True Joy versus Pleasure and the Value of Metaphors — Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius 59.1–59.9, Latin & English

§59.1

Magnam ex epistula tua percepi voluptatem; permitte enim mihi uti verbis publicis nec illa ad significationem Stoicam revoca. Vitium esse voluptatem credimus. Sit sane; ponere tamen illam solemus ad demonstrandam animi hilarem adfectionem.

I perceived great pleasure from your letter; for permit me to use public words and do not recall them to the Stoic significance. We believe that pleasure is a vice. Let it be so, indeed; yet we are accustomed to employ it to demonstrate a cheerful affection of the mind.

§59.2

Scio, inquam, et voluptatem, si ad nostrum album verba derigimus, rem infamem esse et gaudium nisi sapienti¹ non contingere. Est enim animi elatio suis bonis verisque fidentis. Vulgo tamen sic loquimur, ut dicamus magnum gaudium nos ex illius consulatu aut nuptiis aut ex partu uxoris percepisse, quae adeo non sunt gaudia, ut saepe initia futurae tristitiae sint. Gaudio autem iunctum est non desinere nec in contrarium verti.

I know, I say, both that pleasure, if we direct our words to our register, is an infamous thing, and that joy does not fall to anyone except the wise man. For it is an elevation of the mind trusting in its own and true goods. Commonly, however, we speak in such a way as to say that we have perceived great joy from so-and-so’s consulship, or marriage, or from the childbirth of a wife, which are so far from being joys that they are often the beginnings of future sadness. But with joy is joined not to cease nor to be turned into the contrary.

§59.3

Itaque cum dicit Vergilius noster "Et mala mentis gaudia," diserte quidem dicit, sed parum proprie. Nullum enim malum gaudium est. Voluptatibus hoc nomen inposuit et quod voluit expressit. Significavit enim homines malo suo laetos.

Therefore when our Vergil says “And the evil joys of the mind,” he speaks eloquently indeed, but not very properly. For no joy is evil. He imposed this name on pleasures and expressed what he wished. For he signified that men are glad in their own evil.

§59.4

Tamen ego non inmerito dixeram cepisse me magnam ex epistula tua voluptatem; quamvis enim ex honesta causa inperitus homo gaudeat, tamen adfectum eius inpotentem et in diversum statim inclinaturum voluptatem voco,² opinione falsi boni motam, inmoderatam et inmodicam. Sed ut ad propositum revertar, audi, quid me in epistula tua delectaverit: habes verba in potestate. Non effert te oratio nec longius quam destinasti trahit.

Yet I had not without reason said that I had received great pleasure from your letter; for although an unskilful man may rejoice from an honorable cause, yet I call his affection pleasure—impotent and immediately about to incline to the opposite, moved by the opinion of a false good, immoderate and excessive. But to return to the purpose, hear what delighted me in your letter: you have words in your power. Your speech does not carry you away, nor drag you further than you intended.

§59.5

Multi sunt, qui ad id, quod non proposuerant scribere, alicuius verbi placentis decore vocentur, quod tibi non evenit; pressa sunt omnia et rei aptata. Loqueris quantum vis et plus significas quam loqueris. Hoc maioris rei indicium est; apparet animum quoque nihil habere supervacui, nihil tumidi.

There are many who are called away to that which they had not proposed to write, by the beauty of some pleasing word, which has not happened to you; all things are concise and adapted to the subject. You speak as much as you wish, and signify more than you speak. This is an indication of a greater matter; it is apparent that your mind also has nothing superfluous, nothing inflated.

§59.6

Invenio tamen translationes verborum ut non temerarias ita quae periculum sui fecerint.³ Invenio imagines, quibus si quis nos uti vetat et poetis illas solis iudicat esse concessas, neminem mihi videtur ex antiquis legisse, apud quos nondum captabatur plausibilis oratio. Illi, qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei causa eloquebantur, parabolis referti sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex eadem causa qua poetis, sed ut inbecillitatis nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem et audientem in rem praesentem adducant.

Yet I find your translations of words, as they are not rash, so to be such as have made trial of their own danger. I find images; and if anyone forbids us to use them and judges that they are granted to poets alone, he seems to me to have read none of the ancients, among whom plausible speech was not yet caught at. Those who spoke simply and for the sake of demonstrating the matter are full of parables, which I judge necessary, not for the same reason as for poets, but that they may be supports for our weakness, to bring both the speaker and the hearer into the presence of the reality.

