Moral Letters to Lucilius

​Therefore, in all animals there is a sense of their own constitution, and from this comes such ready handling of their limbs; nor do we have any greater proof that they come to life with this knowledge than the fact that no animal is unskilled in the use of itself.

”Constitution,” he says, “is, as you say, the ruling part of the soul in a certain state toward the body. How does an infant understand this, which is so complex and subtle and scarcely explainable even to you? All animals must be born logicians so that they may understand that definition, which is obscure to a large part of toga-wearing men.” Your objection would be true if I were saying that the definition of constitution is understood by animals, and not the constitution itself.

​Nature is more easily understood than explained; therefore, that infant does not know what a constitution is, but knows his own constitution. And he does not know what an animal is, but feels himself to be an animal.

​Moreover, he understands his own constitution itself roughly, generally, and obscurely. We also know that we have a soul; yet we do not know what the soul is, where it is, what kind of thing it is, or whence it comes. Just as our sense of our own soul is for us, although we are ignorant of its nature and seat, so is the sense of their own constitution for all animals. For they must feel that through which they feel other things as well; they must have a sense of that which they obey and by which they are ruled.

​There is no one among us who does not understand that there is something that moves his impulses, though he is ignorant of what it is. And he knows that he has an impulse; but what it is or whence it comes, he does not know. Thus for infants and animals also, the sense of their ruling part exists, though not sufficiently clear or distinct.

”You say,” he says, “that every animal is first reconciled to its own constitution, but that man’s constitution is rational, and therefore man is reconciled to himself not as an animal, but as a rational being. For man is dear to himself in that part by which he is man. How then can an infant be reconciled to a rational constitution, when he is not yet rational?” Each age has its own constitution—one for the infant, another for the boy, another for the old man; all are reconciled to that constitution in which they are.

​An infant is without teeth; he is reconciled to this constitution of his. Teeth have grown; he is reconciled to this constitution. For even that blade of grass, which is destined to become wheat and grain, has one constitution when tender and barely rising from the furrow, another when it has grown strong and stands with a stem that is indeed soft but sufficient to bear its burden, and another when it turns yellow and looks toward the threshing-floor and its ear has hardened; into whatever constitution it comes, it guards that one and is adapted to it.

​The age of the infant, the boy, the youth, and the old man is different; yet I am the same person who was also an infant and a boy and a youth. Thus, although there is one constitution after another for each person, the reconciliation to one’s own constitution is the same. For nature does not commend to me a boy or a young man or an old man, but myself. Therefore, an infant is reconciled to that constitution of his which belongs to the infant at that time, not to that which will belong to the young man in the future. For even if there remains something greater for him to pass into, this condition in which he is born is also none the less in accordance with nature.

​First of all, the animal is reconciled to itself; for there must be something to which other things are referred. I seek pleasure; for whom? For myself. Therefore, I take care of myself. I avoid pain; for whom? For myself. Therefore, I take care of myself. If I do all things on account of the care of myself, the care of myself is before all things. This is inborn in all animals, and is not engrafted but born with them.