On the Nature of Man

​ON THE NATURE OF MAN 1. For anyone who is accustomed to hearing people speak about human nature further than as much of it as reaches into medicine, this discourse is not suitable to hear. For I do not say that man is entirely air, nor fire, nor water, nor earth, nor any other thing that is not clearly present in man; rather, I leave these things to those who wish to say them. However, those who say such things do not seem to me to judge correctly; for though they all use the same idea, they do not say the same things, yet they make the conclusion of their idea the same. For they say that what exists is some one thing, and that this is the one and the all, but they do not agree on the names. One of them claims that this one and all is air, another fire, another water, and another earth, and each adds to his own argument proofs and testimonies that are of no account. For when they all use the same idea but do not say the same things, it is clear that they do not even understand these things. One would understand this best by being present when they argue; for when the same men argue against each other in the presence of the same listeners, the same person never wins three times in succession in the debate, but sometimes this one prevails, sometimes that one, and sometimes whoever happens to have his tongue flow most smoothly before the crowd. And yet, it is right for the one who claims to judge correctly about things to always present his own argument as prevailing, if indeed he knows what exists and declares it correctly. But to me, such men seem to overthrow themselves by their own lack of understanding in the names of their very arguments, and rather to confirm the argument of Melissus.

​2. Now concerning these matters, what has been said is enough for me. But as for physicians, some say that man is only blood, others of them say that man is bile, and some say phlegm; and all these also make the same conclusion. For they say that there is some one thing, whatever each of them wishes to name it, and that this, being one, changes its form and its power, being compelled by heat and cold, and becomes sweet, bitter, white, black, and every other sort of thing. But to me, these things do not seem to be so either. Most people, then, declare things of this sort or very close to them. But I say that if man were one, he would never feel pain; for being one, there would be nothing from which he could feel pain; and even if he did feel pain, the cure would also have to be one. But as it is, there are many cures; for there are many things present in the body which, when they are heated and cooled, and dried and moistened by one another contrary to nature, produce diseases; so that there are many forms of diseases, and many cures for them. And I require the one who claims that man is only blood and nothing else, to show that it does not change its form or become all sorts of things, except for some season of the year or some period of human life in which blood alone appears to be present in man; for it is likely that there is at least some one season in which it appears present by itself. And I say the same things also about the one who claims that man is only phlegm, and about the one who claims he is bile. For I will demonstrate that the things I claim man to be are always the same, both by convention and by nature, in the same way, whether a person is young or old, and whether the season is cold or hot, and I will provide proofs, and declare the necessities through which each increases and decreases in the body.