Rhetoric

​One topos of demonstrative enthymemes is from contraries; for one must examine whether the contrary of a thing has the contrary quality, refuting if it does not belong, and establishing if it does, for instance, that to be temperate is good, for to be intemperate is harmful. Or as in the Messenian speech: “For if war is the cause of the present evils, we must repair them with peace.” And: “For if indeed it is not just to fall into anger against those who have done wrong involuntarily, neither if someone does good to another under compulsion is it fitting that gratitude should be owed to him.” And: “But if indeed there is among mortals such a thing as speaking persuasive falsehoods, you must believe the contrary too, that many unbelievable truths happen to mortals.”

Another is from similar inflections (conjugates); for a quality must belong or not belong in a similar way, for instance, that the just is not entirely good; for then “justly” too would be good, but now to die “justly” is not desirable.

​Another is from correlative terms; for if to do a thing finely or justly belongs to one party, then to have experienced it belongs to the other, and if to command belongs, then also to have performed, as the tax-collector Diomedon said concerning the taxes: “For if it is not shameful for you to sell, neither is it for us to buy.” And if the “finely” or “justly” belongs to the one who has experienced it, it also belongs to the one who did it. But in this there is room for fallacy; for if someone experienced something justly, yet perhaps it was not by you. Therefore one must examine separately whether the one who experienced it is worthy to experience it and the one who did it is worthy to do it, and then use whichever way is fitting. For sometimes such things disagree and nothing prevents it, just as in the *Alcmaeon* of Theodectes: “Did none of mortals hate your mother?” And he says in reply: “But we must examine by making a distinction.” And when Alphesiboea asks “How?”, he replies: “They judged that she should die, but not that I should kill her.” And also the trial concerning Demosthenes and those who killed Nicanor; for since they were judged to have killed him justly, he was thought to have died justly. And concerning the man who died at Thebes, about whom he demands a judgment as to whether he was justly put to death, on the ground that it is not unjust to kill one who has died justly.

​Another is from the more and the less, for instance: “If not even the gods know everything, still less do humans.” For this is: “If a quality does not belong to that which it would more likely belong, it is clear that neither does it belong to that which it would less likely belong.” And that a man strikes his neighbors since indeed he strikes even his father, comes from: “If the less likely quality belongs, the more likely quality also belongs.” For people strike their fathers less than their neighbors. Thus, either in this way, or if that to which it more likely belongs does not have it, or if that to which it less likely belongs has it, whichever of the two needs to be shown, whether that it belongs or that it does not.

​Furthermore, if there is neither more nor less (the equal degree), whence it is said: “And your father is pitiable having lost his children; is not Oeneus then so, having lost his famous son?” And that, “If not even Theseus did wrong, neither did Alexander,” and “If not even the Tyndaridae, neither did Alexander,” and “If Hector did to Patroclus, Alexander also did to Achilles.” And “If other craftsmen are not bad, neither are philosophers,” and “If generals are not bad because they are often put to death, neither are sophists.” And that: “If the private citizen must care for your reputation, you too must care for that of the Greeks.”