- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:65.8-65.15
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-04
Seneca presents Plato's fivefold classification of causes and criticizes the proliferation of causes, advocating instead the Stoic view of a single active cause (God or Reason). He concludes by asserting that such physical inquiries ultimately serve self-examination and intellectual tranquility.
Quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod,1 id propter quod. Novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam in statua, quia de hac loqui coepimus, id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est, quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est, quod imitatur is, qui facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est, ipsa statua est.
Therefore, there are five causes, as Plato says: that from which, that by which, that in which, that toward which, that on account of which. And finally, that which is from these. For example in a statue, since we have begun to speak of this, that from which is the bronze, that by which is the craftsman, that in which is the form which is fitted to it, that toward which is the pattern which he who makes it imitates, that on account of which is the purpose of the maker, and that which is from these is the statue itself.
Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait Plato, habet: facientem: hic deus est. Ex quo fit: haec materia est. Formam: haec est habitus et ordo mundi, quem videmus. Exemplar, scilicet, ad quod deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit.
The world also, as Plato says, has all of these: the maker, who is God; that from which it is made, which is matter; the form, which is the condition and order of the world that we see; the pattern, namely, toward which God made this greatness of the most beautiful work.
Propositum, propter quod fecit. Quaeris, quod sit propositum deo? Bonitas Ita certe Plato ait: "Quae deo faciendi mundum fuit causa? Bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est. Fecit itaque quam optimum potuit." Fer ergo, iudex, sententiam et pronuntia, quis tibi videatur verissimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat.2 Id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas.
the purpose, on account of which he made it. Do you ask what God’s purpose was? Goodness. Indeed, Plato says: “What was God’s cause for making the world? He is good; and to a good being there is no envy of anything that is good. Therefore, he made it as excellent as he could.” Therefore, judge, pass sentence and declare who seems to you to speak most truly, not who does speak most truly. For that is as far above us as truth itself.
Haec, quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur, turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca conprendit. Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam iudicant esse faciendi, pauca dixerunt. Ponant inter causas tempus; nihil sine tempore potest fieri. Ponant locum; si non fuerit, ubi fiat aliquid, ne fiet quidem. Ponant motum; nihil sine hoc nec fit nec perit. Nulla sine motu ars, nulla mutatio est.
This crowd of causes, which is posited by Aristotle and Plato, includes either too many or too few. For if they judge that to be a cause of making without which, if removed, nothing can be produced, they have named too few. Let them place time among the causes; nothing can be done without time. Let them place space; if there is no place where something can be made, it will not even be made. Let them place motion; without this, nothing is either produced or perishes. Without motion, there is no art, no change.
Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet; nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus, quid sit causa? Ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus. Ista enim, quaecumque rettulistis, non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quae faciet.3
But we are now seeking the first and general cause. This must be simple; for matter, too, is simple. We are seeking what cause is. It is, of course, the active reason, that is, God. For those things, whatever you have brought forward, are not many and individual causes, but they depend on one, on that which will make.
Formam dicis causam esse? Hanc inponit artifex operi; pars causae est, non causa. Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. Sic necessarium est exemplar artifici, quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima; sine his procedere ars non potest. Non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt. "
Do you say that form is a cause? The craftsman imposes this upon the work; it is a part of the cause, not the cause. The pattern too is not a cause, but a necessary instrument of the cause. The pattern is as necessary to the craftsman as the chisel and the file; without these, art cannot proceed. Yet these are not parts of art or of the cause.
Propositum," inquit, "artificis, propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est." Ut sit causa,4 non est efficiens causa, sed superveniens. Hae autem innumerabiles sunt; nos de causa generali quaerimus. Illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse. Multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis.
”The purpose of the craftsman,” someone says, “on account of which he applies himself to making something, is a cause.” Granted that it is a cause, it is not an efficient cause, but an accessory one. And these are innumerable; we are seeking the general cause. But they spoke without their usual subtlety when they said that the whole world and the completed work is a cause. For there is a great difference between a work and the cause of a work.
Aut fer sententiam aut, quod facilius in eiusmodi rebus est, nega tibi liquere et nos reverti iube. "Quid te," inquis, "delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum affectum eripiunt, nullam cupiditatem abigunt?" Ego quidem ut potiora illa ago ac tracto, quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum.
Either pass sentence or, what is easier in matters of this kind, say that it is not clear to you and order us to return. “Why,” you ask, “does it delight you to waste time among these things, which snatch away no passion from you, and drive away no desire?” I, indeed, act upon and treat those preferred matters by which the mind is pacified, and I examine myself first, then this world.
- 65.8id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod
This chain of pronominal phrases with prepositions represents the Platonic (or Middle Platonic) fivefold classification of causes (material, efficient, formal, exemplar, and final). Specifically, id in quo ("that in which") refers to the immanent form (forma) that is fitted into the matter.
- 65.10quis tibi videatur verissimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat
A deliberate distinction between the present subjunctives videatur ("seems") and dicat ("speaks/does speak"). It asks Lucilius, as a judge, to declare "who seems to speak most truly" (the limit of human/legal judgment), while acknowledging that "who actually speaks most truly" is beyond human reach (supra nos).
- 65.12ex ea, quae faciet
The manuscript reading faciet (future tense, "will make") emphasizes that the sole universal cause (active reason, i.e., God) is an active agent that will bring about effects and continue to shape things.
- 65.14Ut sit causa
A concessive clause using the present subjunctive ("granted that it is a cause" or "even if it were a cause"). It argues that although the purpose (propositum) motivates action, it is not an efficient cause (causa efficiens), but merely an accessory or supervening cause (causa superveniens).