Rhetoric

​Another is from judgment concerning the same, or a similar, or an opposite matter, especially if all and always so judge, and if not, at least the majority, or the wise, or all or most of them, or the good; or if the judges themselves so judge, or those whom the judges accept, or those against whom it is not possible to judge contrariwise, such as rulers, or those against whom it is not honorable to judge contrariwise, such as gods, or a father, or teachers. Just as Autocles said against Mixidemides, that it was proper for the Venerable Goddesses to submit to trial on the Areopagus, but not for Mixidemides. Or as Sappho said, that to die is an evil; for the gods have so judged, since otherwise they would die. Or as Aristippus said to Plato when the latter spoke rather boastfully, as he thought: “But indeed our companion,” he said, “said nothing of the sort,” meaning Socrates. And Hegesipolis at Delphi asked the god, having previously consulted at Olympia, whether he held the same opinion as his father, as it would be shameful to say the opposite. And concerning Helen, as Isocrates wrote, that she is noble, since Theseus judged her so; and concerning Alexander, that the goddesses preferred him; and concerning Evagoras, that he is noble, as Isocrates says: ”Conon at least, when he met with misfortune, passing over all others, went to Evagoras.”

​Another is from the parts, as in the *Topics*, what kind of motion the soul is; for it must be either this or that. An example from the *Socrates* of Theodectes: “Against what temple has he committed impiety? Which of the gods whom the city worships has he not honored?”

​Another is, since in most cases it happens that both a good and an evil consequence follow the same thing, to exhort or dissuade, to accuse or defend, to praise or blame, on the basis of the consequence. For example, “Envy follows education, which is an evil, but being wise follows, which is a good. Therefore, one must not be educated, for one must not be envied; yet, one must indeed be educated, for one must be wise.” This topic is the “Art” of Callippus, when one has added to it feasibility and the other elements as has been mentioned.

​Another is, when about two opposite things one must either exhort or dissuade, to use the previously mentioned method in both cases. But the difference is that in the former case any chance consequences are opposed, but here contraries are opposed. For instance, a priestess would not allow her son to speak in public: “For if,” she said, “you say what is just, men will hate you, but if you say what is unjust, the gods will; yet, on the contrary, you must speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, but if you say what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the saying, “buying the marsh and the salt”; and this is “retortion”, when a good and an evil follow each of two contraries, each being contrary to each.

Another is, since people do not praise the same things openly and secretly, but openly they praise justice and noble things most, while in private they prefer what is advantageous, to try to infer the other from these; for this topic is the most effective for producing paradoxical arguments.