- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:7.1332a
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-31
Defining happiness as the complete activity of virtue, the text argues that achieving the best constitution requires both external goods dependent on fortune and the deliberate education of citizens by the legislator, which is formed through nature, habit, and reason.
(δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χορηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἱ δʼ εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης.1 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ἄριστʼ ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δʼ ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθʼ ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι,2 μὴ λανθάνειν. φαμὲν δὲ (καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος) ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς. λέγω δʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δʼ ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις, αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν (αἱρετώτερον3 μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἁπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις τοὐναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις. χρήσαιτο δʼ ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, δῆλον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἁπλῶς)· διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῷντο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχόμεθα τῇ τῆς πόλεως συστάσει ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν)· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτʼ ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῴων· εἶτα καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνια δὲ οὐθὲν ὄφελος φῦναι·
(For living well also requires some external equipment, and of this, less for those who are better situated, but more for those who are worse), but some, right from the start, do not seek happiness in the right way, even though they have the capability. And since our proposed task is to see the best constitution, and this is the one under which a city would be best governed, and it would be best governed under the one in which it is most possible for the city to be happy, it is clear that we must not be ignorant of what happiness is. Now we say (and we have defined it in the Ethics, if there is any utility in those discussions) that happiness is the complete activity and employment of virtue, and this not conditionally but absolutely. By ‘conditionally’ I mean necessary actions, and by ‘absolutely’ I mean what is noble. For example, in the case of just actions, just retributions and punishments do indeed proceed from virtue, but they are necessary, and they possess what is noble only out of necessity (for it is more desirable that neither individual man nor city should need any of such things), whereas actions directed toward honors and prosperity are absolutely the most noble actions. For the former is the removal of some evil, but the latter actions are the opposite: for they are establishments and generations of goods. And the excellent man would use even poverty and disease and other bad fortunes well; but blessedness lies in their opposites (for this also has been defined in the ethical treatises, that the excellent man is such that, owing to his virtue, the things that are absolutely good are good for him, and it is clear that his employments of these must also be excellent and noble absolutely); hence men also think that the causes of happiness are external goods, just as if they were to attribute brilliant and beautiful cithara-playing to the lyre rather than to the art. Therefore, it follows from what has been said that some things must already be present, and others the legislator must provide. Therefore, for the constitution of the city, we pray that we may obtain those things over which fortune is sovereign (for we assume that she is sovereign); but that the city should be excellent is no longer the work of fortune, but of knowledge and choice. But surely a city is excellent by virtue of the citizens who share in the constitution being excellent; and in our case, all the citizens share in the constitution. This, then, must be considered: how a man becomes excellent. For even if it is possible for all to be excellent without each of the citizens being so, the latter way is more desirable; for ‘all’ follows from ‘each’. But surely men become good and excellent through three things. And these three are nature, habit, and reason. For one must first be born as something, for instance as a human being and not some other of the animals; and then also with a certain quality of body and soul. But for some things, being born is of no benefit,
- 1332a1ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης
A genitive absolute taking a concessive sense ("although they have the capability"), in connection with the preceding statement that some have the power to attain happiness while others do not.
- 1332a5τί ἐστι
An instance of prolepsis (anticipation), where the noun τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν is anticipated from the indirect question τί ἐστι as the subject of the infinitive, equivalent to δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
- 1332a5μὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον
The phrase μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον is a contrastive negation ("even if not individually"). The adverb οὕτως refers to the state of being individually excellent (καθ' ἕκαστον), which is deemed more desirable (αἱρετώτερον) than being excellent merely as a collective whole.
