesitate to say that it is well with a man, if it is well with his palate?
Et hunc tu, non dico inter viros numeras, sed inter homines, cuius summum bonum saporibus et coloribus sonisque constat? Excedat ex hoc animalium numero pulcherrimo ac dis secundo: mutis adgregetur animal pabulo laetum.
And do you count this man, I do not say among men, but among human beings, whose supreme good consists of tastes, colors, and sounds? Let him depart from this most beautiful class of animals, second only to the gods; let him be grouped with the mute beasts, an animal happy with its fodder.
Inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam, inpotentem, positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem, languidam, voluptatibus deditam; illam effrenatam, meliorem tamen, certe fortiorem ac digniorem viro reliquerunt, hanc necessariam beatae vitae putaverunt, enervem et abiectam.
The irrational part of the soul has two parts: one spirited, ambitious, uncontrolled, placed in passions; the other humble, languid, devoted to pleasures. They left aside the former, which is unbridled, yet better, certainly stronger and more worthy of a man, and they thought this latter part, enervated and abject, necessary for the happy life.
Huic rationem servire iusserunt et fecerunt animalis generosissimi summum bonum demissum et ignobile, praeterea mixtum portentosumque et ex diversis ac male congruentibus membris. Nam ut ait Vergilius noster in Scylla "Prima hominis facies et pulchro pectore virgo Pube tenus, postrema inmani corpore pistrix Delphinum caudas utero commissa luporum." Huic tamen Scyllae fera animalia adiuncta sunt, horrenda, velocia; at isti sapientiam4 ex quibus conposuere portentis!
They ordered reason to serve this, and made the supreme good of the most noble animal low and ignoble, and furthermore mixed and monstrous, composed of diverse and poorly matching limbs. For as our Vergil says of Scylla: “First the face of a human, and a maiden with a beautiful breast down to the womb, last a sea-monster of monstrous body, having dolphin tails joined to a belly of wolves.” Yet to this Scylla wild animals were joined, horrific and swift; but from what monsters have those men composed wisdom!
- 92.1principale
A Latin translation of the Stoic technical term "ruling part" (Greek τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). It designates the central function of the soul, which controls judgment, assent, desire, and reason.
- 92.3bene iudicati
The genitive neuter singular of the participle iudicatus used substantively, meaning "that which has been well judged." It is governed by the adjective tenax (tenacious of, holding fast to), which requires the genitive case.
- 92.4sine quibus honesta
A verb (such as sunt or esse possunt) is omitted in the relative clause sine quibus honesta. The antecedent is the preceding his (representing non honesta), and it is interpreted as "in those non-honorable things, without which honorable things [exist / can exist]."
- 92.9sapientiam
The direct object (accusative) of the verb conposuere (= conposuerunt, 3rd person plural perfect). isti is the subject and ex quibus portentis is an ablative phrase.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — note 1
