- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:88.19-88.28
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-07
Seneca argues that ancestral physical training and liberal studies do not directly impart virtue, and references Posidonius' fourfold division of arts to establish that liberal arts and mathematics are merely auxiliary and lack independent foundations compared to philosophy.
An liberale studium istuc esse iuventuti nostrae credimus, quam maiores nostri rectam exercuerunt1 hastilia iacere, sudem torquere, equum agitare, arma tractare? Nihil liberos suos docebant, quod discendum esset iacentibus. Sed nec hae nec illae docent aluntve virtutem. Quid enim prodest equum regere et cursum eius freno temperare, adfectibus effrenatissimis abstrahi? Quid prodest multos vincere luctatione vel caestu, ab iracundia vinci?
Do we believe that that activity is a liberal study for our youth, which our ancestors trained to stand upright in throwing spears, whirling stakes, managing horses, and handling weapons? They taught their children nothing that should be learned by those lying down. But neither these nor those studies teach or nourish virtue. For what does it profit to rule a horse and to temper its course with a bridle, if one is dragged away by the most unbridled passions? What does it profit to conquer many in wrestling or boxing, if one is conquered by anger?
" Quid ergo? Nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia?" Ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil. Nam et hae viles ex professo artes, quae manu constant, ad instrumenta vitae plurimum conferunt, tamen ad virtutem non pertinent. "Quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus?" Non quia virtutem dare possunt, sed quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant. Quemadmodum prima illa, ut antiqui vocabant, litteratura, per quam pueris elementa traduntur, non docet liberales artes, sed mox percipiendis locum parat, sic liberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem, sed expediunt.
”What then? Do liberal studies confer nothing upon us?” Much for other things, nothing for virtue. For even these low, avowedly manual arts contribute very much to the instruments of life, yet they do not belong to virtue. “Why then do we instruct our children in liberal studies?” Not because they can give virtue, but because they prepare the mind for receiving virtue. Just as that first instruction in literature, as the ancients called it, through which the elements are delivered to boys, does not teach liberal arts, but prepares a place for them to be received soon after, so liberal arts do not lead the mind to virtue, but clear the way.
Quattuor ait esse artium Posidonius genera: sunt volgares et sordidae, sunt ludicrae, sunt pueriles, sunt liberales. Volgares opificum, quae manu constant et ad instruendam vitam occupatae sunt, in quibus nulla decoris, nulla honesti simulatio est.
Posidonius says that there are four kinds of arts: the vulgar and low, the playful, the childish, and the liberal. The vulgar are those of workmen, which consist in manual work and are occupied with furnishing life, in which there is no pretense of beauty or of the honorable.
Ludicrae sunt, quae ad voluptatem oculorum atque aurium tendunt. His adnumeres licet machinatores,2 qui pegmata per se surgentia excogitant et tabulata tacite in sublime crescentia et alias ex inopinato varietates aut dehiscentibus, quae cohaerebant, aut bis, quae distabant, sua sponte coeuntibus aut his, quae eminebant, paulatim in se residentibus. His imperitorum feriuntur oculi omnia subita, quia causas non novere, mirandum.
The playful are those which tend to the pleasure of the eyes and ears. To these you may number the mechanics, who devise stages rising by themselves and platforms silently growing on high, and other unexpected varieties, either by things that clung together gaping open, or by those that were apart coming together of their own accord, or by those that stood out gradually sinking back into themselves. The eyes of the unskilled are struck by these things; everything sudden is a matter of wonder to them, because they do not know the causes.
Pueriles sunt et aliquid habentes liberalibus simile hae artes, quas ἐγκυκλίουσ Graeci, nostri autem liberales vocant. Solae autem liberales sunt, immo, ut dicam verius, liberae, quibus curae virtus est.
The childish arts, which have something similar to liberal arts, are those which the Greeks call the general arts, but our people call liberal. But the only truly liberal arts, or rather, to speak more truly, the free arts, are those whose care is virtue.
"Quemadmodum," inquit, "est aliqua pars philosophiae naturalis, est aliqua moralis, est aliqua rationalis, sic et haec quoque liberalium artium turba locum sibi in philosophia vindicat. Cum ventum est ad naturales quaestiones, geometriae testimonio statur;3 ergo eius, quam adiuvat, pars est."
