Politics

​Generally speaking, therefore, it is numerousness of population that preserves democracies (for this is opposed to justice according to merit); while it is clear that, on the contrary, oligarchy must obtain its preservation from good order. And since there are four chief parts of the multitude—the farming class, the artisan class, the trading class, and the day-laboring class—and four parts of military force that are useful for war—cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry, and navy—where it happens that the territory is suitable for horses, there conditions are naturally suited for constructing a strong oligarchy (for safety for the inhabitants is through this force, and the breeding of horses belongs to those who possess large properties); but where the territory is suitable for heavy infantry, for constructing the next grade of oligarchy (for the heavy infantry force belongs to the wealthy rather than to the poor); on the other hand, the light-armed force and the navy are entirely democratic. At present, therefore, where there is a large multitude of this kind, whenever a factional conflict arises, the wealthy often fare worse in the struggle; but against this one should adopt a remedy from military commanders, who combine with the cavalry and heavy infantry force an appropriate portion of light-armed troops. It is in this way that the common people get the upper hand in factional conflicts over the wealthy; for being light-armed, they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry. Therefore, to establish this force from these people is to establish it against themselves; rather, since age is divided, some being older and others younger, while their own sons are still young, they should be taught the light and unarmed operations, and when they have been selected from childhood, they should themselves be practitioners of these operations. And the sharing of the governing power with the multitude should either be, as was said before, for those who acquire the property qualification, or as among the Thebans, for those who have abstained for a certain time from artisan labor, or as in Massalia, by making a selection of those worthy, both from those within the government and from those outside. Furthermore, the most sovereign offices, which those in the constitution must hold, should have public services attached to them, so that the common people may willingly not participate in them and may have indulgence for the rulers since they pay a high price for office. And it is fitting that those entering upon office should perform magnificent sacrifices and construct some public building, so that the common people, sharing in the feasts and seeing the city adorned partly with votive offerings and partly with buildings, may gladly see the constitution remain; and it will also result for the notable that they have memorials of their expenditure. But at present, those concerned with oligarchies do not do this, but rather the opposite; for they seek gains no less than honor. Therefore, it is well to say that these are small democracies.