- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:102.12-102.20
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
The author argues that renown (claritas) is grounded in the correct judgment of a good man, distinct from glory, which is the unstable opinion of the crowd, or mere vocal praise. He explains that renown is a good for both the praiser and the praised, while dismissing trivial, sophistical disputes that detract from the majesty of philosophy.
" Quid ergo? "inquit, "et fama erit unius hominis existimatio et infamia unius malignus sermo? Gloriam quoque," inquit, "latius fusam intellego, consensum enim multorum exigit." Diversa horum condicio est et illius. Quare? Quia, si de me bene vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum, quo si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim, si me cognoverint, idem sentient. Par illis idemque iudicium est, aeque vero inficiscitur. Dissidere non possunt; ita pro eo est, ac si1 omnes idem sentiant, quia aliud sentire non possunt. " Ad gloriam aut famam non est satis unius opinio." Illic idem potest2 una sententia, quod omnium, quia omnium, si perrogetur, una erit; hic diversa dissimilium iudicia sunt. Difficiles adfectus, dubia omnia invenies, levia, suspecta. Putas tu posse unam omnium esse sententiam? Non est unius una sententia. Illi placet verum, veritatis una vis, una facies est; apud hos falsa sunt, quibus adsentiuntur. Numquam autem falsis constantia est: variantur et dissident. " Sed laus," inquit, "nihil aliud quam vox est, vox autem bonum non est." Cum dicunt claritatem esse laudem bonorum a bonis redditam, non ad vocem referunt, sed ad sententiam. Licet enim vir bonus taceat, sed aliquem iudicet dignum laude esse, laudatus est.
”What then?” he says, “will fame also be the opinion of one man, and infamy the malicious speech of one? I understand glory also,” he says, “as more widely spread, for it requires the consensus of many.” The condition of these is different from that of the other. Why? Because, if a good man thinks well of me, I am in the same position as if all good men thought the same; for all, if they get to know me, will think the same. Their judgment is equal and the same, and is equally imbued with truth. They cannot disagree; thus it is the same as if all think the same, because they cannot think otherwise. “ For glory or fame, the opinion of one is not enough.” In the former case, a single opinion has the same power as that of all, because the opinion of all, if they are asked one by one, will be one; in the latter case, there are diverse judgments of unlike people. You will find troublesome passions, all things doubtful, light, and suspected. Do you think that there can be one opinion of all? Even of a single person, there is not one opinion. To the former (the good man), truth is pleasing, and the power of truth is one, its face is one; among the latter, there are false things to which they assent. But there is never constancy in false things: they vary and disagree. “ But praise,” he says, “is nothing other than a voice, and a voice is not a good.” When they say that renown is praise rendered by good men to good men, they refer it not to the voice, but to the opinion. For although a good man may keep silent, if he judges someone to be worthy of praise, that person has been praised.
Praeterea aliud est laus, aliud laudatio, haec et vocem exigit. Itaque nemo dicit laudem funebrem, sed laudationem, cuius officium oratione constat. Cum dicimus aliquem laude dignum, non verba illi benigna hominum, sed iudicia promittimus. Ergo laus etiam taciti est bene sentientis ac bonum virum apud se laudantis.
Furthermore, praise (laus) is one thing, eulogy (laudatio) another; the latter requires a voice as well. Therefore, no one says a “funeral praise,” but a “funeral eulogy,” the function of which consists of a speech. When we say someone is worthy of praise, we are not promising him the kind words of men, but their judgments. Therefore, praise belongs even to one who is silent but thinks well and praises a good man within himself.
Deinde, ut dixi, ad animum refertur laus, non ad verba, quae conceptam laudem egerunt et in notitiam plurium emittunt. Laudat qui laudandum esse iudicat. Cum tragicus ille apud nos ait magnificum esse "laudari a laudato viro,3" laude digno ait. Et cum aeque antiquus poeta ait "laus alit artis," non laudationem dicit, quae corrumpit artes. Nihil enim aeque et eloquentiam et omne aliud studium auribus deditum vitiavit quam popularis adsensio.
