- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:67.7-67.16
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-05
Seneca argues that to wish for an honorable life is to wish for it including the hardships and self-sacrifices that accompany it. He concludes the letter by asserting that true virtue shines in adversity, and that enduring it bravely is indeed good and desirable.
" Quis tamen umquam hoc sibi optavit? "Quaedam vota aperta et professa sunt, cum particulatim fiunt, quaedam latent, cum uno voto multa conprensa sunt. Tamquam opto mihi vitam honestam. Vita autem honesta actionibus variis constat; in hac est Reguli arca, Catonis scissum manu sua vulnus, Rutili exilium, calix venenatus, qui Socraten transtulit e carcere in caelum. Ita cum optavi mihi vitam honestam, et haec optavi, sine quibus interdum honesta non potest esse.
”Yet who ever wished this for himself?” (you will say). Some wishes are open and professed when they are made in detail; some are hidden when many things are comprehended in a single wish. For instance, I wish for myself an honorable life. But an honorable life consists of various actions; in this is the box of Regulus, the wound of Cato torn open by his own hand, the exile of Rutilius, the poisoned cup which transferred Socrates from prison to heaven. Therefore, when I wished for myself an honorable life, I also wished for these things, without which at times an honorable life cannot exist.
" O terque quaterque beati. Quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis Contigit oppetere!1" Quid interest, optes hoc alicui an optabile fuisse fatearis?
” O thrice and four times blessed, Whose lot it was to meet death before the faces of their fathers Under the high walls of Troy!” What difference does it make whether you wish this for someone or confess that it was desirable for them?
Decius se pro re publica devovit; in medios hostes concitato equo mortem petens inruit. Alter post hunc, paternae virtutis aemulus, conceptis sollemnibus ac iam familiaribus verbis in aciem confertissiman incucurrit, de hoc sollicitus tantum, ut litaret,2 optabilem rem putans bonam mortem. Dubitas ergo, an optimum sit memorabilem mori et in aliquo opere virtutis?
Decius devoted himself for the republic; spurring his horse, he rushed into the midst of the enemy, seeking death. Another after him, a rival of his father’s virtue, having pronounced the solemn and by now family-standard words, charged into the thickest of the battle line, concerned only about this, that his sacrifice might be acceptable, thinking a noble death a desirable thing. Do you doubt, then, whether it is best to die in a memorable way and in some work of virtue?
Cum aliquis tormenta fortiter patitur, omnibus virtutibus utitur. Fortasse una in promptu sit et maxime appareat patientia. Ceterum illic est fortitudo, cuius patientia et perpessio et tolerantia rami sunt. Illic est prudentia, sine qua nullum initur consilium, quae suadet, quod effugere non possis, quam fortissime ferre. Illic est constantia, quae deici loco non potest et propositum nulla vi extorquente dimittit. Illic est individuus ille comitatus virtutum: quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit, sed ex consilii sententia. Quod autem ab omnibus virtutibus conprobatur, etiam si ab una fieri videtur, optabile est.
When anyone endures tortures bravely, he makes use of all virtues. Perhaps one, namely patience, is in readiness and is most apparent. But there is courage, of which patience, endurance, and tolerance are branches. There is prudence, without which no plan is undertaken, which advises you to bear as bravely as possible what you cannot escape. There is constancy, which cannot be cast down from its position and abandons its purpose under no extorting force. There is that inseparable company of virtues: whatever is done honorably, a single virtue does it, but in accordance with the judgment of the council. But what is approved by all virtues, even if it seems to be done by one, is desirable.
Quid? Tu existimas ea tantum optabilia esse, quae per voluptatem et otium veniunt, quae excipiuntur foribus ornatis? Sunt quaedam tristis voltus bona. Sunt quaedam vota, quae non gratulantium coetu, sed adorantium venerantiumque celebrantur.
What? Do you think that those things only are desirable which come through pleasure and leisure, which are welcomed at decorated doors? There are some goods of a grim countenance. There are some wishes which are celebrated not by a crowd of people offering congratulations, but of those adoring and venerating.
Ita tu non putas Regulum optasse, ut ad Poenos perveniret? Indue magni viri animum et ab opinionibus volgi secede paulisper. Cape, quantam debes, virtutis pulcherrimae ac magnificentissimae speciem, quae nobis non ture nec sertis, sed sudore et sanguine colenda est.
So you do not think that Regulus wished to reach the Carthaginians? Put on the mind of a great man and withdraw for a little while from the opinions of the common crowd. Take, as fully as you ought, the likeness of that most beautiful and magnificent virtue, which must be worshiped by us not with incense or garlands, but with sweat and blood.
Adspice M. Catonem sacro illi pectori purissimas manus admoventem et vulnera parum alte demissa laxantem. Utrum tandem illi dicturus es "vellem quae velles3 "et "moleste fero" an "feliciter quod agis"?
Look at Marcus Cato applying his most pure hands to that sacred breast and tearing open the wounds that were not deep enough. Will you, pray, say to him “I could wish what you wished” and “I am sorry,” or “Success to what you do”?
Hoc loco mihi Demetrius noster occurrit, qui vitam securam et sine ullis fortunae incursionibus mare mortuum vocat. Nihil habere, ad quod exciteris, ad quod te concites, cuius denuntiatione et incursu firmitatem animi tui temptes, sed in otio inconcusso iacere non est tranquillitas; malacia est.
At this point our friend Demetrius occurs to me, who calls a life secure and without any incursions of fortune a “dead sea.” To have nothing to excite you, nothing to urge you on, nothing by whose threat and attack you may test the firmness of your mind, but to lie in undisturbed leisure, is not tranquility; it is a dead calm.
Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat: "malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in deliciis habeat. Torqueor, sed fortiter; bene est. Occidor, sed fortiter; bene est." Audi Epicurum, dicet et "dulce est." Ego tam honestae rei ac severae numquam molle nomen inponam.
Attalus the Stoic used to say: “I prefer that fortune keep me in its camp rather than in its pleasures. I am tortured, but bravely; it is well. I am killed, but bravely; it is well.” Listen to Epicurus; he will even say “It is sweet.” I will never bestow a soft name upon so honorable and severe a matter.
Uror, sed invictus. Quidni hoc optabile putem — non quod urit me ignis, sed quod non vincit? Nihil est virtute praestantius, nihil pulchrius. Et bonum est et optabile, quicquid ex huius geritur imperio. VALE.
I am burned, but undefeated. Why should I not think this desirable — not because the fire burns me, but because it does not conquer me? Nothing is more excellent than virtue, nothing more beautiful. Whatever is done under its command is both good and desirable. FAREWELL.
- 67.8Contigit oppetere
The verb contingit (to happen by luck) is used impersonally, taking the infinitive oppetere (to meet [death], perish) as its subject.
- 67.9ut litaret
The verb litare means "to obtain favorable omens, to make an acceptable sacrifice." Here, the purpose clause describes Decius's sole concern that his self-sacrifice (devotio) be accepted by the gods as an effective offering for the state's victory.
- 67.13vellem quae velles
The imperfect subjunctive vellem expresses a present unfulfilled wish or a polite, tentative desire ("I could wish"). This is a formulaic expression of sympathy, implying "I could wish for you what you yourself would wish (i.e., freedom from pain)."
