- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:1.7.14-1.7.28
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Aristotle enumerates various topoi (topics) for determining a "greater good," presenting methods of comparative evaluation from multiple perspectives such as scarcity versus abundance, ends versus means, virtues, the judgment of the wise, pleasure, durability, and grammatical cognates.
καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου,1 οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου, ἀχρηστότερος ὤν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέρα εἶναι. (ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει, ὅθεν λέγεται "ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.)"
And what is scarcer is a greater good than what is abundant, for example gold than iron, though it is less useful; for the possession of it is greater because it is harder to acquire. (But in another way, what is abundant is greater than what is scarce, because its use is superior; for what is used often exceeds what is used seldom, whence it is said: “Water is best.”)
καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥᾴονος· σπανιώτερον γάρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥᾷον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου· ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα.
And in general, what is harder is greater than what is easier; for it is scarcer. But in another way, what is easier is greater than what is harder; for it is as we wish.
καὶ ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον, καὶ οὗ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων·2 τὰ μὲν γὰρ τέλη, τὰ δʼ οὐ τέλη.
Also, that of which the opposite is a greater evil, and that of which the deprivation is a greater loss. And virtue is a greater good than the absence of vice, and vice is a greater evil than the absence of virtue; for the former are ends, and the latter are not ends.
καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω αὐτά, καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα μείζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί.
And those things of which the works are more honorable or more disgraceful are themselves greater; and those of which the vices and virtues are greater, their works are also greater, since as the causes and principles are, so are the results, and as the results are, so are the causes and principles.
καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων, οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως), καὶ τὸ φιλεταιρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρηματώτερον κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ αἱ καλλιόνων καλλίους.
And those things of which the superiority is more desirable or more honorable; for example, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell (for sight is more desirable than smell), and to be more friendly to companions is more honorable than to be more fond of money, so that friendliness to companions is also more honorable than fondness of money. And conversely, the excesses of better things are better, and those of more honorable things are more honorable.
καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ βελτίους· αἱ γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιόνων δὲ ἢ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό.
And those things of which the desires are more honorable or better; for greater desires are for greater things. And for the same reason, the desires for more honorable or better things are themselves better and more honorable.
καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους ἢ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα· ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ τὸ αὐτό.
And those things of which the sciences are more honorable or more serious, their subjects are also more honorable and serious; for as the science is, so is its truth; and each science commands its own subject. And for the same reason, the sciences of more serious and honorable things are in proportion more serious and honorable.
καὶ ὃ κρίνειαν ἂν ἢ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείους ἢ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν.3 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὃ λαβὸν φρόνησιν ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ἕκαστον· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.
And what the wise, or all, or the many, or the majority, or the best would judge or have judged to be a greater good, must be so, either absolutely or in so far as they judged according to their wisdom. And this is common also to other things; for the essence, quantity, and quality of a thing are such as science and wisdom would state them to be. But we have spoken of goods; for the good has been defined as that which each entity would choose if it possessed wisdom; it is clear, then, that what wisdom says is more so, is also a greater good.
καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίους, οἷον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἰσχύος. καὶ ὃ ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἂν ἕλοιτο.
And what belongs to better people, either absolutely or in so far as they are better; for example, courage rather than strength. And what the better person would choose, either absolutely or in so far as they are better; for example, to suffer injustice rather than to commit it; for the more just person would choose this.
καὶ τὸ ἥδιον τοῦ ἧττον ἡδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος· ἥδιον δὲ τό τε ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἡδύ.
And what is more pleasant rather than what is less pleasant; for all things pursue pleasure, and desire to enjoy it for its own sake, and the good and the end have been defined by these. And that which is freer from pain and longer-lasting is more pleasant.
καὶ τὸ κάλλιον τοῦ ἧττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἤτοι τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν.
And what is more honorable rather than what is less so; for the honorable is either what is pleasant or what is desirable for its own sake.
καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἢ φίλοις βούλονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω ἀγαθά, ὅσων δὲ ἧττον, μείζω κακά.
And those things of which people more desire to be themselves the cause for themselves or for their friends, these are greater goods; and those of which they less desire to be the cause are greater evils.
καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν ἀβεβαιοτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαίου.
And what is longer-lasting rather than what is shorter-lasting, and what is more secure rather than what is less secure; for the use of the former is superior in time, and of the latter in choice; for when they wish, the use of the secure is more available.
καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν τῶν συστοίχων4 καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, καὶ τἆλλʼ ἀκολουθεῖ, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνης αἱρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.
And as it is with one of the cognate words and similar inflections, so the others follow; for example, if “courageously” is more honorable and desirable than “temperately,” then “courage” is also more desirable than “temperance,” and “being courageous” than “being temperate.”
καὶ ὃ πάντες αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὃ πάντες. καὶ ὃ οἱ πλείους ἢ ὃ οἱ ἐλάττους· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὗ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροί, ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖέν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες.
And what all choose is a greater good than what not all choose. And what the majority choose is greater than what the minority choose; for the good was defined as that which all aim at, so that what is aimed at more is a greater good. And also what disputants or enemies, or judges, or those whom they judge, declare to be so; for the former is as if all declared it, and the latter are those in authority and who know.
- 1364a23καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου
This presents two contrasting topics of comparative value: "scarcity value" (emphasizing possession, κτῆσις, because of the difficulty of acquisition) versus "utility value" (emphasizing use, χρῆσις, because of frequent availability).
- 1364a32ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων
μὴ κακίας and μὴ ἀρετῆς are negative phrases meaning "the absence of vice" and "the absence of virtue" respectively. The argument compares a positive state (virtue/vice) with a mere lack of it, asserting the superiority of positive states.
- 1364b14ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν
A contrast between ἢ ἁπλῶς ("either absolutely") and ἢ ᾗ... ("or in so far as..."). It indicates that the judgment of wise men is valid both in an absolute sense and in a qualified sense restricted to the perspective of their practical wisdom.
- 1364b34καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν τῶν συστοίχων
A logical topic using τῶν συστοίχων ("cognates") and τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων ("similar inflections"). It explains an inferential rule of linguistic analogy: if a relationship of superiority holds between one pair of related words (e.g., adverbs), it also holds for their corresponding nouns and verbs.