§59.7

Sextium ecce cum maxime lego, virum acrem, Graecis verbis, Romanis moribus philosophantem. Movit me imago ab illo posita: ire quadrato agmine exercitum, ubi hostis ab omni parte suspectus est, pugnae paratum; "Idem," inquit, "sapiens facere debet; omnes virtutes suas undique expandat, ut ubicumque infesti aliquid orietur, illic parata praesidia sint et ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondeant." Quod in exercitibus iis, quos imperatores magni ordinant, fieri videmus,⁴ ut imperium ducis simul omnes copiae sentiant, sic dispositae, ut signum ab uno datum peditem simul equitemque percurrat; hoc aliquanto magis necessarium esse nobis ait.

Look, I am especially reading Sextius, a sharp man, philosophizing in Greek words but Roman morals. I was moved by the image placed by him: that an army marches in a square formation, where an enemy is suspected from every side, ready for battle; “The same,” he says, “the wise man ought to do; he should expand all his virtues on every side, so that wherever anything hostile arises, there ready garrisons may be, and may respond without tumult at the nod of the ruler.” Which we see done in those armies which great commanders arrange, so that all the troops feel the command of the leader at the same time, being so disposed that the signal given by one runs through both infantry and cavalry at once; this, he says, is somewhat more necessary for us.

§59.8

Illi enim saepe hostem timuere sine causa, tutissimumque illis iter quod suspectissimum fuit; nihil stultitia pacatum habet. Tam superne illi metus est quam infra. Utrumque trepidat latus. Secuntur pericula et occurrunt. Ad omnia pavet, inparata est et ipsis ferretur auxiliis. Sapiens autem ad omnem incursum munitus, intentus, non si paupertas, non si luctus, non si ignominia, non si dolor impetum faciat, pedem referet. Interritus et contra illa ibit et inter illa.

For they have often feared an enemy without cause, and the safest journey for them was that which was most suspected; folly has nothing pacified. Its fear is as much from above as from below. Either side trembles. Dangers follow and meet them. It is terrified at all things, is unprepared, and is thrown into confusion even by its very succors. But the wise man, fortified against every inroad, intent, will not retreat even if poverty, if grief, if ignominy, if pain should make an attack. Undaunted, he will go both against those things and among them.

§59.9

Nos multa alligant, multa debilitant. Diu in istis vitiis iacuimus, elui difficile est. Non enim inquinati sumus, sed infecti. Ne ab alia imagine ad aliam transeamus, hoc quaeram, quod saepe mecum dispicio: quid ita nos stultitia tam pertinaciter teneat? Primo quia non fortiter illam repellimus nec toto ad salutem impetu nitimur, deinde quia illa, quae a sapientibus viris reperta sunt, non satis credimus nec apertis pectoribus haurimus leviterque tam magnae rei insistimus.

Many things bind us, many weaken us. We have lain long in those vices, it is difficult to be washed clean. For we are not merely soiled, but dyed deep. Lest we pass from one image to another, I will ask this, which I often investigate with myself: why does folly hold us so pertinaciously? First, because we do not bravely repel it, nor strive with all our might for salvation; secondly, because we do not sufficiently believe those things which have been found out by wise men, nor draw them in with open hearts, and we insist lightly upon so great a matter.

Syntax notes4 items

59.2nisi sapienti
nisi (except) qualifies the dative sapienti, which functions as the logical subject of the impersonal verb contingere (to happen to, fall to the lot of). The phrase means "does not fall to the lot of anyone except the wise man."
59.4adfectum ... voluptatem voco
The verb voco (I call) takes a double accusative construction, with adfectum (affection) as the direct object and voluptatem (pleasure) as the object complement. The intermediate adjectives and participles, such as impotentem and inclinaturum, all modify the direct object adfectum.
59.6ut non temerarias ita quae periculum sui fecerint
The correlative conjunctions ut ... ita (as ... so / while ... yet) contrast the qualities of the metaphors. The latter part quae ... fecerint is a relative clause with the subjunctive perfect (relative clause of characteristic), describing the boldness of the metaphors as "such as have made trial of their own danger."
59.7Quod ... fieri videmus
The sentence-initial Quod is a connecting relative pronoun referring back to the whole situation of the army's formation described previously. This relative clause Quod ... fieri videmus serves to anticipate and explain the pronoun hoc (this same thing), which is the subject of the main clause.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25)urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:59.1-59.9