- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:66.35-66.44
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-05
Clarifies the difference between the faculties of reason and the senses, classifies goods into primary, secondary, and middle categories, and argues that even goods in adversity are equal through their alignment with nature, using the fundamental equality of various modes of death as an analogy.
De bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. Non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est. Nec futuri providus est nec praeteriti memor; quid sit consequens, nescit. Ex hoc1 autem rerum ordo sedesque contexitur et unitas vitae per rectum itura. Ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum; aliena et externa pro vilibus habet et ea, quae neque bona sunt neque mala, accessiones minimas ac levissimas iudicat. Omne enim illi bonum in animo est.
The senses do not judge concerning goods and evils; they are ignorant of what is useful and what is useless. They cannot pass judgment unless brought to the present matter. They are neither foresighted of the future nor mindful of the past; they do not know what follows. But from this (reason) the order and foundation of things is woven, and the unity of a life destined to go through the right path. Therefore, reason is the arbiter of goods and evils; it regards alien and external things as worthless, and judges those things which are neither good nor evil to be the smallest and lightest additions. For all its good is in the mind.
Ceterum bona quaedam prima existimat, ad quae ex proposito venit, tamquam victoriam, bonos liberos, salutem patriae. Quaedam secunda, quae non apparent nisi in rebus adversis, tamquam aequo animo pati morbum magnum, exilium. Quaedam media, quae nihilo magis secundum naturam sunt quam contra naturam, tamquam prudenter ambulare, conposite sedere. Non enim minus secundum naturam est sedere quam stare aut ambulare.
Moreover, it considers certain goods to be primary, which it reaches by deliberate purpose, such as victory, good children, and the safety of one’s country. It considers certain goods to be secondary, which do not appear except in adversity, such as enduring a severe illness or exile with an even mind. It considers certain goods to be middle, which are no more according to nature than contrary to nature, such as walking prudently or sitting composedly. For sitting is no less according to nature than standing or walking.
Duo illa bona superiora diversa sunt. Prima enim secundum naturam sunt: gaudere liberorum pietate, patriae incolumitate. Secunda contra naturam sunt: fortiter opstare tormentis et sitim perpeti morbo urente praecordia. "
Those two superior classes of goods are diverse. For the primary are according to nature: to rejoice in the devotion of children, and in the safety of one’s country. The secondary are contrary to nature: to oppose tortures bravely, and to endure thirst when sickness burns the breast.
Quid ergo? Aliquid contra naturam bonum est?" Minime; sed id aliquando contra naturam est, in quo bonum illud existit.2 Vulnerari enim et subiecto igne tabescere et adversa valetudine adfligi contra naturam est, sed inter ista servare animum infatigabilem secundum naturam est.
”What then? Is something contrary to nature a good?” By no means; but that in which that good exists is sometimes contrary to nature. For to be wounded, to waste away with fire applied beneath, and to be afflicted by ill health is contrary to nature, but to keep an untiring mind among these things is according to nature.
Et ut quod volo exprimam breviter, materia boni aliquando contra naturam est, bonum numquam, quoniam bonum sine ratione nullum est, sequitur autem ratio naturam. "Quid est ergo ratio? "Naturae imitatio. "Quod est summum hominis bonum? "Ex naturae voluntate se gerere. "
And to express briefly what I mean, the material of the good is sometimes contrary to nature, but the good itself never is, since there is no good without reason, and reason follows nature. “What then is reason?” The imitation of nature. “What is the highest good of man?” To conduct oneself according to the will of nature.
Non est "inquit "dubium, quin felicior pax sit numquam lacessita quam multo reparata sanguine. Non est dubium "inquit "quin felicior res sit inconcussa valetudo quam ex gravibus morbis et extrema minitantibus in tutum vi quadam et patientia educta. Eodem modo non erit dubium, quin maius bonum sit gaudium quam obnixus animus ad perpetiendos cruciatus vulnerum aut ignium."
”There is no doubt,” he says, “that a peace never provoked is happier than one restored with much blood. There is no doubt,” he says, “that unshaken health is a happier state than that which is brought out of grave illnesses threatening the very end into safety by some force and patience. In the same way, there will be no doubt that joy is a greater good than a mind strained to endure the tortures of wounds or fires.”
