Rhetoric

​These, then, are pretty much the admitted goods.

​But in the case of doubtful goods, the arguments are derived from the following. That of which the contrary is an evil, is a good.

​And that of which the contrary is expedient to enemies; for example, if to be cowardly is most expedient to enemies, it is clear that courage is most beneficial to the citizens.

​And in general, that of which the contrary to what enemies wish or in what they rejoice appears beneficial; wherefore it is said: “Indeed Priam would rejoice.” But this is not always the case, but for the most part; for nothing prevents the same thing from being sometimes expedient to opponents; whence it is said that “evils bring men together,” when the same thing is harmful to both.

And that of which there is no excess is a good, but whatever is greater than it should be is an evil.

​And that for the sake of which much labor has been spent or expense incurred; for it is already an apparent good, and such a thing is assumed as an end, and as an end of many things, and the end is a good. Whence these sayings: “And they would leave Priam a boast” and “It is a shameful thing indeed to remain long.” And the proverb, “to break the water-pot at the door.”

​And that which the many aim at, and what appears to be an object of contention; for that which all aim at was a good, and the many appear as equivalent to “all.”

And that which is praiseworthy; for no one praises what is not good. And that which enemies and bad people praise; for this is as if everyone already agreed, even those who have suffered from them; for they would agree because of its obviousness, just as those whom friends blame and enemies do not blame are bad (wherefore the Corinthians assumed they had been insulted by Simonides when he wrote: “And Ilium does not find fault with the Corinthians”).

​And that which some of the wise, or of good men or women, have preferred; for instance, Athena preferred Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander, and Homer Achilles.

​And in general, things that are objects of choice; and people choose to do the things mentioned, and what is bad for enemies, and what is good for friends, and what is possible.

​And these are of two kinds: those which might happen, and those which happen easily. And easy things are those which are done either without pain or in a short time; for what is difficult is defined either by pain or by length of time. And if things happen as they wish; and they wish either for no evil or for less evil than the good (and this will be the case if it is either undetected or the punishment is small).

​And things that are one’s own, and what no one else has, and extraordinary things; for in this way there is more honor. And things that are suited to them; and such are those that are fitting according to birth and power, and those which they think they lack, even if they are small; for they choose to do these no less.

​And things that are easily accomplished; for they are possible and easy. And easily accomplished are those which all, or many, or equals, or inferiors have successfully done. And things by which they will please friends, or make themselves hated by enemies. And whatever those whom they admire choose to do. And things for which they are naturally fitted and experienced; for they think they will succeed more easily. And what no bad person does; for they are more praiseworthy. And what they happen to desire; for it appears not only pleasant but also better.

​And especially what each class is particularly fond of; for instance, the lovers of victory if there will be victory, the lovers of honor if honor, the lovers of money if money, and others in like manner. Concerning the good and the expedient, then, from these things we must derive our proofs.