- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:7.1333a
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-31
Discusses how education must correspond to the structure of ruling and being ruled, and, based on the division of the soul (rational and obedient parts, practical and theoretical reason), defines the hierarchy of actions and ends where leisure, peace, and noble things are supreme.
ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστιδʼ ὡς ἑτέραν εἶναι. τὸν γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον.1 (ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. διαφέρει δʼ ἔνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακονεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθʼ αὑτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκεν.) ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός,2 τὸν δʼ αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθʼ αὑτό, τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ λόγῳ δʼ ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον· ὧν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθʼ ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεταί πως. τούτων δὲ ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον. διῄρηταί τε διχῇ, καθʼ ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαιρεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός. ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δηλονότι. καὶ τὰς πράξεις δʼ ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν·3 αἰεὶ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τοῦθʼ αἱρετώτατον οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διῄρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ σχολὴν καὶ εἰς πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκεν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων αἱρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν,
So that the education also must in one sense be the same, and in another sense be different. For they say that he who is to rule well must first be ruled. (And there is ruling, just as it was said in our first discourses, of which one kind is for the sake of the ruler, and the other for the sake of the ruled. Of these, we say that the former is despotic, and the latter is that of free men. And some of the duties commanded differ not in the tasks themselves, but in that for the sake of which they are done. Wherefore, it is honorable for even young free men to perform as services many of the tasks which seem to be menial; for as to what is honorable and what is not, actions do not differ so much in themselves as in their end and that for the sake of which they are done.) And since we say that the virtue of a citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same person must first be ruled and later be a ruler, this would be the task for the legislator to busy himself with: how men may become good, and through what practices, and what is the end of the best life. And the soul is divided into two parts, of which one has reason in itself, and the other does not have it in itself but is capable of obeying reason; to which, we say, belong the virtues in accordance with which a man is in some way said to be good. And in which of these two the end rather lies, is not unclear how we must say to those who divide it as we do. For the worse is always for the sake of the better, and this is manifest alike in the things of art and in those of nature; and that which has reason is better. And it is divided in two, in the way we are accustomed to divide it; for one is practical reason and the other is theoretical. In the same way, then, this part also must clearly be divided. And we shall say that the actions also are analogously related, and those of the part which is by nature better must be more choice-worthy for those capable of attaining either all of them or the two; for that which is the highest possible to attain is always most choice-worthy for each. And all of life is also divided into business and leisure, and war and peace, and of things done, some are directed toward necessary and useful things, and others toward honorable things. Concerning these, there must be the same choice as for the parts of the soul and their actions: war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, and things necessary and useful for the sake of honorable things. Therefore, the statesman must legislate looking to all of these, both as regards the parts of the soul and as regards their actions, but more toward the better things and the ends. And in the same way concerning lifestyles and the choices of things; for one must be able to be busy and to make war,
- 1333a1τὸν γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον
A double accusative-and-infinitive construction where φασί ('they say') introduces the indirect discourse, in which δεῖν ('to be necessary') functions as the main infinitive with τὸν μέλλοντα... as its subject accusative, and ἀρχθῆναι ('to be ruled') as the complementary infinitive of δεῖν.
- 1333a11ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός...
A long subordinate (causal) clause starting with ἐπεί at line 11 continues until ὕστερον at line 14, followed by the main clause starting with τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη... at line 14. The predicate of the main clause, πραγματευτέον εἴη ἄν, is a gerundive (potential optative) with the agent expressed by the dative τῷ νομοθέτῃ.
- 1333a25τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν
The noun πράξεις ('actions') is omitted after the article τὰς from the preceding context. τοῖς δυναμένοις is a dative of reference ('for those capable of'). ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν refers to those capable of attaining either all actions corresponding to the parts of the soul (πασῶν), or the two actions (expressed by the dual genitive τοῖν δυοῖν) corresponding to the two divisions of reason itself (practical and theoretical).