Timely Advice and Virtue as the Supreme Good — Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius 71.1–71.8, Latin & English

§71.1

Subinde me de rebus singulis consulis oblitus vasto nos mari dividi.¹ Cum magna pars consilii sit in tempore, necesse est evenire, ut de quibusdam rebus tunc ad te perferatur sententia mea, cum iam contraria potior est. Consilia enim rebus aptantur. Res nostrae feruntur, immo volvuntur. Ergo consilium nasci sub diem debet; et hoc quoque nimis tardum est; sub manu, quod aiunt, nascatur. Quemadmodum autem inveniatur, ostendam.

From time to time you consult me about individual matters, forgetting that we are divided by a vast sea. Since a great part of advice depends on timing, it must happen that my opinion on certain matters is brought to you at a time when already the opposite course is preferable. For plans are adapted to circumstances. Our affairs are carried along, indeed they roll along. Therefore advice ought to be born just at the day of action; and this too is too slow; let it be born, as they say, ‘at hand’. But how it may be found, I shall show.

§71.2

Quotiens, quid fugiendum sit aut quid petendum, voles scire, ad summum bonum, propositum totius vitae tuae, respice. Illi enim consentire debet, quicquid agimus; non disponet singula, nisi cui iam vitae suae summa proposita est. Nemo, quamvis paratos habeat colores, similitudinem reddet, nisi iam constat, quid velit pingere. Ideo peccamus, quia de partibus vitae omnes deliberamus, de tota nemo deliberat.

Whenever you wish to know what is to be avoided or what is to be sought, look to the supreme good, the purpose of your whole life. For whatever we do must agree with that; he will not arrange single details unless the sum of his life has already been set before him. No one, although he has his colors ready, will produce a likeness unless it is already established what he wishes to paint. For this reason we err, because we all deliberate about parts of life, but about the whole no one deliberates.

§71.3

Scire debet quid petat ille, qui sagittam vult mittere, et tunc derigere ac moderari manu telum. Errant consilia nostra, quia non habent, quo derigantur. Ignorant,² quem portum petat, nullus suus ventus est. Necesse est multum in vita nostra casus possit, quia vivimus casu.

He who wishes to shoot an arrow must know what he is aiming at, and then direct and control his weapon with his hand. Our plans wander because they do not have a mark to be directed towards. For one who is ignorant of which port he is seeking, no wind is his own. It is necessary that chance has great power in our life, because we live by chance.

§71.4

Quibusdam autem evenit, ut quaedam scire se nesciant. Quemadmodum quaerimus saepe eos, cum quibus stamus, ita plerumque finem summi boni ignoramus adpositum. Nec multis verbis nec circumitu longo, quod sit summum bonum, colliges; digito, ut ita dicam, demonstrandum est nec in multa spargendum. Quid enim ad rem pertinet in particulas illud diducere, cum possis dicere: summum bonum est, quod honestum est? Et quod magis admireris: unum bonum est, quod honestum est, cetera falsa et adulterina bona sunt.

But it happens to some that they do not know that they know certain things. Just as we often look for those with whom we are standing, so for the most part we are ignorant of the goal of the supreme good which lies close at hand. You will gather what the supreme good is neither with many words nor with a long roundabout way; it must be pointed out with a finger, so to speak, and not scattered into many details. For what does it matter to divide that into small parts, when you can say: the supreme good is what is honorable? And what you may admire more: there is only one good, which is honorable; other things are false and counterfeit goods.

§71.5

Hoc si persuaseris tibi et virtutem adamaveris, amare enim parum est, quicquid illa contigerit, id tibi, qualecumque aliis videbitur, faustum felixque erit. Et torqueri, si modo iacueris ipso torquente securior, et aegrotare, si non male dixeris fortunae, si non cesseris morbo, omnia denique, quae ceteris videntur mala, et mansuescent et in bonum abibunt, si super illa eminueris. Hoc liqueat, nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, et omnia incommoda suo iure bona vocabuntur, quae modo virtus honestaverit.

If you convince yourself of this and fall in love with virtue—for to love is not enough—whatever she touches, that will be favorable and happy for you, of whatever kind it seems to others. And to be tortured—if only you lie there more secure than the torturer himself—and to be sick—if you do not curse fortune, if you do not yield to the disease—finally, all things which seem bad to others will both grow mild and pass into good, if you rise above them. Let this be clear, that nothing is good except the honorable, and all disadvantages will by their own right be called goods, provided only that virtue has made them honorable.

