- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:66.17-66.25
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-04
The author acknowledges that there are natural differences between joy and pain, but argues that the value of virtue itself dealing with them remains equal, asserting that the evaluation of virtue must not be swayed by external conditions such as wealth or bodily state.
Honestum omne1 securum est, tranquillum est; si recusat aliquid, si conplorat, si malum iudicat, perturbationem recepit et in magna discordia volutatur. Hinc enim species recti vocat, illinc suspicio mali retrahit. Itaque qui honeste aliquid facturus est, quicquid opponitur, id etiam si incommodum putat, malum non putet, velit, libens faciat. Omne honestum iniussum incoactumque est, sincerum et nulli malo mixtum.
Every honorable thing is secure, is tranquil; if it refuses anything, if it laments, if it judges anything to be an evil, it has admitted perturbation and tosses about in great discord. For from here the appearance of the right calls, and from there the suspicion of evil pulls back. Therefore, he who is about to do something honorably, whatever is opposed, even if he thinks it an inconvenience, let him not think it an evil; let him wish it, let him do it willingly. Every honorable thing is unbidden and uncoerced, pure and mixed with no evil.
Scio, quid mihi responderi hoc loco possit: "hoc nobis persuadere conaris, nihil interesse, utrum aliquis in gaudio sit an in eculeo iaceat ac tortorem suum lasset?" Poteram2 respondere: Epicurus quoque ait sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum: "dulce est et ad me nihil pertinet." Quid miraris, si ego paria bona dico alterius in convivio iacentis, alterius inter tormenta fortissime stantis, cum quod incredibilius est dicat Epicurus, dulce esse torreri?
I know what can be answered to me in this place: “Are you trying to persuade us of this, that it makes no difference whether someone is in joy or lies on the rack and tires out his torturer?” I could have answered: Epicurus also says that the wise man, even if he were burned in the bull of Phalaris, would cry out: “It is sweet, and it does not concern me.” Why do you wonder if I say that the goods of one lying at a banquet and of another standing most bravely amid tortures are equal, when Epicurus says what is more incredible, that it is sweet to be burned?
Sed hoc respondeo, plurimum interesse inter gaudium et dolorem; si quaeratur electio, alterum petam, alterum vitabo. Illud secundum naturam est, hoc contra. Quamdiu sic aestimantur, magno inter se dissident spatio; cum ad virtutem ventum est, utraque par est et quae per laeta procedit et quae per tristia.
But I answer this, that there is a very great difference between joy and pain; if choice were sought, I will seek the one, I will avoid the other. The former is according to nature, the latter contrary to it. As long as they are valued thus, they differ from each other by a great space; but when we come to virtue, both are equal, both that which proceeds through joyful things and that which proceeds through sad things.
Nullum habet momentum vexatio et dolor et quicquid aliud incommodi est; virtute enim obruitur. Quemadmodum minuta lumina claritas solis obscurat, sic dolores, molestias, iniurias virtus magnitudine sua elidit atque opprimit et quocumque adfulsit, ibi quicquid sine illa apparet, extinguitur; nec magis ullam portionem habent incommoda, cum in virtutem inciderunt, quam in mari nimbus.
Vexation and pain and whatever other inconvenience there is have no weight; for they are overwhelmed by virtue. Just as the brightness of the sun obscures tiny lights, so virtue by its greatness crushes and oppresses pains, annoyances, and injuries, and wherever it shines, whatever appears without it is extinguished there; nor do inconveniences have any more portion, when they fall into virtue, than a storm cloud in the sea.
Hoc ut scias ita esse, ad omne pulchrum vir bonus sine ulla cunctatione procurret; stet illic licet3 carnifex, stet tortor atque ignis, perseverabit nec quid passurus, sed quid facturus sit, aspiciet, et se honestae rei tamquam bono viro credet; utilem illam sibi iudicabit, tutam, prosperam. Eundem locum habebit apud illum honesta res, sed tristis atque aspera, quem vir bonus pauper aut exul ac pallidus.
