- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:81.9-81.16
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-06
The passage discusses the essential voluntariness of "returning gratitude" through linguistic distinctions, arguing that only the wise man truly understands gratitude, love, and loyalty, and that contextual circumstances and personal relationships must be weighed when comparing benefits and injuries.
Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis et officia docentibus notis signat. Sic certe solemus loqui: "ille illi gratiam rettulit." Referre est ultro, quod debeas, adferre. Non dicimus "gratiam reddidit," reddunt enim et qui reposcuntur et qui inviti et qui ubilibet et qui per alium. Non dicimus "reposuit beneficium" aut "solvit"; nullum nobis placuit, quod aeri alieno convenit, verbum.
The propriety of words in certain things is wonderful, and the custom of ancient speech designates some things with extremely effective signs that teach duties. Surely we are accustomed to speak thus: “he returned gratitude to him.” To return is to bring back voluntarily what you owe. We do not say “he returned gratitude,” for those also return who are demanded back, and those who are unwilling, and those in any place whatsoever, and those through another. We do not say “he replaced the benefit” or “he paid”; no word pleased us which belongs to debt.
Referre est ad eum, a quo acceperis, rem ferre. Haec vox significat voluntariam relationem; qui rettulit, ipse se appellavit.1 Sapiens omnia examinabit secum: quantum acceperit, a quo, quando, ubi, quemadmodum. Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem; non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens, hic scilicet, qui magis dato gaudet quam alius accepto.
To return is to carry the thing to him from whom you received it. This word signifies a voluntary return; he who has returned has summoned himself. The wise man will examine all things with himself: how much he received, from whom, when, where, in what manner. Therefore we deny that anyone knows how to return gratitude except the wise man; no more than anyone knows how to give a benefit except the wise man, he namely, who rejoices more in the giving than another in the receiving.
Hoc aliquis inter illa numerat, quae videmur inopinata omnibus dicere, παράδοξα Graeci vocant, et ait: "Nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam? Ergo nec quod debet, creditori suo reponere quisquam scit alius nec, cum emit aliquam rem, pretium venditori persolvere? "Ne nobis fiat invidia, scito idem dicere Epicurum. Metrodorus certe ait solum sapientem referre gratiam scire Deinde idem admiratur, cum dicimus: "Solus sapiens scit amare. Solus sapiens amicus est." Atqui et amoris et amicitiae pars est referre gratiam, immo hoc magis vulgare est et in plures cadit quam vera amicitia. Deinde idem admiratur, quod dicimus fidem nisi in sapiente non esse, tamquam non ipse idem dicat. An tibi videtur fidem habere, qui referre gratiam nescit?
Someone numbers this among those things which we seem to say contrary to everyone’s opinion, which the Greeks call paradoxes, and says: “Does no one, then, except the wise man know how to return gratitude? Then does no one else know how to repay to his creditor what he owes, nor, when he buys something, to pay the price to the seller?” Lest hatred be directed at us, know that Epicurus says the same thing. Metrodorus certainly says that the wise man alone knows how to return gratitude. Then the same person wonders when we say: “Only the wise man knows how to love. Only the wise man is a friend.” And yet to return gratitude is a part of both love and friendship; indeed, this is more common and falls upon more people than true friendship. Then the same person wonders at our saying that there is no loyalty except in the wise man, as if he himself did not say the same thing. Or does he seem to you to have loyalty, who does not know how to return gratitude?
Desinant itaque infamare nos tam quam incredibilia iactantes et sciant apud sapientem esse ipsa honesta, apud vulgum simulacra rerum honestarum et effigies. Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens. Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; scientia illi potius quam voluntas desit. Velle non discitur.
Therefore let them cease to defame us as if we were boasting of incredible things, and let them know that with the wise man are the honorable things themselves, but with the crowd are the shadows and images of honorable things. No one knows how to return gratitude except the wise man. Let the fool also return it, however he knows and in whatever way he can; let knowledge rather than will be lacking to him. To will is not learned.
Sapiens inter se omnia conparabit, maius enim aut minus fit, quamvis idem sit, tempore, loco, causa, Saepe enim hoc non potuere divitiae in domum infusae, quod opportune dati mille denarii. Multum enim interest, donaveris an succurreris, servaverit illum tua liberalitas an instruxerit. Saepe quod datur, exiguum est, quod sequitur ex eo, magnum. Quantum autem existimas interesse, utrum aliquis quod derat a se, quod praestabat, sumpserit2 an beneficium acceperit ut daret?
The wise man will compare all things among themselves; for a thing becomes greater or smaller, though it be the same, by time, place, and cause. For often riches poured into a house could not do this, which a thousand denarii given opportunely did. For it makes a great difference whether you have given a gift or brought help, whether your generosity has saved him or equipped him. Often what is given is small, but what follows from it is great. But how great a difference do you think it makes, whether someone took from himself what was lacking, which he performed, or received a benefit in order to give?
Sed ne in eadem, quae satis scrutati sumus, revolvamur. In hac conparatione beneficii et iniuriae vir bonus iudicabit quidem quod erit aequissimum, sed beneficio favebit; in hanc erit partem proclivior.
But lest we roll back into the same things, which we have sufficiently examined. In this comparison of benefit and injury, the good man indeed will judge what will be most fair, but he will favor the benefit; he will be more inclined to this side.
Plurimum autem momenti persona solet adferre in rebus eiusmodi: "Dedisti mihi beneficium in servo, iniuriam fecisti in patre. Servasti mihi filium, sed patrem abstulisti." Alia deinceps, per quae procedit omnis conlatio, prosequitur et, si pusillum erit, quod intersit, dissimulabit. Etiam si multum fuerit, sed si id donari salva pietate ac fide3 poterit, remittet; id est, si ad ipsum tota pertinebit iniuria.
But person usually brings the most weight in matters of this kind: “You gave me a benefit in the case of a slave, you did me an injury in the case of my father. You saved my son, but you took away my father.” He pursues other things in turn, through which all comparison proceeds, and if what difference there is is tiny, he will disregard it. Even if it is much, but if it can be forgiven without violating piety and loyalty, he will remit it; that is, if the injury belongs entirely to himself.
- 81.10ipse se appellavit
The verb appellare in a legal context means "to call upon a debtor for payment" or "to demand fulfillment of an obligation." Thus, this phrase indicates that the act of returning gratitude (gratiam referre) is not prompted by a creditor's demand, but is a voluntary obligation self-imposed by one's own conscience.
- 81.14utrum aliquis quod derat a se, quod praestabat, sumpserit
Within the indirect question introduced by utrum, quod derat (what was lacking) serves as the object of sumpserit, modified by a se (from himself). The clause quod praestabat (that which he was providing) functions in apposition to specify quod derat. The phrase contrasts procuring what was lacking from one's own resources with receiving a benefit from another to pass it on.
- 81.16salva pietate ac fide
An ablative absolute construction (or ablative of attendant circumstances) consisting of the adjective salvus (unharmed, intact) and the nouns pietas (affection, piety) and fides (loyalty, faith) in the ablative case. It expresses the condition under which forgiveness is possible: "without violating affection and good faith."