§71.6

Multis videmur maiora promittere quam recipit humana condicio; non inmerito. Ad corpus enim respiciunt. Revertantur ad animum; iam hominem deo metientur. Erige te, Lucili virorum optime, et relinque istum ludum literarium philosophorum, qui rem magnificentissimam ad syllabas vocant, qui animum minuta docendo demittunt et conterunt; fies similis illis, qui invenerunt ista, non qui docent et id agunt, ut philosophia potius difficilis quam magna videatur.

To many we seem to promise greater things than human condition admits; and not without reason. For they look to the body. Let them return to the mind; then they will measure man by God. Raise yourself up, Lucilius, best of men, and leave that schoolroom of philosophers who summon the most magnificent thing to syllables, who lower and wear down the mind by teaching minute things; you will become like those who found these things, not those who teach them and make it their aim that philosophy should seem difficult rather than great.

§71.7

Socrates qui totam philosophiam revocavit ad mores et hanc summam dixit esse sapientiam, bona malaque distinguere, "sequere," inquit, "illos, si quid apud te habeo auctoritatis, ut sis beatus, et te alicui stultum videri sine. Quisquis volet, tibi contumeliam faciat et iniuriam, tu tamen nihil patieris, si modo tecum erit virtus. Si vis," inquit, "beatus esse, si fide bona vir bonus, sine contemnat te aliquis.³" Hoc nemo praestabit, nisi qui omnia bona exaequaverit, quia nec bonum sine honesto est et honestum in omnibus par est. "

Socrates, who recalled the whole of philosophy to morals and said that this is the highest wisdom, to distinguish good and bad things, says: “follow those men, if I have any authority with you, so that you may be happy, and allow yourself to seem foolish to someone. Let whoever wishes do insult and injury to you, yet you will suffer nothing, provided only that virtue is with you. If you wish,” he says, “to be happy, if a good man in good faith, allow someone to despise you.” No one will guarantee this, except one who has made all goods equal, because there is no good without the honorable, and the honorable is equal in all things.

§71.8

Quid ergo? Nihil interest inter praeturam Catonis et repulsam? Nihil interest, utrum Pharsalica acie Cato vincatur an vincat? Hoc eius bonum, quo victis partibus non potest vinci,⁴ par erat illi bono, quo victor rediret in patriam et conponeret pacem?" Quidni par sit? Eadem enim virtute et mala fortuna vincitur et ordinatur bona. Virtus autem non potest maior aut minor fieri; unius staturae est."

”What then? Is there no difference between Cato’s praetorship and his rejection? Is there no difference whether Cato is defeated in the battle of Pharsalus or wins? Was this good of his, by which, though his party was defeated, he could not be defeated, equal to that good by which he might return as victor to his country and arrange peace?” Why should it not be equal? For by the same virtue both bad fortune is conquered and good fortune is ordered. But virtue cannot become greater or smaller; it is of one stature.

Syntax notes4 items

71.1oblitus vasto nos mari dividi
The perfect participle oblitus (from the deponent verb obliviscor) agrees with the subject of the main verb consulis (2nd person singular) and governs the accusative-and-infinitive clause vasto nos mari dividi (where nos is the accusative subject and dividi is the passive infinitive).
71.3Ignorant
Many editions emend this to ignoranti (the dative singular of the present participle ignorans, meaning 'to one who is ignorant'). Although the text reads ignorant (3rd person plural), the overall syntax and context of this famous maxim ('for one who does not know which port he is seeking, no wind is favorable') require a dative sense, which is maintained across all translations.
71.7sine contemnat te aliquis
The imperative second-person singular sine (from sinere, 'allow') is followed directly by the present subjunctive contemnat (3rd person singular) without the conjunction ut. This represents a paratactic subjunctive of command/concession: 'allow that someone despise you.'
71.8quo victis partibus non potest vinci
The ablative relative pronoun quo indicates means or cause ('by which'). Inside this clause, victis partibus functions as an ablative absolute ('even though his party was defeated'), emphasizing that Cato's personal virtue cannot be conquered by external political defeat.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25)urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:71.1-71.8