- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:2.9.1-2.9.8
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
The author defines indignation as the primary opposite of pity, describing it as pain felt at undeserved good fortune. He distinguishes indignation from envy and begins analyzing the circumstances and objects that provoke it.
ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν·1 τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ·
What most opposes pity is what they call indignation; for to be pained at undeserved bad fortune is in a way opposed to, and proceeds from the same character as, being pained at undeserved good fortune. And both emotions belong to a good character.
δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν.
For we ought to feel sympathy and pity for those who fare ill undeservedly, but to feel indignation at those who fare well; for what happens contrary to desert is unjust. Wherefore we also attribute indignation to the gods.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν·2 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.
And envy also might seem to oppose pity in the same way, as being close to and the same as indignation, but it is different. For envy is also a turbulent pain and is felt at good fortune, but not of the undeserved person, rather of one’s equal and peer. But the feature of ‘not because something else will happen to oneself, but on account of the neighbor himself’ must belong to all of them alike; for it will no longer be envy on the one hand and indignation on the other, but fear, if the pain and turbulence exist because of this, namely that some evil will happen to oneself from the other’s good fortune.
φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατʼ ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ.3
And it is clear that the opposite emotions will also follow upon these; for he who is pained at those who suffer undeservedly will rejoice or be free from pain at those who suffer under opposite circumstances; for example, no good man would be pained when parricides and murderers meet with punishment; for we ought to rejoice at such things, and likewise at those who fare well according to desert; for both are just, and make the decent man rejoice; for he must expect that what belongs to his equal will belong to himself as well.
καὶ ἔστιν τοῦαὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφʼ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν·4 διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτʼ ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.
And all these belong to the same character, and the opposites to the opposite character; for the same person is malicious and envious; for whenever one is pained at something coming into being and existing, one must necessarily rejoice at its deprivation and destruction; wherefore all these are preventive of pity, though they differ for the reasons stated, so that they are all alike useful for making things not pitiable.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
First, then, let us speak of indignation, whom they feel indignation at, and at what things, and in what state they themselves are; and then after these, of the other emotions.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν·
And this is clear from what has been said; for if to feel indignation is to be pained at apparent undeserved good fortune, first of all it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things;
οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
for if someone is just or courageous, or if he is to obtain virtue, one will not feel indignation at him (nor indeed is there pity for the opposites of these), but at wealth and power and such things, of which, to speak simply, good men are worthy, and those who possess natural goods, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such things.
- 1386bἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν
The verb ἀντίκειται (opposes) governs the dative τῷ ἐλεεῖν (pity). The subject is the relative clause ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν (what they call feeling indignation), where the verb καλοῦσι takes a double accusative (the relative pronoun ὃ and the predicate infinitive νεμεσᾶν acting as a noun).
- 1386b10τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν
The subject is the substantivized clause starting with τὸ, meaning 'the fact that one feels pain not because something else will happen to oneself, but on account of the neighbor himself.' ἅπασιν is a neuter plural dative meaning 'to all these emotions' (pity, indignation, envy), governed by ὑπάρχειν (to belong to), which depends on the impersonal verb δεῖ.
- 1386b30ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ.
The infinitive ὑπάρξαι is accompanied by the potential particle ἄν, serving as the object of ἐλπίζειν (to expect). The subject of the infinitive is understood to be the decent man, and the dative αὑτῷ (to himself) depends on ὑπάρξαι. After τῷ ὁμοίῳ (to his equal), the verb ὑπάρχει is omitted.
- 1387a1ἐφʼ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν
The relative pronoun ᾧ has its antecedent attracted into the dative case and, together with the preposition ἐπί, modifies λυπεῖται (to be pained). The participles γιγνομένῳ and ὑπάρχοντι agree with ᾧ, meaning 'at its coming into being and existing.' The pronoun τούτου (of this) refers back to the entity represented by ᾧ.