- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:85.1-85.8
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-06
Seneca criticizes the use of trivial logical arguments and refutes the Peripatetic view that a wise man should possess moderated passions, asserting the Stoic stance that a wise man must be completely free from them.
Peperceram tibi et quicquid nodosi adhuc supererat, praeterieram, contentus quasi gustum tibi dare eorum, quae a nostris dicuntur, ut probetur virtus ad explendam beatam vitam sola satis efficax. Iubes me quicquid est interrogationum aut nostrarum aut ad traductionem nostram excogitatarum comprendere. Quod si facere voluero, non erit epistula, sed liber. Illud totiens testor, hoc me argumentorum genere non delectari. Pudet in aciem descendere pro dis hominibusque susceptam subula armatum.1
I had spared you and had passed over whatever of difficulty still remained, content to give you as it were a taste of those things which are said by our school, so that it might be proved that virtue alone is sufficiently effective for completing a happy life. You bid me encompass whatever there is of syllogisms, either ours or devised for our refutation. But if I should wish to do this, it will not be a letter, but a book. I testify this so many times, that I am not delighted by this kind of arguments. It is shameful to descend into the battle-line undertaken for gods and men, armed with a cobbler’s awl.
" Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans est, et constans. Qui constans est, inperturbatus est. Qui inperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est; ergo prudens beatus est et prudentia ad beatam vitam satis est."
”He who is prudent is also temperate. He who is temperate is also constant. He who is constant is unperturbed. He who is unperturbed is without sadness. He who is without sadness is happy; therefore, the prudent man is happy, and prudence is sufficient for a happy life.”
Huic collectioni hoc modo Peripatetici quidam respondent, ut inperturbatum et constantem et sine tristitia sic interpretentur, tamquam inperturbatus dicatur, qui raro perturbatur et modice, non qui numquam. Item sine tristitia eum dici aiunt, qui non est obnoxius tristitiae nec frequens nimiusve in hoc vitio. Illud enim humanam naturam negare,2 alicuius animum inmunem esse tristitia. Sapientem non vinci maerore, ceterum tangi. Et cetera in hunc modum sectae suae respondentia.
To this syllogism certain Peripatetics reply in this way, so that they interpret “unperturbed” and “constant” and “without sadness” as if “unperturbed” were said of one who is rarely and moderately perturbed, not who is never. Likewise they say that he is said to be “without sadness” who is not subject to sadness nor frequent or excessive in this vice. For to say that anyone’s mind is immune from sadness is to deny human nature. The wise man is not conquered by sorrow, but he is touched by it. And other things in this manner corresponding to their sect.
Non his tollunt adfectus, sed temperant. Quantulum autem sapienti damus, si inbecillissimis fortior est et maestissimis laetior et effrenatissimis moderatior et humillimis maior? Quid, si miretur velocitatem suam Ladas ad claudos debilesque respiciens? Illa vel intactae segetis3 per summa volaret Gramina nec cursu teneras laesisset aristas, Vel mare per medium fluctu suspensa tumenti Ferret iter celeres nec tingueret aequore plantas. Haec est pernicitas per se aestimata, non quae tardissimorum conlatione laudatur. Quid, si sanum voces leviter febricitantem? Non est bona valitudo mediocritas morbi. "
By these they do not remove the passions, but moderate them. But how little do we grant to the wise man, if he is only stronger than the weakest, happier than the saddest, more moderate than the most unbridled, and greater than the lowest? What if Ladas should admire his own speed, looking back at the lame and the weak? “She would fly over the topmost blades of an untouched crop, nor would she have harmed the tender ears of wheat in her course; or, suspended on the swelling wave, she would make her way through the midst of the sea, nor would she wet her swift soles in the water.” This is swiftness estimated by itself, not that which is praised by comparison with the slowest. What if you should call him healthy who has a slight fever? Good health is not a moderation of disease.
