Rhetoric

​There are two parts of a speech; for it is necessary both to state the matter concerning which it is, and to prove this. Therefore, to state it without proving it, or to prove it without first stating it, is impossible; for he who proves, proves something, and he who states beforehand, states it for the sake of proving.

​Of these, the one is the statement, the other the proof, just as if one were to make a division, saying that the one is the problem, the other the demonstration.

​But nowadays they make ridiculous divisions; for narrative is surely a part of the judicial speech alone, but in an epideictic or deliberative speech, how is it possible for there to be a narrative such as they describe, or the refutation of the opponent, or an epilogue of the demonstrations? And introduction, comparison, and recapitulation in deliberative speeches occur only when there is opposition. For accusation and defense occur often, but not advice; and furthermore, the epilogue is not even a part of every judicial speech, for instance if the speech is short or the matter is easy to remember; for it results in a subtraction from the length.

​Therefore, the necessary parts are the statement and the proof. These then are the proper parts, but at most they are introduction, statement, proof, and epilogue; for the refutation of the opponent belongs to the proofs, and the comparison is an amplification of one’s own arguments, so that it is a certain part of the proofs (for he who does this proves something), whereas the introduction is not, nor is the epilogue, which merely reminds.

​If, then, one makes such divisions, there will be what Theodoros and his followers used to do: narrative as one thing, and post-narrative and pre-narrative, and refutation and post-refutation. But one ought to give a name only when speaking of a distinct class and a real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and nonsensical, such as Licymnius does in his Art, naming epourosis, apoplanesis, and ozoi.