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Rhetoric

§3.7.1-3.7.11

Propriety of Style and Expression of Emotion and Character

The passage discusses the "propriety" of style in rhetoric, emphasizing that it must express emotion (pathos) and character (ethos), and be proportionate to the subject, while also outlining remedies for stylistic excess and effective rhetorical techniques.

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§3.7.1

τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ παθητική τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον.

Style will possess propriety if it is emotional, character-expressing, and proportionate to the subject matter.

§3.7.2

τὸ δʼ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδʼ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν πότνια συκῆ.

​Proportion is preserved if grand subjects are not treated in a slapdash manner, nor trivial subjects solemnly, and if no ornament is attached to a trivial term; otherwise, it appears like comedy, as Cleophon does; for he used to say some things just as if he were to say “lady fig-tree.”

§3.7.3

παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρά, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου καὶ λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως.

​The style is emotional if, in the case of insolence, it is the language of an angry man; in the case of impious and ugly things, that of one who is disgusted and hesitant even to speak them; in the case of praiseworthy things, admiringly; in the case of pitiable things, humbly; and similarly in other cases.

§3.7.4

πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεταί τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος,1 ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστʼ οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς λέγει ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ.

​And the appropriate style makes the matter persuasive; for the soul of the hearer is misled into thinking that the speaker is telling the truth, because people are so disposed in such circumstances, so that they think, even if the facts are not as the speaker says, that they are indeed so; and the hearer always sympathizes with the one who speaks emotionally, even if he says nothing of substance.

§3.7.5

διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες.

​Therefore many stun their hearers by making a clamor.

§3.7.6

καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτε ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἁρμόττουσα ἑκάστῳ γένει καὶ ἕξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθʼ ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ ἀνήρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἕξεις δέ, καθʼ ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθʼ ἅπασαν ἕξιν οἱ βίοι ποιοί τινες.

​And this expression of character is the showing by signs, when the style appropriate to each class and habit follows. By “class” I mean according to age, such as child, man, or old man, and woman or man, and Laconian or Thessalian; and by “habits” those according to which someone is of a certain character in life, for lives are not of a certain character according to every habit.

§3.7.7

ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οὐδʼ ὡσαύτως ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πάσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ2 κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ λογογράφοι, τίς δʼ οὐκ οἶδεν; , ἅπαντες ἴσασιν· ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὗπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

​If, therefore, one also uses words appropriate to the habit, he will produce character; for a rustic and an educated man would not say the same things nor in the same way. The hearers also experience an effect from what the speechwriters use to satiety: “Who does not know?”, “Everyone knows”; for the hearer agrees, feeling ashamed, so that he may share in what everyone else also shares.

§3.7.8

τὸ δʼ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν.

​Using them opportunely or inopportunely is common to all these classes.

§3.7.9

ἄκος δʼ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα.

​And the remedy for every excess is the well-known one: for the speaker must rebuke himself in addition; for it seems to be true, since what he is doing does not escape the notice of the speaker himself.

§3.7.10

ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρήσασθαι3 (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής)· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ τοῖς ἁρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, πιθανὸν γίγνεται.

​Furthermore, not to use all the proportionate devices at the same time (for in this way the hearer is deceived); I mean, for example, if the words are harsh, not to use also the voice and facial expression that fit them; otherwise, each device becomes manifest for what it is. But if one employs one and not the other, he achieves the same effect unnoticed. If, therefore, soft things are spoken harshly, and harsh things softly, it becomes persuasive.

§3.7.11

τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες, ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν4 ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπαίνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ οἵτινες ἔτλησαν· φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἥρμοσεν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἢ δὴ οὕτως δεῖ, ἢ μετʼ εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

​Compound words, multiple epithets, and foreign words are most suitable for one who speaks emotionally; for there is excuse for an angry man to call an evil “heaven-high” or to speak of it as “monstrous,” and also when he already holds his hearers and has made them enthusiastic either by praises or by censures or by anger or by friendship, as Isocrates also does at the end of the Panegyricus: “fame and memory” and “those who dared”; for they utter such things when they are enthusiastic, so that they also accept them, being clearly in the same state of mind. Therefore they also suited poetry, for poetry is an inspired thing. One must write either in this way, or with irony, as Gorgias used to do and as are the passages in the Phaedrus.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 1408a20λέγοντος

    The participle λέγοντος in ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος either modifies an implied τοῦ λέγοντος (of the speaker) or functions as a genitive absolute with ὡς, meaning "as if the speaker were telling the truth." It explains the cause or content of the hearer's soul (ἡ ψυχὴ) being misled (παραλογίζεται).

  2. 1408a30ᾧ

    The relative pronoun ᾧ (dative singular neuter) has its antecedent (such as a demonstrative τούτῳ) omitted and is attracted to the dative case governed by the verb χρῶνται within the relative clause. The entire phrase functions as a dative of means or cause for the main verb πάσχουσι (experience an effect).

  3. 1408b5χρήσασθαι

    The infinitive χρήσασθαι, accompanied by the negative particle μή, is used as an imperative infinitive to express a prohibition or recommendation. This usage is common in Aristotle's style when stating rules or advice.

  4. 1408b10καὶ ὅταν

    The temporal clause introduced by καὶ ὅταν (and when) structurally extends the application of the judgment συγγνώμη [ἐστί] (there is excuse / it is excusable) from the preceding clause. It forms a double conditional structure: "there is excuse for an angry man..., and likewise there is excuse when the speaker already holds his audience..."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:3.7.1-3.7.11