That you may know this to be so, the good man will run forward to every beautiful thing without any hesitation; though the executioner stand there, though the torturer and fire stand there, he will persevere and will look not at what he is to suffer, but at what he is to do, and he will trust himself to the honorable thing as if to a good man; he will judge it useful to himself, safe, prosperous. An honorable thing, though sad and harsh, will have the same place with him as a poor or exiled and pale good man.
Agedum pone ex alia parte virum bonum divitiis abundantem, ex altera nihil habentem, sed in se omnia; uterque aeque vir bonus erit, etiam si fortuna dispari utetur. Idem, ut dixi, in rebus iudicium est, quod in hominibus: aeque laudabilis virtus est in corpore valido ac libero posita quam in morbido ac vincto.
Come now, place on one side a good man abounding in riches, on the other one having nothing but all things in himself; both will be equally a good man, even if they use unequal fortune. The same judgment, as I have said, is in things as in men: virtue placed in a healthy and free body is equally praiseworthy as in a sick and bound one.
Ergo tuam quoque virtutem non magis laudabis, si4 corpus illi tuum integrum fortuna praestiterit quam si ex aliqua parte mutilatum; alioqui hoc erit ex servorum habitu dominum aestimare. Omnia enim ista, in quae dominium casus exercet, serva sunt, pecunia et corpus et honores, inbecilla, fluida, mortalia, possessionis incertae. Illa rursus libera et invicta opera virtutis, quae non ideo magis adpetenda sunt, si benignius a fortuna tractantur, nec minus, si aliqua iniquitate rerum premuntur.
Therefore, you will not praise your own virtue any more if fortune has provided an intact body to it than if it is mutilated in some part; otherwise, this will be to value the master from the condition of the slaves. For all those things over which chance exercises dominion are slaves—money, body, honors—weak, fluid, mortal, of uncertain possession. On the other hand, those works of virtue are free and unconquered, which are not to be sought any more on that account if they are treated more kindly by fortune, nor any less if they are pressed by some unfairness of things.
Quod amicitia in hominibus est, hoc in rebus adpetitio. Non, puto, magis amares virum bonum locupletem quam pauperem, nec robustum et lacertosum quam gracilem et languidi corporis; ergo ne rem quidem magis adpetes aut amabis hilarem ac pacatam quam distractam et operosam.
What friendship is in men, this desire is in things. You would not, I think, love a rich good man more than a poor one, nor a strong and muscular one more than a slender one of weak body; therefore, you will not desire or love a cheerful and peaceful thing any more than a distracted and troublesome one.
Aut si hoc est, magis diliges ex duobus aeque bonis viris nitidum et unctum quam pulverulentum et horrentem. Deinde hoc usque pervenies, ut magis diligas integrum omnibus membris et inlaesum quam debilem aut luscum. Paulatim fastidium tuum illo usque procedet, ut ex duobus aeque iustis ac prudentibus comatum et crispulum malis. Ubi par in utroque virtus est, non conparet aliarum rerum inaequalitas. Omnia enim alia non partes, sed accessiones sunt.
Or if this is so, you will love more, of two equally good men, the neat and anointed one than the dusty and unkempt one. Then you will arrive even at this, that you love more the one who is intact in all his limbs and uninjured than the weak or one-eyed one. Gradually your fastidiousness will proceed so far that, of two equally just and prudent men, you prefer the one with long hair and curly hair. Where virtue is equal in both, the inequality of other things does not appear. For all other things are not parts, but additions.
- 66.17Honestum omne
This is a nominative neuter singular phrase, but the subsequent verbs such as 'recusat', 'conplorat', and 'iudicat' describe active human behavior. Rhetorically, this either personifies 'the honorable (concept)' itself, or implicitly refers to 'the person who acts honorably.'
- 66.18Poteram
The imperfect indicative is used here to convey a counterfactual nuance: 'I could have answered (if I wished to, but I choose a different reply).'
- 66.21stet illic licet
The word 'licet' functions as a concessive conjunction ('although' / 'granted that') introducing the present subjunctive 'stet' (third-person singular present subjunctive of 'sto').
- 66.23non magis laudabis, si... quam si...
In the comparative construction 'non magis... quam...', the two conditional clauses ('si...' and 'quam si...') are placed in parallel, arguing that virtue should be praised equally regardless of external fortune.