Sic," inquit, "sapiens inperturbatus dicitur, quomodo apyrina dicuntur, non quibus nulla inest duritia granorum, sed quibus minor." Falsum est. Non enim deminutionem malorum in bono viro intellego, sed vacationem; nulla debent esse, non parva. Nam si ulla sunt, crescent et interim inpedient. Quomodo oculos maior et perfecta suffusio excaecat, sic modica turbat.
”Just so,” he says, “the wise man is said to be unperturbed, as certain pomegranates are said to be seedless, not in which there is no hardness of seeds, but in which there is less.” It is false. For I do not understand a diminution of evils in a good man, but a freedom from them; they ought not to be small, but to be non-existent. For if there are any, they will grow and in the meantime will hinder. Just as a larger and complete cataract blinds the eyes, so a moderate one disturbs them.
Si das aliquos adfectus sapienti, inpar illis erit ratio et velut torrente quodam auferetur, praesertim cum illi non unum adfectum des, cum quo conluctetur, sed omnis. Plus potest quamvis mediocrium turba quam posset unius magni violentia.
If you grant some passions to the wise man, reason will be unequal to them and will be carried away as if by a torrent, especially since you do not give him one passion with which to struggle, but all of them. A crowd of even moderate passions is more powerful than the violence of a single great one could be.
Habet pecuniae cupiditatem, sed modicam. Habet ambitionem, sed non concitatam. Habet iracundiam, sed placabilem. Habet inconstantiam, sed minus vagam ac mobilem. Habet libidinem non insanam. Melius cum illo ageretur,4 qui unum vitium integrum haberet, quam cum eo, qui leviora quidem, sed omnia.
He has a desire for money, but a moderate one. He has ambition, but not excited. He has anger, but placable. He has inconstancy, but less wandering and unstable. He has a passion that is not insane. It would be better for him who had one entire vice than for him who had lighter ones, but all of them.
Deinde nihil interest, quam magnus sit adfectus; quantumcumque est, parere nescit, consilium non accipit. Quemadmodum rationi nullum animal optemperat, non ferum, non domesticum et mite, natura enim illorum est surda suadenti; sic non secuntur, non audiunt adfectus, quantulicumque sunt. Tigres leonesque numquam feritatem exuunt, aliquando summittunt, et cum minime expectaveris, exasperatur torvitas mitigata. Numquam bona fide vitia mansuescunt.
Next, it makes no difference how great the passion is; however much it is, it does not know how to obey, and it does not receive advice. Just as no animal obeys reason, neither a wild one, nor a domestic and gentle one, for their nature is deaf to persuasion; so passions, however small they are, do not follow, do not listen. Tigers and lions never strip off their wildness, sometimes they submit it, and when you least expect it, their mitigated fierceness is exasperated. Vices are never tamed in good faith.
- 85.1subula armatum
The combination of subula (a cobbler's awl, a small sharp tool) and armatum (armed, acc. sing. masc. modifying the implied subject Seneca) symbolizes the absurdity of using trivial and excessively fine logical arguments (interrogatio) in a grand battle (in aciem... pro dis hominibusque).
- 85.3Illud enim humanam naturam negare
An accusative with infinitive construction in indirect speech. The subject is the neuter demonstrative pronoun Illud ("the following thing"), the predicate infinitive is negare, and its object/accusative subject is the clause alicuius animum inmunem esse tristitia ("that anyone's mind is immune from sadness").
- 85.4Illa vel intactae segetis...
A quotation from Vergil's Aeneid (7.808-811). It describes the supernatural swiftness of Camilla and is used here as a metaphor for absolute swiftness (pernicitas per se aestimata), independent of comparison.
- 85.7Melius cum illo ageretur
The imperfect subjunctive of the impersonal expression bene/melius agitur cum aliquo ("it goes well/better with someone" or "someone is better off"). It functions as the apodosis of a contrary-to-fact conditional sentence ("it would be better for him if...").