The Self-Sufficiency of the Wise and the Need for Friends — Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius 9.1–9.8, Latin & English

§9.1

An merito reprehendat in quadam epistula Epicurus eos, qui dicunt sapientem se ipso esse contentum et propter hoc amico non indigere, desideras scire. Hoc obicitur Stilboni ab Epicuro et iis quibus summum bonum visum est animus inpatiens.

You wish to know whether Epicurus is right in censuring, in a certain letter, those who say that the wise man is content with himself and therefore does not need a friend. This is objected to Stilpo by Epicurus and by those to whom the supreme good seemed to be an impatient mind.

§9.2

In ambiguitatem incidendum est, si exprimere ἀπάθειαν uno verbo cito voluerimus et inpatientiam¹ dicere. Poterit enim contrarium ei, quod significare volumus, intellegi. Nos eum volumus dicere, qui respuat omnis mali sensum; accipietur is, qui nullum ferre possit malum. Vide ergo, num satius sit aut invulnerabilem animum dicere aut animum extra omnem patientiam positum.

We must fall into ambiguity if we wish to express apatheia in a single word quickly and call it impatience. For the opposite of what we want to mean could be understood. We want to mean one who rejects the sensation of all evil; but he will be understood as one who can bear no evil. Consider, therefore, whether it is better to say an invulnerable mind, or a mind placed beyond all passivity.

§9.3

Hoc inter nos et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem. Illud nobis et illis commune est: sapientem se ipso esse contentum. Sed tamen et amicum habere vult et vicinum et contubernalem, quamvis sibi ipse sufficiat.

This is the difference between us and them: our wise man indeed conquers every trouble, but feels it; theirs does not even feel it. This is common to us and them: that the wise man is content with himself. But nevertheless, he wishes to have both a friend and a neighbor and a companion, although he is sufficient for himself.

§9.4

Vide quam sit se contentus; aliquando sui parte contentus est. Si illi manum aut morbus aut hostis exciderit, si quis oculum vel oculos casus excusserit, reliquiae illi suae satisfacient, et erit inminuto corpore et amputato tam laetus, quam integro fuit. Sed quae si desunt, non desiderat, non deesse mavult.²

See how content he is with himself; sometimes he is content with a part of himself. If disease or an enemy cuts off his hand, if some accident knocks out his eye or eyes, his remaining parts will satisfy him, and he will be as joyful with an impaired and amputated body as he was with it whole. But if these are lacking, he does not long for them, though he would prefer them not to be lacking.

§9.5

Ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit. Et hoc, quod dico "possit," tale est: amissum aequo animo fert. Sine amico quidem numquam erit. In sua potestate habet, quam cito reparet. Quomodo si perdiderit Phidias statuam, protinus alteram faciet; sic hic faciendarum amicitiarum artifex substituet alium in locum amissi.

Thus the wise man is content with himself, not so that he wishes to be without a friend, but so that he can. And this which I say, ‘he can,’ is of this sort: he bears the loss of a friend with an even mind. Indeed, he will never be without a friend. He has it in his own power how quickly he may replace him. Just as if Phidias has lost a statue, he will immediately make another; so this artisan of making friendships will substitute another in place of the one lost.

§9.6

Quaeris, quomodo amicum cito facturus sit; dicam, si illud mihi tecum converterit,³ ut statim tibi solvam, quod debeo, et quantum ad hanc epistulam, paria faciamus. Hecaton ait: "Ego tibi monstrabo amatorium sine medicamento, sine herba, sine ullius veneficae carmine: si vis amari, ama." Habet autem non tantum usus amicitiae veteris et certae magnam voluptatem, sed etiam initium et comparatio novae.

You ask how he will make a friend quickly; I will tell you, if it is agreed between me and you that I should immediately pay you what I owe, and so far as this letter is concerned, we make things even. Hecaton says: ‘I will show you a love-potion without medicine, without herb, without any witch’s spell: if you wish to be loved, love.’ But not only the use of an old and established friendship has great pleasure, but also the beginning and acquisition of a new one.

§9.7

Quod interest inter metentem agricolam et serentem, hoc inter eum, qui amicum paravit et qui parat. Attalus philosophus dicere solebat iucundius esse amicum facere quam habere, quomodo artifici iucundius pingere est quam pinxisse. Illa in opere suo occupata sollicitudo ingens oblectamentum habet in ipsa occupatione. Non aeque delectatur, qui ab opere perfecto removit manum. Iam fructu artis suae fruitur; ipsa fruebatur arte, cum pingeret. Fructuosior est adulescentia liberorum, sed infantia dulcior.

What is the difference between a harvesting farmer and a sowing one, this is the difference between him who has prepared a friend and him who is preparing one. The philosopher Attalus used to say that it is more pleasant to make a friend than to have one, just as it is more pleasant for an artist to paint than to have painted. That great anxiety occupied in its own work has immense delight in the occupation itself. He who has removed his hand from the finished work is not equally pleased. He now enjoys the fruit of his art; he was enjoying the art itself when he was painting. The youth of children is more fruitful, but infancy is sweeter.

§9.8

Nunc ad propositum revertamur. Sapiens, etiam si contentus est se, tamen habere amicum vult, si nihil aliud, ut exerceat amicitiam, ne tam magna virtus iaceat, non ad hoc, quod dicebat Epicurus in hac ipsa epistula, "ut habeat, qui sibi aegro adsideat, succurrat in vincula coniecto vel inopi," sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipse aegro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet. Qui se spectat et propter hoc ad amicitiam venit, male cogitat. Quemadmodum coepit, sic desinet: paravit amicum adversum vincla laturum opem; cum primum crepuerit catena, discedet.

Now let us return to the proposition. The wise man, even if he is content with himself, nevertheless wishes to have a friend, if for nothing else, to exercise friendship, lest so great a virtue lie idle; not for this purpose, which Epicurus was saying in this very letter, ‘that he may have someone to sit by him when he is sick, to succor him when thrown into chains or in need,’ but so that he may have someone by whose sickbed he himself may sit, whom he himself may free when surrounded by hostile custody. He who regards himself and for this reason comes to friendship, thinks badly. As he began, so he will end: he has prepared a friend to bring help against chains; as soon as the chain rattles, he will depart.

Syntax notes3 items

9.2inpatientiam
Seneca points out that translating the Greek ἀπάθεια directly as "inpatientia" risks being misunderstood in Latin as "unable to bear pain" (impatient). Therefore, he proposes alternative phrasings such as "invulnerabilis" (invulnerable) or "extra omnem patientiam" (placed beyond all passivity).
9.4Sed quae si desunt, non desiderat, non deesse mavult.
The pronoun "quae" (neuter plural) refers to the lost body parts mentioned just before, or to external goods in general. In Stoic value theory, bodily integrity and friends are not the supreme good (virtue); hence, if they are lacking, the wise man "does not long for them" (non desiderat), but "prefers them not to be lacking" (non deesse mavult), reflecting the concept of "preferred indifferents" (proegmena).
9.6si illud mihi tecum converterit
The verb "converterit" is read as "convenit" (it is agreed) in some manuscripts. Here it means the establishment (agreement) of a metaphorical commercial transaction: "if it is agreed between me and you that I should immediately repay what I owe and make things even regarding this letter."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-22)

2026-09-22 AI review — source 1

urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:9.1-9.8