Rhetoric

​It remains to speak concerning the proofs common to all, since those specific to each class of speech have been discussed. The common proofs are two in genus, example and enthymeme; for maxim is a part of enthymeme.

​First, then, let us speak concerning example; for example is similar to induction, and induction is a starting point. There are two species of examples: for one species of example is to speak of things that have happened before, and another is to make them up oneself. Of the latter, one is comparison, and the other is fables, ​such as those of Aesop and the Libyan ones. Speaking of things that have happened is something like this: as if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for previously Darius did not cross over until he took Egypt, but having taken it he crossed; and again, Xerxes did not make an attempt until he took [it], but having taken [it] he crossed; so that this one also, if he takes [it], will cross over, wherefore it must not be permitted.

​Comparison consists of the Socratic arguments; for instance, if one should say that those chosen by lot ought not to rule; for it is similar to as if one were to choose athletes by lot, not those who are able to compete, but those who happen to win the draw; or if one were to choose by lot which of the sailors ought to act as pilot, as if the one who wins the draw ought to do so, and not the one who knows how.

​A fable is such as that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, and that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For when the Himeraeans had chosen Phalaris as general with absolute power and were about to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus, having spoken on other matters, told them a fable: that a horse held a meadow alone, but when a stag came and ruined the pasture, wishing to punish the stag, he asked a certain man if he could punish the stag with him; and the man said he could, if the horse would take a bit and the man himself could mount upon him holding javelins; and having agreed and the man having mounted, instead of getting revenge, the horse itself became a slave to the man. “So also you,” he said, “watch out lest, wishing to punish your enemies, you suffer the same thing as the horse; for you already have the bit, having chosen a general with absolute power; and if you give him a bodyguard and allow him to mount, you will already be slaves to Phalaris.”

​And Aesop, speaking in Samos when a demagogue was being tried for his life, said that a fox, while crossing a river, was swept into a cleft, and not being able to get out, suffered for a long time, and many dog-ticks clung to her; and a wandering hedgehog, when he saw her, took pity and asked if he should remove the dog-ticks from her, but she would not allow it; and when he asked why, she said: “Because these are already full of me and draw little blood, but if you remove these, others will come hungry and drink up the rest of my blood.” “So also with you, men of Samos, this man will no longer harm you (for he is rich), but if you kill him, others will come who are poor, who will consume you by stealing what remains.”

​Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this good aspect, that while it is difficult to find similar things that have actually happened, it is easier to find fables; for one must make them just as one does comparisons, if one is able to see similarity, which is easier from philosophy.

​While, therefore, those through fables are easier to provide, those through actual events are more useful for deliberation; for things about to be are, for the most part, similar to things that have happened.

​And one should use examples, when not possessing enthymemes, as demonstrations (for conviction is produced through these), but when possessing them, as testimonies, using them as an epilogue to the enthymemes; for when placed first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable for rhetorical speeches except in a few cases; but when placed after, they resemble testimonies, and a witness is everywhere persuasive; wherefore also for one placing them first it is necessary to state many, but for one placing them after, even one is sufficient; for a good witness, even single, is useful. How many species of examples there are, then, and how and when they are to be used, has been said.