- Source
- Polybius. Vols. 1-4. Büttner-Wobst, Theodor, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1893.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0543.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:12.25i.1-12.25i.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Explains that Homer is a sufficient example of vividness, and argues that book-learning is only the third part of history. It criticizes Timaeus's redundant speeches and stresses the importance of timely judgment and investigating historical causes.
ὅτι δὲ1 τὸ λεγόμενον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἱκανὸν ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς πίστιν ὁ ποιητής, παρʼ ᾧ πολὺ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμφάσεως ἴδοι τις ἂν ὑπάρχον.
And that what is said is not impossible, the poet is a sufficient example for belief, in whose work one would see much of such vividness existing.
ἐξ ὧν πᾶς ἂν εἰκότως συγκατάθοιτο τρίτον εἶναι μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τρίτην ἔχειν τάξιν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων πολυπραγμοσύνην.2
From which everyone would reasonably agree that the inquiry from records is the third part of history and holds the third rank.
ὡς δʼ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκφανέστατον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἐπί τε τῶν συμβουλευτικῶν καὶ παρακλητικῶν, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτικῶν λόγων, οἷς κέχρηται Τίμαιος.
And how true what is now said is, would become most manifest in the deliberative, hortatory, and indeed embassy speeches which Timaeus employs.
ὀλίγοι μὲν γὰρ καιροὶ πάντας ἐπιδέχονται διαθέσθαι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι βραχεῖς [καί] τινας τῶν ὑπόντων, καὶ τούτων τινὰς μὲν οἱ νῦν, ἄλλους δʼ οἱ προγεγονότες, καὶ τινὰς μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ προσίενται, τινὰς δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, τινὰς δʼ Ἀθηναῖοι.
For few occasions admit of treating all the arguments that are present, but most admit only of some brief ones among those underlying, and of these, some are accepted by the men of today, others by those of former times, and some indeed the Aetolians accept, others the Peloponnesians, and others the Athenians.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ματαίως3 καὶ ἀκαίρως [καὶ] πρὸς πάντα πάντας διεξιέναι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, ὃ ποιεῖ Τίμαιος πρὸς πᾶσαν ὑπόθεσιν εὑρεσιλογῶν, τελέως ἀνάληθες καὶ μειρακιῶδες καὶ διατριβικόν — ἅμα καὶ πολλοῖς ἀποτυχίας αἴτιον ἤδη τοῦτο γέγονε καὶ καταφρονήσεως — τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἁρμόζοντας καὶ καιρίους ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν, τοῦτʼ ἀναγκαῖον.
And to go through all the possible arguments on all occasions, uselessly and out of season—which Timaeus does by inventing arguments for every subject—is completely untrue, childish, and pedantic (belonging to the schoolroom)—and this has already been the cause of failure and contempt for many—whereas to always choose the appropriate and timely ones, this is necessary.
ἀστάτου δὲ τῆς χρείας οὔσης καὶ πόσοις καὶ ποίοις τῶν ἐνόντων χρηστέον, ἀλλοιοτέρου τινὸς δεῖ ζήλου καὶ παραγγέλματος, εἰ μέλλομεν μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλʼ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας.
But since the need is unstable, and it is uncertain how many and what kind of the available arguments must be used, some different kind of effort and instruction is needed, if we intend not to harm but to benefit our readers.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς ἐν πᾶσι δυσπαράγγελτος, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀχθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας καὶ τριβῆς θεωρημάτων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑπονοηθείη τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τούτων.
Now, the proper season is indeed difficult to prescribe in all things, but it is not impossible to be brought to apprehension through principles derived from personal experience and training; and at present, what is said would be best understood from the following.
εἰ γὰρ οἱ συγγραφεῖς ὑποδείξαντες τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν βουλευομένων, κἄπειτα τοὺς κατʼ ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους ἐκθέντες διασαφήσαιεν ἡμῖν4 τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ἢ κατευστοχῆσαι συνέβη τοὺς εἰπόντας ἢ διαπεσεῖν, γένοιτʼ ἄν τις ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθινή, καὶ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν ἅμα μὲν διακρίνοντες, ἅμα δὲ μεταφέροντες ἐπὶ τὰ παραπλήσια κατευστοχεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
For if historians, having shown the occasions, the impulses, and the dispositions of those deliberating, and then having set forth the speeches actually delivered, should make clear to us the causes for which it happened that the speakers either succeeded or failed, some true understanding of the matter would arise, and we would be able, partly by distinguishing and partly by transferring to similar cases, to always hit the mark in the matters before us.
ἀλλʼ ἔστιν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν αἰτιολογεῖν δυσχερές, τὸ δὲ ῥησικοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀλίγα καιρίως εἰπεῖν καὶ τούτου παραγγελίαν εὑρεῖν ὀλίγοις ἐφικτόν, τὸ δὲ πολλὰ διαθέσθαι καὶ ματαίως τῶν ἐν μέσῳ κειμένων καὶ κοινόν.
But it is, I think, difficult to assign causes, but easy to babble in books; and to say a few things in a timely manner and to find instruction for this is attainable by few, whereas to set forth many things uselessly is common and within reach of anyone.
- 12.25i.1ὅτι δὲ
The introductory ὅτι at the beginning of the sentence serves to present or introduce a fact or thesis ('That...'), carrying over the preceding discussion about the necessity of personal experience. Here, it functions to introduce the topic without an explicit main governing verb.
- 12.25i.2τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων πολυπραγμοσύνην
The prepositional phrase ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ('from records') is attributively positioned between the article τὴν and the noun πολυπραγμοσύνην ('inquiry, busy research'). This entire noun phrase serves as the accusative subject of the infinitives εἶναι and ἔχειν.
- 12.25i.5τὸ μὲν ματαίως
Two contrasting actions are expressed by articular infinitives (tò mén ... diexiénai and tò dé ... lambánein). The first infinitive phrase is associated with the predicates 'τελέως ἀνάληθες καὶ μειρακιῶδες καὶ διατριβικόν', while the second is resumed by 'τοῦτʼ' and completed by 'ἀναγκαῖον'. Despite the parenthesis (ἅμα καὶ...) inserted in the middle, the sentence maintains a clear 'mén ... dé' antithetical structure.
- 12.25i.8διασαφήσαιεν ἡμῖν
The condition is expressed by the optative (διασαφήσαιεν, preceded by participles), and the conclusion uses the optative with ἄν (γένοιτʼ ἄν, δυναίμεθʼ ἄν). This forms a potential condition ('should they clarify... would arise / we would be able'), expressing a hypothetical possibility or ideal future scenario.