- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:111.1-111.5
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca supports Cicero's translation of "sophisms" as "cavillations" and argues that such trivial subtleties are useless for training the soul. He asserts that a true philosopher transcends fortune, maintains an unshakeable mind, and must learn to despise life before attempting to rule it.
Quid vocentur Latine sophismata, quaesisti a me. Multi temptaverunt illis nomen inponere, nullum haesit, videlicet, quia res ipsa non recipiebatur a nobis nec in usu erat, nomini quoque repugnatum est. Aptissimum tamen videtur mihi, quo1 Cicero usus est: cavillationes vocat.
You have asked me what sophisms are called in Latin. Many have attempted to impose a name on them, but none has stuck; evidently because the thing itself was not received by us nor was in use, the name also was resisted. Yet that which Cicero used seems to me most suitable: he calls them cavillations.
Quibus quisquis se tradidit, quaestiunculas quidem vafras nectit, ceterum ad vitam nihil proficit, neque fortior fit neque temperantior neque elatior. At ille, qui philosophiam in remedium suum exercuit, ingens fit animo, plenus fiduciae, inexsuperabilis et maior adeunti.2
Whoever has surrendered himself to these, weaves indeed crafty little questions, but makes no progress for life, becoming neither braver nor more temperate nor more elevated. But he who has practiced philosophy for his own cure, becomes immense in spirit, full of confidence, insuperable, and greater to one who approaches him.
Quod in magnis evenit montibus, quorum proceritas minus apparet longe intuentibus; cum accesseris, tunc manifestum fit, quo in arduo summa sint; talis est, mi Lucili, verus et rebus, non artificiis philosophus. In edito stat admirabilis, celsus, magnitudinis verae. Non exsurgit in plantas nec summis ambulat digitis eorum more, qui mendacio staturam adiuvant longioresque quam sunt, videri volunt; contentus est magnitudine sua.
This happens in the case of great mountains, whose height appears less to those looking from afar; when you have approached, then it becomes manifest on what a steep height their summits are; such, my Lucilius, is the true philosopher—true in reality, not in artifices. He stands on high, admirable, lofty, of true greatness. He does not raise himself upon his soles, nor does he walk on the tips of his toes in the manner of those who help their stature with a lie and wish to seem taller than they are; he is content with his own greatness.
Quidni contentus sit eo usque crevisse, quo manus fortuna non porrigit? Ergo et supra humana est et par sibi in omni statu rerum, sive secundo cursu vita procedit, sive fluctuatur et it per adversa ac difficilia; hanc constantiam cavillationes istae, de quibus paulo ante loquebar, praestare non possunt. Ludit istis animus, non proficit, et philosophiam a fastigio suo deducit in planum.
Why indeed should he not be content to have grown to that point where the hand of fortune does not reach? Therefore, he is both above human affairs and equal to himself in every state of things, whether life proceeds with a favorable course, or fluctuates and goes through adverse and difficult times; those cavillations of which I was speaking a little while ago cannot guarantee this constancy. The mind plays with them, it does not profit, and it drags philosophy down from its height to the level ground.
Nec te prohibuerim3 aliquando ista agere, sed tunc, cum voles nihil agere. Hoc tamen habent in se pessimum: dulcedinem quandam sui faciunt et animum specie subtilitatis inductum tenent ac morantur, cum tanta rerum moles vocet, cum vix tota vita sufficiat, ut hoc unum discas, vitam contemnere. "Quid? Regere," inquis. Secundum opus est; nam nemo illam bene rexit nisi qui contempserat. VALE.
Nor would I forbid you to engage in those things sometimes, but only then when you wish to do nothing. Yet they have this worst quality in themselves: they create a certain sweetness of their own and hold and delay the mind, seduced by the appearance of subtlety, when so great a mass of affairs calls, when scarcely a whole life is sufficient to learn this one thing, to despise life. ‘What? To rule it?’ you say. That is a secondary task; for no one has ruled it well except one who had despised it. FAREWELL.
- 111.1quo
Relative pronoun qui in the neuter singular ablative. It takes this case because the verb utor (usus est) governs the ablative. The antecedent is an omitted id or loosely related nomen, meaning 'that which Cicero used.'
- 111.2adeunti
Present active participle of the verb adeo (to approach) in the masculine singular dative. Used substantively, it functions as a dative of reference or relation with the comparative maior, meaning 'greater to one who approaches.'
- 111.5prohibuerim
Perfect active subjunctive, first-person singular. It is used here as a potential subjunctive to express a polite or softened assertion: 'I would not forbid.'
