Logic of Divination and the Dispute on Modality — Cicero, On Fate 11–14, Latin & English

§11

Sed haec ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt, extirpari autem et funditus tolli, ut is ipse, qui ad ea propensus fuerit, a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in¹ naturalibus causis, sed in voluntate, studio, disciplina. Quae tolluntur omnia, si vis et natura fati ex divinationis ratione firmabitur. Etenim si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis proficiscitur? (percepta appello, quae dicuntur Graece qewrh/mata). Non enim credo nullo percepto aut ceteros artifices versari in suo munere, aut eos, qui divinatione utantur, futura praedicere.

But although these vices can arise from natural causes, yet that they should be extirpated and radically removed, so that the very person who had been inclined to them is called away from such great vices, this is not placed in natural causes, but in will, effort, and training. All of these are destroyed, if the force and nature of fate are established on the basis of divination. For indeed, if divination exists, from what kind of grasped principles of an art does it proceed? (I call “grasped principles” what are called “theorēmata” in Greek). For I do not believe that other artisans engage in their duties without any grasped principle, nor that those who practice divination predict future events without it.

§12

Sint igitur astrologorum percepta huius modi: "Si quis verbi causa oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur." Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro, valente dialectico, magna luctatio est, deseras. Si enim est verum, quod ita conectitur: "Si quis oriente Canicula natus est, in mari non morietur", illud quoque verum est: "Si Fabius oriente Canicula natus est, Fabius in mari non morietur." Pugnant igitur haec inter se, Fabium oriente Canicula natum esse, et Fabium in mari moriturum;² et quoniam certum in Fabio ponitur, natum esse eum Canicula oriente, haec quoque pugnant, et esse Fabium, et in mari esse moriturum. Ergo haec quoque coniunctio est ex repugnantibus: "Et est Fabius, et in mari Fabius morietur", quod, ut propositum est, ne fieri quidem potest. Ergo illud: "Morietur in mari Fabius" ex eo genere est, quod fieri non potest. Omne ergo, quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest.

Let, therefore, the grasped principles of the astrologers be of this kind: “If anyone, for example, was born at the rising of the Dog-star, he will not die in the sea.” Watch out, Chrysippus, lest you abandon your own case, in which you have a great struggle with Diodorus, the powerful dialectician. For if that which is thus connected is true: “If anyone was born at the rising of the Dog-star, he will not die in the sea”, that also is true: “If Fabius was born at the rising of the Dog-star, Fabius will not die in the sea.” Therefore, these contradict each other, that Fabius was born at the rising of the Dog-star, and that Fabius will die in the sea; and since it is assumed as certain in the case of Fabius that he was born at the rising of the Dog-star, these also contradict each other, both that Fabius exists and that he will die in the sea. Therefore, this conjunction also consists of contradictory elements: “Both Fabius exists and Fabius will die in the sea”, which, as has been proposed, cannot even happen. Therefore, that statement: “Fabius will die in the sea” is of that kind which cannot happen. Therefore, everything that is said falsely concerning the future is impossible to happen.

§13

At hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum, et, quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse et, quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu, et quae non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id numquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millensimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset. At si ista conprobabis divina praedicta, et, quae falsa in futuris dicentur, in iis habebis, ut ea fieri non possint, et, si vere dicatur de futuro, idque ita futurum sit, dicas esse necessarium; quae est tota Diodori vobis inimica sententia.

But this, Chrysippus, you by no means want, and it is on this very point that you have the greatest contest with Diodorus. For he says that only that can happen which either is true or will be true, and whatever will be, he says must necessarily happen, and whatever will not be, he denies can happen. You say that even things which will not be can happen, as that this gem can be broken, even if that will never happen, and that it was not necessary for Cypselus to rule in Corinth, although that had been declared a thousand years before by the oracle of Apollo. But if you approve those divine predictions, you will hold both that those things which are said falsely in the future cannot happen, and that if a statement is made truly about the future and it is to be so, you must say that it is necessary; which is the entire opinion of Diodorus, hostile to you.

§14

Etenim si illud vere conectitur: "Si oriente Canicula natus es, in mari non moriere", primumque quod est in conexo: "Natus es oriente Canicula", necessarium est (omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt,³ ut Chrysippo placet dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt inmutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere); si igitur, quod primum in conexo est, necessarium est, fit etiam, quod consequitur, necessarium. Quamquam hoc Chrysippo non videtur valere in omnibus; sed tamen, si naturalis est causa, cur in mari Fabius non moriatur, in mari Fabius mori non potest.

For if that is truly connected: “If you were born at the rising of the Dog-star, you will not die in the sea”, and the first part which is in the connected statement: “You were born at the rising of the Dog-star”, is necessary (for all things true in the past are necessary, as is pleasing to Chrysippus, who disagrees with his master Cleanthes, because past things are immutable and cannot change from true to false); if therefore that which is first in the connected statement is necessary, that which follows also becomes necessary. Although this does not seem to Chrysippus to hold in all cases; but nevertheless, if there is a natural cause why Fabius should not die in the sea, Fabius cannot die in the sea.

Syntax notes3 items

11extirpari autem et funditus tolli, ut is ipse, qui ad ea propensus fuerit, a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in
This demonstrates the anaphoric relation between the infinitive phrases acting as the subject (extirpari... tolli) and the pronoun id in non est id positum.... The ut... avocetur clause acts either as an appositive noun clause explaining the content of these infinitives or as a clause of result ("so that the very person... is called away").
12et esse Fabium, et in mari esse moriturum
These infinitive phrases serve as the subject of pugnant (contradict). Since "that Fabius was born" has been assumed as a settled fact (certum), the condition of the antecedent is equivalently reduced to "the existence of Fabius" (esse Fabium), which is then directly contrasted as contradictory to the consequent (in mari esse moriturum).
14omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt
This is the main part of the parenthetical clause omnia enim... convertere, explaining the Stoic logical premise of the necessity (immutability) of past truths. The following conditional "if the first part in the connected statement is necessary, that which follows also becomes necessary" represents Diodorus' position; Chrysippus himself does not accept this rule (that the necessity of the antecedent entails the necessity of the consequent) in all cases, as indicated by Quamquam hoc Chrysippo non videtur valere in omnibus.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi054.humanitext-lat1:11-14