Rhetoric

​And to do the same things often is pleasant; for what is customary was pleasant.

​And to change is pleasant; for to change is to return to nature; for the same thing always produces an excess of the established state, whence it is said: “Change in all things is sweet.” For on this account also things that occur at intervals are pleasant, both men and things; for it is a change from the present, and at the same time what occurs at intervals is rare.

​And to learn and to admire are pleasant for the most part; for in admiring there is the desire to learn, so that the admirable is desirable, and in learning there is the settling into what is according to nature.

​And to do good and to receive good are among pleasant things; for to receive good is to obtain what they desire, and to do good is to possess and to excel, both of which they strive for. And because being beneficent is pleasant, to correct one’s neighbors and to complete what is lacking are also pleasant to men.

​And since both learning and admiring are pleasant, it is necessary that also such things as follow are pleasant, for instance, that which is imitative, such as painting, sculpture, and poetry, and everything which has been well imitated, even if the imitated object itself is not pleasant; for one does not rejoice in the object itself, but there is a reasoning that ‘this is that,’ so that it happens that one learns something.

​And sudden turns of fortune and being saved from dangers by a hair’s breadth; for all these are admirable.

​And since what is according to nature is pleasant, and things related to each other are by nature related, all related and similar things are pleasant for the most part, as man to man, horse to horse, and youth to youth, whence also the proverbs are said: ‘Equal delights equal,’ and ‘How always the like,’ and ‘Beast knows beast,’ and ‘For jackdaw to jackdaw,’ and as many other such sayings as there are.

​And since what is similar and related is entirely pleasant to itself, and each person is most of all in this state toward himself, it is necessary that all are self-loving, either more or less; for all such relations exist most of all toward oneself. And since all are self-loving, it is necessary that what is one’s own is pleasant to all, as their own works and words; wherefore they are for the most part lovers of flatterers, lovers of lovers, lovers of kinsmen, and lovers of children; for children are their own work. And to complete what is lacking is pleasant;

​for it becomes already their own work. And since to rule is most pleasant, to seem to be wise is also pleasant; for to have practical wisdom is fit for ruling, and wisdom is a knowledge of many and wonderful things. Furthermore, since they are for the most part ambitious, it is necessary that both to censure one’s neighbors and to rule are pleasant, ​and to spend time in that in which a person thinks he is best, just as also the poet says and hastens to this: “dispensing the greatest part of each day, where he happens to be at his best.”

Likewise, since play and all relaxation are among pleasant things, and laughter is among pleasant things, it is necessary that also ridiculous things are pleasant, both men, words, and works; and concerning ridiculous things a separate definition has been given in the Poetics. Concerning pleasant things, then, let this much be said; but painful things are clear from the opposites of these.