Next, as I said, praise is referred to the mind, not to words, which bring out the conceived praise and send it forth into the knowledge of many. He praises who judges that someone ought to be praised. When that tragic poet among us says that it is magnificent “to be praised by a praised man,” he means by one worthy of praise. And when an equally ancient poet says “praise nourishes the arts,” he does not mean a eulogy, which corrupts the arts. For nothing has so corrupted both eloquence and every other study directed to the ears as popular assent.
Fama vocem utique desiderat, claritas potest etiam citra vocem contingere contenta iudicio. Plena est non tantum inter tacentis, sed etiam inter reclamantis. Quid intersit inter claritatem et gloriam dicam: gloria multorum iudiciis constat, claritas bonorum, "Cuius," inquit, "bonum est claritas, id est laus bono a bonis reddita?
Fame certainly requires a voice, but renown can happen even without a voice, being content with judgment. It is full not only among those who are silent, but also among those who object. I shall say what is the difference between renown and glory: glory consists of the judgments of many, renown of the good. “Whose good,” he says, “is renown, that is, praise rendered to a good man by good men?
Utrum laudati an laudantis? "Utriusque, Meum, qui laudor; quia natura me amantem omnium genuit, et bene fecisse gaudeo, et gratos me invenisse virtutum interpretes laetor; hoc plurium bonum est, quod grati sunt, sed et meum. Ita enim animo conpositus sum, ut aliorum bonum meum iudicem, utique eorum, quibus ipse sum boni causa.
Is it of the praised or of the praiser?” Of both. It is mine, who am praised; because nature generated me as a lover of all, and I rejoice to have done well, and I am glad to have found grateful interpreters of my virtues; this is the good of the many, in that they are grateful, but it is also mine. For I am so disposed in mind that I judge the good of others to be my own, especially of those to whom I myself am the cause of good.
Est istud laudantium bonum, virtute enim geritur; omnis autem virtutis actio bonum est. Hoc contingere illis non potuisset, nisi ego talis essem. Itaque utriusque bonum est merito laudari, tam mehercules quam bene iudicasse iudicantis bonum est et eius, secundum quem iudicatum est.4 Numquid dubitas, quin iustitia et habentis bonum sit et autem sit eius, cui debitum solvit? Merentem laudare iustitia est; ergo utriusque bonum est.
That is the good of the praisers, for it is done with virtue; and every action of virtue is a good. This could not have happened to them unless I had been such a person. Therefore it is the good of both to be deservedly praised, just as, by Hercules, to have judged well is the good of the judge and of him in whose favor the judgment was made. Do you doubt that justice is the good both of the possessor and of him to whom the debt is paid? To praise one who deserves it is justice; therefore it is the good of both.
Cavillatoribus istis abunde responderimus. Sed non debet hoc nobis esse propositum arguta disserere et philosophiam in has angustias ex sua maiestate detrahere; quanto satius est ire aperta via et recta quam sibi ipsum flexus disponere, quos cum magna molestia debeas relegere? Neque enim quicquam aliud istae disputationes sunt quam inter se perite captantium lusus.
We have answered those cavillers abundantly. But this ought not to be our purpose, to dispute subtle things and drag philosophy down from its majesty into these narrow straits; how much better is it to go by an open and straight path than to set up turnings for oneself, which you must retrace with great trouble? For those disputations are nothing other than a game of people skillfully trying to catch one another.
- 102.12pro eo est, ac si
An idiomatic comparative expression meaning "it is the same as if" or "it is equivalent to," taking the subjunctive mood (sentiant).
- 102.13idem potest
The verb possum is used in the sense of "to have power" or "to be effective," forming a correlative structure with idem ... quod ("the same as") to mean "has the same power as that of all."
- 102.16laudari a laudato viro
A quotation from the lost tragedy Hector Proficiscens by the early Roman tragic poet Gnaeus Naevius. Here, laudato carries the nuance of gerundive passive potentiality ("worthy of praise") rather than merely "actually praised."
- 102.19secundum quem iudicatum est
secundum aliquem iudicare is a legal idiom meaning "to decide or judge in someone's favor." Here, it is used in the impersonal passive voice, referring to "the one in whose favor the judgment was given."