Carneades on Voluntary Motion and Free Will — Cicero, On Fate 19–23, Latin & English

§19

Licet enim Epicuro concedenti omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum esse non vereri, ne omnia fato fieri sit necesse; non enim aeternis causis naturae necessitate manantibus verum est id, quod ita enuntiatur: "Descendit in Academiam Carneades", nec tamen sine causis, sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas et inter causas cohibentis¹ in se efficientiam naturalem. Ita et semper verum fuit "Morietur Epicurus, cum duo et septuaginta annos vixerit, archonte Pytharato", neque tamen erant causae fatales, cur ita accideret, sed, quod ita cecidit, serie certa causarum casurum, sicut cecidit, fuit.

For Epicurus is permitted, even while conceding that every proposition is either true or false, not to fear that it is necessary for all things to happen by fate. For it is not by eternal causes flowing from the necessity of nature that what is so declared is true: “Carneades went down to the Academy”, nor yet is it without causes; but there is a difference between causes that have preceded by chance and causes that contain in themselves a natural efficiency. Thus it was also always true: “Epicurus will die when he has lived seventy-two years, in the archonship of Pytharatus”, yet there were no fated causes why it should so happen, but because it so fell out, it was about to fall out by a certain series of causes, just as it did fall out.

§20

Nec ii, qui dicunt inmutabilia esse, quae futura sint, nec posse verum futurum convertere in falsum, fati necessitatem confirmant, sed verborum vim interpretantur. At qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam, ii mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliatam necessitate fati devinciunt. Sed haec hactenus; alia videamus. Concludit enim Chrysippus hoc modo: "Si est motus sine causa, non omnis enuntiatio, quod a)ci/wma dialectici appellant, aut vera aut falsa erit; causas enim efficientis quod non habebit, id nec verum nec falsum erit; omnis autem enuntiatio aut vera aut falsa est; motus ergo sine causa nullus est. Quod si ita est, omnia, quae fiunt, causis fiunt antegressis; id si ita est, fato omnia fiunt; efficitur igitur fato fieri, quaecumque fiant."

Nor do those who say that future things are immutable, and that a true future cannot be changed into false, confirm the necessity of fate, but they interpret the force of words. But those who introduce an everlasting series of causes bind the mind of man, stripped of free will, in the necessity of fate. But so much for this; let us look at other matters. For Chrysippus concludes in this manner: “If there is a motion without a cause, not every proposition, which the dialecticians call an axiom, will be either true or false; for that which does not have efficient causes will be neither true nor false; but every proposition is either true or false; therefore, there is no motion without a cause. But if this is so, all things that happen happen by preceding causes; if this is so, all things happen by fate; it is therefore brought about that whatever happens happens by fate.”

§21

Hic primum si mihi libeat adsentiri Epicuro et negare omnem enuntiationem aut veram esse aut falsam, eam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri conprobem; illa enim sententia habet aliquid disputationis, haec vero non est tolerabilis. Itaque contendit omnis nervos Chrysippus, ut persuadeat omne a)ci/wma aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut enim Epicurus veretur, ne, si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri, quaecumque fiant, (si enim alterum utrum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum et, si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat) sic Chrysippus metuit, ne, si non obtinuerit omne, quod enuntietur, aut verum esse aut falsum, non teneat omnia fato fieri et ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum.

At this point, in the first place, if I should please to agree with Epicurus and deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would rather receive that blow than approve that all things happen by fate; for the former opinion has some room for discussion, but the latter indeed is intolerable. Therefore, Chrysippus exerts every nerve to persuade us that every axiom is either true or false. For just as Epicurus fears lest, if he should concede this, it must be conceded that whatever happens happens by fate (for if either of the two is true from eternity, that is also certain, and if certain, also necessary; thus he thinks both necessity and fate are confirmed), so Chrysippus fears lest, if he does not obtain that everything which is declared is either true or false, he cannot maintain that all things happen by fate and from eternal causes of future events.

§22

Sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari necessitatem fati putat. Itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus et plagam, cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo (id appellat e)la/- xiston); quam declinationem sine causa fieri si minus verbis, re² cogitur confiteri. Non enim atomus ab atomo pulsa declinat. Nam qui potest pelli alia ab alia, si gravitate feruntur ad perpendiculum corpora individua rectis lineis, ut Epicuro placet? Sequitur enim, ut, si alia ab alia numquam depellatur, ne contingat quidem alia aliam. Ex quo efficitur, etiamsi sit atomus eaque declinet, declinare sine causa.

But Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom. And so a certain third motion arises beyond weight and impact, when the atom swerves by the smallest interval (which he calls the minimum); which swerve, if not in words, he is forced by reality to confess occurs without a cause. For the atom does not swerve because it is struck by another atom. For how can one be struck by another, if individual bodies are carried perpendicularly by gravity in straight lines, as Epicurus pleases? For it follows that, if one is never driven off by another, one does not even touch another. From which it is brought about that, even if there is an atom and it swerves, it swerves without a cause.

§23

Hanc Epicurus rationem induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu cogeretur. Id Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturalis motus avellere. Acutius Carneades, qui docebat posse Epicureos suam causam sine hac commenticia declinatione defendere. Nam cum docerent esse posse quendam animi motum voluntarium, id fuit defendi melius quam introducere declinationem, cuius praesertim causam reperire non possent; quo defenso³ facile Chrysippo possent resistere. Cum enim concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa, non concederent omnia, quae fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus; voluntatis enim nostrae non esse causas externas et antecedentis.⁴

Epicurus introduced this reasoning for this reason, that he feared lest, if the atom were always carried by a natural and necessary gravity, nothing would be free for us, since the mind would be so moved as to be compelled by the motion of the atoms. Democritus, the author of atoms, preferred to accept this, that all things happen by necessity, rather than to tear away natural motion from individual bodies. Carneades was more acute, who taught that the Epicureans could defend their cause without this fictitious swerve. For since they taught that there could be a certain voluntary motion of the mind, it was better to defend that than to introduce a swerve, especially since they could not find its cause; and if this were defended, they could easily resist Chrysippus. For although they had conceded that no motion is without a cause, they would not concede that all things which happen happen by antecedent causes; for there are no external and antecedent causes of our will.

Syntax notes4 items

19cohibentis
Accusative plural of the present participle cohibens (written with the archaic ending -is instead of -es), modifying causas. It takes efficientiam naturalem as its object, meaning "causes that contain in themselves a natural efficiency."
22si minus verbis, re
The phrase si minus is an idiomatic expression meaning "if not" or "if less." Here it forms a concessive contrast: "if not in words, [then] in reality."
23quo defenso
Ablative absolute construction containing a relative pronoun (quō dēfēnsō). It refers back to the defense of animi motum voluntarium (voluntary motion of the mind), functioning conditionally as "if this were defended."
23voluntatis enim nostrae non esse causas externas et antecedentis
An accusative and infinitive clause in indirect discourse, where causas (accusative plural; antecedentis has the archaic ending -is) is the subject and esse is the infinitive (negated by non). voluntatis nostrae is a genitive of possession or relation, meaning "for there are no external and antecedent causes of our will."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)

2026-09-21 AI review — note 1

urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi054.humanitext-lat1:19-23