Regarding the Prohibition of Comedy

​It is no small advantage, O men of Smyrna, for one who intends to persuade, that his words should be pleasing to his hearers; whereas, of those who wish to admonish, the multitude are so far from readily adopting their opinions that they do not even tolerate them ​at all. Nevertheless, for all those affairs which themselves by their own nature urge earnest attention, there is no need of an adviser; rather, nature everywhere leads towards one’s own interest. But those things which we must pursue or guard against after being instructed by reason, these are left to the adviser. So, if anyone is unwilling to listen, he invalidates the giving of advice on his own part. Moreover, while it is reasonable for some others to behave rudely, it is, in my judgment at least, one of the most absurd things that you, who seem to excel so much both in intelligence and in education, should not first of all be altogether well-disposed towards listening to speeches, and then, if someone recommends what is best, should not make use of it and feel grateful. If, then, I were about to introduce some labors or troubles, first of all, there would perhaps have been need of a struggle, and then I would have tried to teach that what is beneficial to the whole is preferable to immediate entertainment. But as it is, I am so far from proposing anything difficult that I have come to advise these very things, of which nothing is difficult either to say or to hear; so far am I from doing or advising anything of a difficult nature. And I shall begin from where you would most easily follow, and from my own custom. I say, then, that we must celebrate the festival for Dionysus, and by Zeus, for Aphrodite too, and for all the other gods, offering libations and sacrifices, singing paeans, wearing wreaths, and omitting nothing that pertains to piety. But one thing which is associated with these, which is reasonably pleasing to the multitude but most painful of all to the decent, we must remove out of the way; I mean these blasphemies and these daytime revels, and by Zeus, those at the all-night festivals, and that there should be neither poets nor performers of these, nor should we play at what is not for the better. For the case stands thus: to hear ill-speaking against one’s will is not pleasant, but to tolerate it willingly is a practice of malice; and this is among the first steps toward depravity, ​and one could bring no greater accusation against either an individual or a city than that they rejoice in evils. For envy, which seems to be the ultimate of human sins, having no excuse, must be shared by one who is inferior to this desire, and he must nurture it in himself. And here is proof: no one, at least, rejoices when those whom he loves and for whom he wishes good things are spoken ill of. Now, concerning assault and damage and such things, it is possible to say that one acted unwillingly; but the nature of malice is so different that, first, it is named after vice, as admitting no forgiveness, and second, it is not the designation of any single action, but of a disposition that wishes nothing good to anyone. And just as malice itself has the greatest share of vice, starting from its very name, so ill-speaking in turn has the greatest share of malice, starting from the similarity of its name. Thus both belong to evil and base men. Therefore, I think one should always choose to think and say what is best, but during the holy months and festivals, how is it not reasonable to strive for all auspicious speech, and for every thought to be most refined, and for everyone to be on the most friendly terms with one another, as if the gods were officiating over this friendship and concord, and indeed to consider the festivals almost, so to speak, as covenants of friendship? And there is no sacrifice so splendid, nor libations so pleasing, which could be more acceptable to the gods than if we offer our minds as good as possible to the extent of our ability. Moreover, what greater sign of reverence for the gods could there be than neither to say nor to hear anything discordant in their presence? Or is it that, when a respected friend is present, we would hesitate to say many things, even if we had just cause to abuse someone, yet using the ears of the gods as a shield, we will readily speak, and some of us will listen to, things which we ourselves would not say are beautiful, but which we disparage as being shameful? But in order that...