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Politics

§7.1324a

Happiness in City and Individual: Active and Contemplative Life

Aristotle asserts that happiness is the same for the individual and the city, defines the tasks of political inquiry, and introduces the debate between the political/active life and the philosophical/contemplative life.

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§7.1324a

ὁ μετʼ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης1 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας2 ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος. πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἑνός τε ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθενται ἐφʼ ἑνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ᾖ πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαῖεν· εἴ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα διʼ ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἓν μὲν πότερος αἱρετώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν3 πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην τὴν τάξιν καθʼ ἣν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετʼ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τόν γε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δʼ οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετʼ ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ· τούτων δʼ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες· μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφʼ ἑκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι4 καὶ πολιτευομένοις.

[that the best life is] the one accompanied by virtue, supplied to such an extent as to participate in actions in accordance with virtue. But as for those who dispute this, leaving them aside in our present inquiry, we must examine it later, if anyone happens not to be persuaded by what has been said. Next, it remains to speak of whether we should say that happiness is the same for each individual human being and for a city, or not the same. And this too is clear. For all would agree that it is the same. For those who place living well in wealth for an individual also deem the whole city happy if it is wealthy; and those who honor the tyrannical life most would say that the city which rules over the greatest number is the happiest; and if anyone accepts the individual on account of virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city is the happier. But these are already two things that require examination: one, which life is more choiceworthy, the one through participating in citizenship and sharing in a city, or rather the alien life and one released from political association; and further, what constitution we must establish and what disposition of a city is best, whether sharing in a city is choiceworthy for all, or not for some but for most. Since this is the work of political thought and contemplation, and not what is choiceworthy for each individual, and since we have chosen this examination now, the former would be a secondary matter, while the latter is the work of this method. That, therefore, the best constitution must be this order according to which anyone might act best and live happily, is clear; but it is disputed by those very people who agree that the life with virtue is most choiceworthy, whether the political and active life is choiceworthy, or rather the one released from all external things, such as a contemplative one, which some say is the only philosophical life. For almost these two lives appear to be chosen by those who are most ambitious for virtue, both among the earlier and the present; I mean these two: the political and the philosophical. And it makes no small difference which of the two is the truth; for it is necessary for a wise man to direct himself toward the better goal, both for each of human beings and in common for the constitution. For some believe that ruling over one’s neighbors, if done despotically, involves some of the greatest injustice, but if politically, while it does not have injustice, it has an obstacle to one’s own well-being; while others happen to hold opinions as if from the opposite direction, that only the active and political life is that of a man, for the actions of each virtue do not belong more to private individuals than to those who perform public actions and participate in politics.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 1323bὁ μετʼ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης

    This phrase connects directly with the end of the previous chunk ("ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος..."). The masculine singular article ὁ refers back to βίος (life) and acts as the predicate of the sentence to complete its meaning.

  2. 1324a2ἐάσαντας

    An accusative plural participle. It implies a non-expressed subject in the accusative (such as ἡμᾶς, "us") performing the action of "leaving aside" the objectors for the moment in the current inquiry.

  3. 1324a18εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν

    A genitive absolute construction with the participle ὄντος. The articular infinitive τοῦ κοινωνεῖν (sharing in/participating in the city) acts as the logical subject of the construction, and αἱρετοῦ functions as its predicate adjective.

  4. 1324a40οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι

    A comparative construction with negation. Literally, "actions [of virtue] do not belong more to private individuals than to those who perform public actions," which functions as a strong assertion that those engaged in public life have greater opportunities for exercising virtue.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:7.1324a