”Just as,” he says, “there is some part of philosophy that is natural, some moral, some rational, so also this crowd of liberal arts claims a place for itself in philosophy. When we come to natural questions, we stand by the testimony of geometry; therefore, it is a part of that which it helps.”
Multa adiuvant nos nec ideo partes nostri sunt. Immo si partes essent, non adiuvarent. Cibus adiutorium corporis nec tamen pars est. Aliquid nobis praestat geometriae ministerium; sic philosophiae necessaria est, quomodo ipsi faber. Sed nec hic geometriae pars est nec illa philosophiae.
Many things help us, yet they are not therefore parts of us. Indeed, if they were parts, they would not help. Food is a help to the body, yet it is not a part. The service of geometry provides something to us; thus it is necessary to philosophy in the same way as the carpenter is to geometry itself. But neither is the latter a part of geometry, nor the former of philosophy.
Praeterea utraque fines suos habet. Sapiens enim causas naturalium et quaerit et novit, quorum numeros mensurasque geometres persequitur et subputat. Qua ratione constent caelestia, quae illis sit vis quaeve natura, sapiens scit; cursus et recursus et quasdam observationes, per quas descendunt et adlevantur ac speciem interdum standum praebent, cum caelestibus stare non liceat, colligit mathematicus.
Moreover, each has its own boundaries. For the wise man seeks and knows the causes of natural things, whose numbers and measures the geometrician pursues and calculates. By what system the heavenly bodies consist, what is their power or what is their nature, the wise man knows; the mathematician collects their courses and returns, and certain observations through which they descend and are lifted up, and sometimes present the appearance of standing still, although it is not permitted for heavenly bodies to stand still.
Quae causa in speculo imagines exprimat, sciet sapiens; illud tibi geometres potest dicere, quantum abesse debeat corpus ab imagine et qualis forma speculi quales imagines reddat. Magnum esse solem philosophus probabit; quantus sit, mathematicus, qui usu quodam et exercitatione procedit; sed ut procedat, impetranda illi quaedam principia sunt. Non est autem ars sui iuris, cui precarium fundamentum est.
What cause expresses images in a mirror, the wise man will know; the geometrician can tell you how far a body ought to be from the image, and what shape of mirror returns what kind of images. The philosopher will prove that the sun is large; how large it is, the mathematician will prove, who proceeds by a certain use and practice; but that he may proceed, certain principles must be obtained by him. But an art is not independent whose foundation is precarious.
Philosophia nil ab alio petit, totum opus a solo excitat; mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficiaria est,4 in alieno aedificat. Accipit prima, quorum beneficio ad ulteriora perveniat. Si per se iret ad verum, si totius mundi naturam posset conprendere, dicerem multum conlaturam mentibus nostris, quae tractatu caelestium crescunt trahuntque aliquid ex alto. Una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili; nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quaerit.
Philosophy begs nothing from another, it raises the whole work by itself alone; mathematics is, so to speak, built on another’s ground, it builds on what belongs to another. It receives first principles, by the benefit of which it may arrive at further things. If it went to the truth by itself, if it could comprehend the nature of the whole world, I should say it would contribute much to our minds, which grow by the treatment of heavenly things and draw something from on high. The mind is consummated by one thing, the immutable knowledge of good and evil; but no other art seeks anything concerning good and evil.
- 88.19quam maiores nostri rectam exercuerunt
The relative pronoun quam refers to iuventuti nostrae (our youth, feminine singular). The adjective rectam is accusative feminine singular, functioning predicatively with the relative pronoun in the accusative. It means 'upright' or 'straight (correctly)' and stands in contrast with the following iacentibus (those lying down, the lazy).
- 88.22His adnumeres licet machinatores
An impersonal construction of licet (it is permitted) taking the second-person singular present subjunctive adnumeres. His is a dative meaning 'to these (arts)', and machinatores (mechanics, accusative plural) is the direct object of adnumeres.
- 88.24geometriae testimonio statur
statur is the impersonal passive of the intransitive verb stare (to stand, rely on). testimonio is an ablative of means (by the testimony), and geometriae is a genitive. It means 'reliance is placed on the testimony of geometry'.
- 88.28mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficiaria est
superficiaria is an adjective derived from Roman law, referring to superficies (the right to a building on another's land). It is a metaphorical expression indicating that mathematics does not possess its own independent principles, but is built upon the axioms and assumptions of another (philosophy), like a building erected on someone else's land.