Rhetoric

​For the good man does these things. And those who do not oppose them when they are angry or in earnest; for such people are combative. And those who are seriously disposed towards them in some way, as, for instance, those who admire them, consider them to be excellent, and take pleasure in them, ​and especially those who have been thus affected regarding those things in which they themselves most wish either to be admired, or to seem excellent, or to be pleasant.

​And those who are similar to them and engage in the same pursuits, provided they do not annoy them or make their living from the same source; for in that case it becomes ‘potter against potter.’

​And those who desire the same things, if it is possible for them to share them at the same time; otherwise, the same thing happens in this case too.

​And those towards whom they are in such a relation that they do not feel shame regarding matters of opinion, provided they do not do so out of contempt.

​And those before whom they feel shame regarding truth. And those with whom they compete, or by whom they wish to be emulated and not envied, these they either love or wish to be friends with.

​And those with whom they cooperate in doing good, unless greater evils are likely to result to themselves.

​And those who love their friends both in their absence and in their presence in the same way; wherefore everyone loves those who are thus disposed towards the dead. And generally, those who are very fond of their friends and do not abandon them; for among good things, they especially love those who are good at loving.

​And those who do not play a part before them; and such are those who speak of their own weaknesses too. For it has been said that before friends we do not feel shame regarding matters of opinion. If, therefore, he who feels shame does not love, he who does not feel shame is like one who loves. And those who are not fearful, and in whom we have confidence; for no one loves one whom he fears.

​The kinds of friendship are companionship, intimacy, kinship, and the like. The things that produce friendship are doing a favor, ​and doing it unasked, and not making it known when one has done it; for in this way it appears to be for his sake and not for any other reason.

Concerning enmity and hating, it is clear that they may be observed from their opposites. The things that produce enmity are anger, spiteful treatment, and calumny.

​Now anger arises from matters concerning oneself, but enmity can arise even without matters concerning oneself; for if we think someone is of a certain character, we hate him. And while anger is always directed against particulars, for instance, against Callias or Socrates, hatred is also directed against classes; for everyone hates the thief and the informer. And the former is curable by time, but the latter is incurable. And the former is a desire for [causing] pain, but the latter is for [causing] evil; for the angry man wishes his pain to be felt, but to the hater this makes no difference. And all painful things are felt, but the greatest evils are least felt, such as injustice and folly; for the presence of vice causes no pain. And the former is accompanied by pain, but the latter is not accompanied by pain; for he who is angry feels pain, but he who hates does not. And the former might feel pity if many things happened [to his enemy], but the latter would feel pity for no one; for the former wishes the one he is angry with to suffer in return, but the latter wishes him not to exist.

​It is clear, therefore, from these things that it is possible to prove that people are enemies and friends, and to make them such when they are not, and to refute those who claim to be, and to bring those who are disputing through anger or enmity to whichever of the two one chooses.