Minime. Illa enim, quae fortuita sunt, plurimum discriminis recipiunt; aestimantur enim utilitate sumentium.3 Bonorum unum propositum est consentire naturae; hoc in omnibus par est. Cum alicuius in senatu sententiam sequimur, non potest dici: ille magis adsentitur quam ille; ab omnibus in eandem sententiam itur. Idem de virtutibus dico. omnes naturae adsentiuntur. Idem de bonis dico: omnia naturae adsentiuntur.
By no means. For those things which are accidental admit of very much difference; for they are estimated by the utility of those who receive them. The single purpose of goods is to agree with nature; this is equal in all of them. When we follow someone’s opinion in the senate, it cannot be said: “that man agrees more than this one”; they all go into the same opinion. I say the same of virtues: they all agree with nature. I say the same of goods: they all agree with nature.
Alter adulescens decessit, alter senex, aliquis praeter hos infans, cui nihil amplius contigit quam prospicere vitam. Omnes hi aeque fuere mortales, etiam si mors aliorum longius vitam passa est procedere, aliorum in medio flore praecidit, aliorum interrupit ipsa principia.
One died as a young man, another as an old man, and someone else, besides these, as an infant, to whom nothing more was granted than to look upon life. All these were equally mortal, even if the death of some allowed life to proceed further , while that of others cut it off in its very flower, and that of others interrupted its very beginnings.
Alius inter cenandum solutus est. Alterius continuata mors somno est. Aliquem concubitus extinxit. His oppono ferro transfossos aut exanimatos serpentium morsu aut fractos ruina aut per longam nervorum contractionem extortos minutatim. Aliquorum melior dici, aliquorum peior potest exitus; mors quidem omnium par est. Per quae desiliunt, diversa sunt; in quod desiliunt, unum est.4 Mors nulla maior aut minor est; habet enim eundem in omnibus modum, finisse vitam.
One was released in the midst of dining. Another’s death was continued from sleep. Sexual intercourse extinguished someone. To these I oppose those pierced by the sword, or deprived of life by the bite of serpents, or crushed by a collapse, or twisted piece by piece through a long contraction of the sinews. The end of some can be called better, of others worse; yet the death of all is equal. The things through which they leap down are diverse; that into which they leap down is one. No death is greater or smaller; for it has the same limit in all, to have ended life.
Idem tibi de bonis dico: hoc bonum inter meras voluptates est, hoc inter tristia et acerba. Illud fortunae indulgentiam rexit, hoc violentiam domuit. Utrumque aeque bonum est, quamvis illud plana et molli via ierit, hoc aspera. Idem finis omnium est: bona sunt, laudanda sunt, virtutem rationemque comitantur; virtus aequat inter se, quicquid agnoscit.
I say the same to you concerning goods: this good is in the midst of pure pleasures, that one in the midst of sad and bitter things. The former governed the indulgence of fortune, the latter subdued its violence. Each is equally good, although the former went by a flat and soft path, the latter by a rough one. The end of all is the same: they are goods, they are to be praised, they accompany virtue and reason; virtue equals among themselves whatever it recognizes as its own.
- 66.35Ex hoc
The demonstrative pronoun hoc (neuter singular) refers to the intellectual activity of recognizing 'what follows' (quid sit consequens), or more broadly to the faculty of reason that grasps such logical consistency.
- 66.38id aliquando contra naturam est, in quo bonum illud existit
The subject of the main clause, id (the antecedent), is modified by the relative clause in quo... This syntactically emphasizes that what is contrary to nature is not the virtue (bonum) itself, but the external circumstances or material (such as illness or torture) in which that virtue manifests.
- 66.41utilitate sumentium
utilitate is an ablative of standard or measure ('by the utility'). sumentium is the genitive plural of the present participle of sumere ('to take, enjoy'), used substantively to mean 'of those who receive or choose (accidental things),' which limits utilitate.
- 66.43Per quae desiliunt, diversa sunt; in quod desiliunt, unum est
Contrasts the neuter plural relative pronoun quae (referring to the diverse 'means or pathways' to death) with the neuter singular quod (referring to the 'single destination, i.e., death' to which everyone ultimately comes). In both clauses, the antecedents (ea and id) are omitted.