- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:76.10-76.17
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-05
The author argues that reason is man's proper good, and that perfected reason (virtue) is the only true good, illustrating this with practical analogies of a ship and a sword to show that only virtue improves the soul and brings happiness.
Quid in homine proprium? Ratio. Haec recta et consummata felicitatem hominis implevit. Ergo si omnis res, cum bonum suum perfecit, laudabilis est et ad finem naturae suae pervenit; homini autem suum bonum ratio est; si hanc perfecit, laudabilis est et finem naturae suae tetigit. Haec ratio perfecta virtus vocatur eademque honestum est.
What is proper in man? Reason. This, when right and completed, has filled up the happiness of man. Therefore, if every thing, when it has perfected its own good, is praiseworthy and reaches the end of its nature; and since man’s own good is reason; if he has perfected this, he is praiseworthy and has touched the end of his nature. This perfected reason is called virtue, and the same is what is honorable.
Id itaque unum bonum est in homine, quod unum hominis est. Nunc enim non quaerimus, quid sit bonum, sed quid sit hominis bonum. Si nullum aliud est hominis quam ratio, haec erit unum eius bonum, sed pensandum cum omnibus.1 Si sit aliquis malus, puto improbabitur; si bonus, puto probabitur. Id ergo in homine primum solumque est, quo et probatur et inprobatur.
That, therefore, is the one good in man, which is the one thing belonging to man. For now we are not asking what is good, but what is the good of man. If there is no other thing belonging to man than reason, this will be his one good, though it must be weighed with all other things. If anyone should be bad, I think he will be disapproved; if good, I think he will be approved. That, therefore, is the first and only thing in man by which he is both approved and disapproved.
Non dubitas, an hoc sit bonum; dubitas an solum bonum sit. Si quis omnia alia habeat, valetudinem, divitias, imagines multas, frequens atrium, sed malus ex confesso sit, inprobabis illum. Item si quis nihil quidem eorum, quae rettuli, habeat, deficiatur pecunia, clientium turba, nobilitate et avorum proavorumque serie, sed ex confesso bonus sit, probabis illum. Ergo hoc unum est bonum hominis, quod qui habet, etiam si aliis destituitur laudandus est, quod qui non habet, in omnium aliorum copia damnatur ac reicitur.2
You do not doubt whether this is a good; you doubt whether it is the only good. If anyone should have all other things, health, wealth, many family portraits, a crowded hall, but should be confessedly bad, you will disapprove of him. Likewise, if anyone should have indeed none of those things which I have mentioned, should be lacking in money, a crowd of clients, nobility, and a series of grandfathers and great-grandfathers, but should be confessedly good, you will approve of him. Therefore, this is the one good of man, which he who has, even if he is destitute of other things, is to be praised, and he who has not, in the abundance of all other things, is condemned and rejected.
Quae condicio rerum, eadem hominum est. Navis bona dicitur non quae pretiosis coloribus picta est nec cui argenteum aut aureum rostrum est nec cuius tutela ebore caelata est nec quae fiscis atque opibus regiis pressa est, sed stabilis et firma et iuncturis aquam excludentibus spissa, ad ferendum incursum maris solida, gubernaculo parens, velox et non sentiens ventum.
The condition of things is the same as that of men. A ship is said to be good not because it is painted with precious colors, nor because it has a silver or golden beak, nor because its tutelary deity is carved in ivory, nor because it is laden with treasures and royal wealth, but because it is steady and firm, tight with joints that exclude water, solid to bear the onset of the sea, obedient to the rudder, swift and not feeling the wind.
Gladium bonum dices non cui auratus est balteus nec cuius vagina gemmis distinguitur, sed cui et ad secandum subtilis acies est et mucro munimentum omne rupturus. Regula non quam formosa, sed quam recta sit quaeritur. Eo quidque laudatur, cui comparatur, quod illi proprium est.3
You will say a sword is good not if it has a gilded belt, nor if its sheath is distinguished with gems, but if it has a sharp edge for cutting and a point that will break through every defense. A ruler is sought not for how beautiful it is, but for how straight it is. Each thing is praised for that to which it is compared, which is proper to it.
Ergo in homine quoque nihil ad rem pertinet, quantum aret, quantum faeneret, a quam multis salutetur, quam pretioso incumbat lecto, quam perlucido poculo bibat, sed quam bonus sit. Bonus autem est, si ratio eius explicita et recta est et ad naturae suae voluntatem accommodata.
Therefore in man also, it is of no relevance how much he plows, how much he lends at interest, by how many he is saluted, on how precious a bed he reclines, from how transparent a cup he drinks, but how good he is. And he is good if his reason is unfolded and right, and adapted to the will of his nature.
Haec vocatur virtus, hoc est honestum et unicum hominis bonum. Nam cum sola ratio perficiat hominem, sola ratio perfecta beatum facit; hoc autem unum bonum est, quo uno beatus edicitur. Dicimus et illa bona esse, quae a virtute profecta contractaque sunt, id est opera eius omnia; sed ideo unum ipsa bonum est, quia nullum sine illa est.
This is called virtue; this is what is honorable and the only good of man. For since reason alone perfects man, perfected reason alone makes him happy; and this is the one good by which alone a man is declared happy. We also say that those things are goods which have proceeded and been derived from virtue, that is, all its works; but for this reason virtue itself is the one good, because there is no good without it.
Si omne in animo bonum est, quicquid illum confirmat, extollit, amplificat, bonum est; validiorem autem animum et excelsiorem et ampliorem facit virtus. Nam cetera, quae cupiditates nostras inritant, deprimunt quoque animum et labefaciunt et, cum videntur adtollere, inflant ac multa vanitate deludunt. Ergo unum id bonum est, quo melior animus efficietur.
If every good is in the soul, whatever strengthens, elevates, and enlarges it is a good; but virtue makes the soul stronger, more elevated, and more enlarged. For other things, which excite our desires, also depress the soul and weaken it, and, when they seem to lift it up, they puff it up and deceive it with much vanity. Therefore, that is the one good by which the soul will be made better.
- 76.11pensandum cum omnibus
pensandum is a gerundive used here impersonally, expressing the obligation or necessity that 'it (man's proper good) must be weighed in comparison with all other things.'
- 76.12quod qui habet, etiam si aliis destituitur laudandus est, quod qui non habet, in omnium aliorum copia damnatur ac reicitur
A complex nested structure where the connecting relative quod (referring to bonum) serves as the direct object within a clause whose subject is a noun clause introduced by another relative qui ('he who'). Thus, qui habet ('he who has [it]') functions as the subject of laudandus est ('is to be praised'). The same structure applies to the second half: quod qui non habet...
- 76.14Eo quidque laudatur, cui comparatur, quod illi proprium est
The pronoun Eo is an ablative of cause/means ('by that') and stands in apposition to the subsequent relative clause quod illi proprium est ('that which is proper to it'). cui comparatur is a relative clause meaning 'for which it is matched / to which it is compared,' where the antecedent of cui is quidque.