Rhetoric

Let anger, then, be a desire, accompanied by pain, for revenge, on account of an apparent disregard towards oneself or one’s own, when such disregard is not fitting.

​If indeed anger is this, it is necessary that the angry person is always angry with someone in particular, for instance with Cleon but not with man in general, and because that person has done or was about to do something to himself or to one of his own, and that a certain pleasure, that which arises from the hope of getting revenge, follows every anger. For it is pleasant to think that one will attain what one aims at, and no one aims at things that appear impossible for oneself, but the angry person aims at what is possible for himself. Therefore, it has been well said of anger: “And it, much sweeter than dripping honey, increases in the breasts of men;” for a certain pleasure follows both for this reason and because they dwell on revenge in their thoughts; the image (phantasia) then arising at that time produces pleasure, just like that of dreams.

​Since disregard is the realization of an opinion concerning that which appears worthy of nothing (for we think that both good and bad things, and those things which contribute to them, are worthy of serious concern, but whatever is nothing or of little account, we suppose to be worthy of nothing), there are three species of disregard: contempt, spite, and insult (hubris).

​For both the one who shows contempt disregards (for they show contempt for whatever things they think are worthy of nothing, and they disregard things worthy of nothing), and the one who is spiteful appears to disregard. For spite is an obstacle to wishes, not in order that something may accrue to oneself, but in order that it may not accrue to the other. Since, then, it is not in order that something may accrue to himself, he disregards; for it is clear that he does not suppose the other will harm him (for otherwise he would be afraid and would not disregard him), nor that the other could benefit him in any way worthy of mention (for otherwise he would take care to be his friend).

​And the one who insults also disregards; for insult (hubris) is doing and saying things at which there is shame for the sufferer, not so that something else may happen to oneself than what has happened, but in order that one may be pleased; for those who retaliate do not insult, but take revenge.

​And the cause of the pleasure for those who insult is that they think they themselves excel more by ill-treating others (wherefore the young and the rich are insolent; for they think they excel by being insolent); and insult implies dishonor, and the one who dishonors disregards. For that which is worthy of nothing has no honor, neither of good nor of bad; therefore Achilles says in anger: “He has dishonored me; for he has taken away my prize and holds it himself,” and: “As if some dishonored vagabond,” implying that he is angry on account of these things.

​And they think it is fitting that they are highly regarded by those who are inferior in birth, in power, in virtue, and generally in whatever they themselves excel by far, as, for instance, the rich man excels the poor in money, the rhetorical man excels the incapable speaker in speaking, the ruler excels the ruled, and the one worthy of ruling excels the one worthy of being ruled. Therefore, it has been said: “Great is the anger of Zeus-nourished kings,” and: “But even hereafter he keeps his resentment;” for they are angry on account of their superiority.

​Furthermore, by those from whom one thinks one ought to receive good treatment; and these are those whom one has benefited or is benefiting, either oneself or through someone else or through one of one’s own, or whom one wishes or has wished to benefit.

It is clear, then, from these things already in what state of mind people themselves are angry, and with whom, and for what reasons. For they themselves are angry when they are in pain; for the one who is in pain aims at something. Therefore, whether someone thwarts them directly in anything, as for instance thwarting a thirsty person from drinking, or whether not directly, it appears to do the same thing likewise; and whether someone opposes them, or does not cooperate, or annoys them in some other way when they are in this state, they are angry with all of them.

​Therefore, those who are sick, poor, at war, in love, thirsty, and generally those who desire something and do not succeed, are prone to anger and easily aroused, especially towards those who disregard their present condition; for instance, the sick person towards those who disregard things relating to his sickness, the poor person towards those who disregard things relating to his poverty, the one at war towards those relating to the war, the lover towards those relating to love, and likewise for the others; and if not these, even if someone should disregard them in any other matter whatsoever. For each person has the way paved for his own anger by his existing emotion. Furthermore, if he happens to be expecting the opposite.