- Source
- Cicero. M. Tullii Ciceronis De divinatione libri duo libri de fato quae manserunt. Mueller, C. F. W., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1915.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi054.humanitext-lat1:30-34
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Introduces Chrysippus' refutation of the idle argument using the concept of co-fated events (confatalia), followed by Carneades' critique of fatalism and the correct definition of prior causation.
Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata; simplex est: "Morietur illo die Socrates"; huic,1 sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si ita fatum erit: "Nascetur Oedipus Laio", non poterit dici: "sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit"; copulata enim res est et confatalis; sic enim appellat, quia ita fatum sit et concubiturum cum uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum, ut, si esset dictum: "Luctabitur Olympiis Milo" et referret aliquis: "Ergo, sive habuerit adversarium sive non habuerit, luctabitur", erraret; est enim copulatum "luctabitur", quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est. Omnes igitur istius generis captiones eodem modo refelluntur. "Sive tu adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces" captiosum; tam enim est fatale medicum adhibere quam convalescere. Haec, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat.
”For some things,” he says, “are simple in reality, and some are copulated. A simple thing is: ‘Socrates will die on that day’; for him, whether he does something or does not do it, the day of his dying is determined. But if it is fated thus: ‘Oedipus will be born to Laius’, it cannot be said: ‘whether Laius has been with a woman or has not been’; for the matter is copulated and confated; for he calls it so because it has been fated both that Laius will lie with his wife and that he will procreate Oedipus from her, just as if it had been said: ‘Milo will wrestle in the Olympic Games’, and someone were to reply: ‘Therefore, whether he has an opponent or does not have one, he will wrestle’, he would err; for ‘he will wrestle’ is copulated, because without an opponent there is no wrestling. All captious arguments of this kind, therefore, are refuted in the same manner: ‘Whether you call a doctor or do not call a doctor, you will recover’ is captious; for it is as much fated to call a doctor as to recover. These things, as I said, he calls confated.”
Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat. Itaque premebat alio modo nec ullam adhibebat calumniam; cuius erat haec conclusio: "Si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione conserte contexteque fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt."
”Carneades did not approve of this whole class of argument and thought this reasoning concluded too inconsiderately. Therefore, he pressed in another way and used no trickery; his conclusion was this: ‘If all things happen by antecedent causes, all things happen connectedly and interwovenly by a natural bond; but if this is so, necessity brings about all things; if this is true, nothing is in our power; but something is in our power; on the other hand, if all things happen by fate, all things happen by antecedent causes; therefore, whatever happens does not happen by fate.’”
Hoc artius adstringi ratio non potest. Nam si quis velit idem referre atque ita dicere: "Si omne futurum ex aeternitate verum est, ut ita certe eveniat, quem ad modum sit futurum, omnia necesse est conligatione naturali conserte contexteque fieri", nihil dicat. Multum enim differt, utrum causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat, an etiam sine aeternitate naturali, futura quae sint, ea vera esse possint intellegi.2 Itaque dicebat Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset.
”This argument cannot be bound more tightly. For if anyone should wish to reply with the same and speak thus: ‘If every future thing is true from eternity, so that it may happen certainly in the way it is going to be, it is necessary that all things happen connectedly and interwovenly by a natural bond’, he would say nothing. For it differs much whether a natural cause from eternity brings about future true things, or whether even without natural eternity, the things which are future can be understood to be true. Therefore, Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could speak of future things unless they were those whose causes nature so contained that it was necessary for them to happen.”
Quid enim spectans deus ipse diceret3 Marcellum eum, qui ter consul fuit, in mari esse periturum? Erat hoc quidem verum ex aeternitate, sed causas id efficientis non habebat. Ita ne praeterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa tamquam vestigia extarent, Apollini nota esse censebat; quo minus futura! causis enim efficientibus quamque rem cognitis posse denique sciri, quid futurum esset. Ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis, cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi. Quocirca, si Stoicis, qui omnia fato fieri dicunt, consentaneum est huius modi oracla ceteraque, quae a divinatione ducuntur, conprobare, iis autem, qui, quae futura sunt, ea vera esse ex aeternitate dicunt, non idem dicendum est, vide, ne non eadem sit illorum causa et Stoicorum; hi enim urguentur angustius, illorum ratio soluta ac libera est.
”For looking at what would the god himself say that Marcellus, the one who was thrice consul, was going to perish in the sea? This was indeed true from eternity, but it did not have causes bringing it about. Thus he thought that not even past things, of which no signs remained as traces, were known to Apollo; much less future things! For only when the efficient causes of each thing are known, can what will be in the future finally be known. Therefore, neither could Apollo predict concerning Oedipus, with no causes set beforehand in the nature of things why it was necessary for his father to be killed by him, nor anything of that kind. Wherefore, if it is consistent for the Stoics, who say all things happen by fate, to approve of oracles of this kind and other things which are derived from divination, yet for those who say that what is future is true from eternity, the same must not be said, see lest the cause of the latter is not the same as that of the Stoics; for the latter are pressed more narrowly, while the reasoning of the former is loose and free.”
Quodsi concedatur nihil posse evenire nisi causa antecedente, quid proficiatur, si ea causa non ex aeternis causis apta dicatur? Causa autem ea est, quae id efficit, cuius est causa, ut vulnus mortis, cruditas morbi, ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat, nec, quod in campum descenderim, id fuisse causae,4 cur pila luderem, nec Hecubam causam interitus fuisse Troianis, quod Alexandrum genuerit, nec Tyndareum Agamemnoni, quod Clytaemnestram. Hoc enim modo viator quoque bene vestitus causa grassatori fuisse dicetur, cur ab eo spoliaretur.
”But if it should be conceded that nothing can happen except by an antecedent cause, what is gained if that cause is not said to be fitted from eternal causes? Now that is a cause which brings about that of which it is the cause, as a wound of death, indigestion of illness, fire of heat. Therefore, cause ought not to be understood in such a way that whatever antecedes something is its cause, but what antecedes it efficiently; nor that because I descended into the campus, that was the cause why I played ball, nor that Hecuba was the cause of ruin to the Trojans because she bore Alexander, nor Tyndareus to Agamemnon because he bore Clytemnestra. For in this way a well-dressed traveler also will be said to have been the cause to the highwayman why he was robbed by him.”
- 30huic
The pronoun huic is a dative of reference referring to Socrates, indicating that for him (regardless of his actions) the day of his death is determined.
- 32utrum causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat, an etiam sine aeternitate naturali, futura quae sint, ea vera esse possint intellegi
A double indirect question introduced by utrum ... an, functioning as the subject of the verb differt. In the second part, the relative clause futura quae sint modifies the pronoun ea, which in turn acts as the subject of the accusative-with-infinitive construction ea vera esse.
- 33diceret
Imperfect subjunctive. It functions as a potential subjunctive in the past or a deliberative subjunctive in a rhetorical question, implying past impossibility: "(looking at what) could the god himself have said?".
- 34id fuisse causae
The demonstrative pronoun id is the subject of the infinitive, and causae is a partitive genitive. Literally "that was of cause," which is a Latin idiomatic expression meaning "that was the cause."