- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:70.1-70.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-05
Visiting Lucilius' Pompeii, the author reflects on his youth and compares life to a voyage, declaring death to be a harbor rather than a reef. He argues that the wise man values living well over merely living long, discussing the right to end one's own life and the proper attitude toward death.
Post longum intervallum Pompeios tuos vidi. In conspectum adulescentiae meae reductus sum. Quicquid illic iuvenis feceram, videbar mihi facere adhuc posse1 et paulo ante fecisse.
After a long interval, I saw your Pompeii. I was brought back to the sight of my youth. Whatever I had done there as a young man, I seemed to myself still to be able to do and to have done just a little while ago.
Praenavigavimus, Lucili, vitam et quemadmodum in mari, ut ait Vergilius noster, "Terraeque urbesque recedant," sic in hoc cursu rapidissimi temporis primum pueritiam abscondimus, deinde adulescentiam, deinde quidquid est illud inter iuvenem et senem medium, in utriusque confinio positum, deinde ipsius senectutis optimos annos. Novissime incipit ostendi publicus finis generis humani.
We have sailed past life, Lucilius, and just as on the sea, as our Virgil says, “Lands and cities recede,” so in this course of swift-flowing time, first we hide childhood, then youth, then whatever that middle period is between youth and old age, placed on the border of both, then the best years of old age itself. Last of all, the common end of the human race begins to show itself.
Scopulum esse illum putamus dementissimi; portus est, aliquando petendus, numquam recusandus, in quem si quis intra primos annos delatus est, non magis queri debet quam qui cito navigavit. Alium enim, ut scis, venti segnes ludunt ac detinent et tranquillitatis lentissimae taedio lassant, alium pertinax flatus celerrime perfert.
We, most foolishly, think that that is a reef; it is a harbor, to be sought at some time, never to be refused, into which if anyone has been carried within his first years, he ought no more to complain than one who has sailed quickly. For, as you know, slow winds play with and detain one man, and weary him with the boredom of a most sluggish calm, while a persistent breeze carries another along most swiftly.
Idem evenire nobis puta: alios vita velocissime adduxit, quo veniendum erat etiam cunctantibus, alios maceravit et coxit. Quae, ut scis, non semper retinenda est. Non enim vivere bonum est, sed bene vivere. Itaque sapiens vivit, quantum debet, non quantum potest.
Think that the same happens to us: life has brought some most swiftly to the place where even the hesitating had to come, while it has worn out and parched others. Life, as you know, is not always to be retained. For it is not living that is good, but living well. Therefore, the wise man lives as long as he ought, not as long as he can.
Videbit ubi victurus sit, cum quibus, quomodo, quid acturus. Cogitat semper, qualis vita, non quanta sit. Si multa occurrunt molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittit se. Nec hoc tantum in necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi coepit suspecta esse fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid ideo desinendum sit. Nihil existimat sua referre,2 faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an citius. Non tamquam de magno detrimento timet; nemo multum ex stilicidio potest perdere.
He will see where he is to live, with whom, how, and what he is to do. He always reflects on what quality his life is, not how great. If many troublesome things occur and disturb his peace, he lets himself out. Nor does he do this only in extreme necessity, but as soon as fortune begins to be suspect to him, he carefully looks around to see whether he should end it there. He thinks it of no concern to himself whether he makes an end or receives it, whether it happens later or sooner. He does not fear as if regarding a great loss; no one can lose much from a dripping vessel.
Citius mori aut tardius ad rem non pertinet, bene mori aut male ad rem pertinet. Bene autem mori est effugere male vivendi periculum. Itaque effeminatissimam vocem illius Rhodii existimo, qui cum in caveam coniectus esset a tyranno et tamquam ferum aliquod animal aleretur, suadenti cuidam, ut abstineret cibo: "omnia," inquit, "homini, dum vivit, speranda sunt."
To die sooner or later is of no relevance; to die well or ill is of relevance. Moreover, to die well is to escape the danger of living ill. Therefore, I consider that utterance of the Rhodian to be most effeminate, who, when he had been thrown into a cage by a tyrant and was fed like some wild beast, said to someone advising him to abstain from food: “A man must hope for everything as long as he lives.”
Ut sit hoc verum,3 non omni pretio vita emenda est. Quaedam licet magna, licet certa sint, tamen ad illa turpi infirmitatis confessione non veniam. Ego cogitem in eo, qui vivit, omnia posse fortunam, potius quam cogitem in eo, qui scit mori, nil posse fortunam?
Even though this may be true, life is not to be bought at any price. Though some things may be great and certain, yet I will not come to them by a shameful confession of weakness. Should I think that fortune can do everything to one who lives, rather than that fortune can do nothing to one who knows how to die?
Aliquando tamen, etiam si certa mors instabit et destinatum sibi supplicium sciet, non commodabit poenae suae manum; sibi commodaret.4 Stultitia est timore mortis mori. Venit qui occidat. Expecta. Quid occupas? Quare suscipis alienae crudelitatis procurationem? Utrum invides carnifici tuo an parcis?
Sometimes, however, even if certain death is imminent and he knows the punishment destined for him, he will not lend his hand to his own punishment; he would be lending it to himself. It is folly to die from fear of death. The executioner is coming. Wait. Why do you forestall him? Why do you take upon yourself the management of another’s cruelty? Do you envy your executioner or spare him?
Socrates potuit abstinentia finire vitam et inedia potius quam veneno mori. Triginta tamen dies in carcere et in expectatione mortis exegit, non hoc animo tamquam omnia fieri possent, tamquam multas spes tam longum tempus reciperet, sed ut praeberet se legibus, ut fruendum amicis extremum Socraten daret. Quid erat stultius quam mortem contemnere, venenum timere?
Socrates could have ended his life by abstinence and died of hunger rather than poison. Yet he spent thirty days in prison and in expectation of death, not with the mind that everything could happen, as if so long a time could receive many hopes, but to offer himself to the laws, to give his friends the final Socrates to enjoy. What was more foolish than to despise death and fear poison?
- 70.1videbar mihi facere adhuc posse
A personal construction of the verb videor (with the subject ego implied), taking the nominative infinitives facere posse and fecisse. Literally, 'I seemed to myself to be able to do,' where mihi is the dative of reference indicating the person who holds the opinion.
- 70.5sua referre
An idiomatic construction with the impersonal verb refert ('it concerns/matters'). When the person concerned is expressed by a pronoun, the feminine ablative singular of the possessive adjective (meā, tuā, suā, etc.) is used instead of the genitive. The logical subject of refert is the indirect question clause that follows.
- 70.7Ut sit hoc verum
The conjunction ut with the present subjunctive sit introduces a concessive clause ('granted that this is true' or 'even though this may be true'). It is used to provisionally grant the premise of the Rhodian's saying.
- 70.8sibi commodaret
The imperfect subjunctive commodaret expresses the apodosis of a conditional sentence with the protasis implied (an unreal condition, or potential potentiality: 'if he were to do so, he would be lending it to himself'). It implies that he will not help the executioner unless by doing so he is actually serving his own interest (to escape prolonged torture, etc.).