Politics

​But rather to watch everything from which two things are accustomed to arise, high spirit and trust, and to allow neither schools nor other assemblies for discussion, and to do everything by which as far as possible all will be unknown to one another (for mutual acquaintance produces more trust toward one another); and that those who are residing there should always be in the open and spend time at the gates (for in this way they would least escape notice in what they do, and they would be accustomed to have a small mind by always living as slaves); and all other such Persian and barbarian tyrannical measures (for they all have the same effect); and to try not to escape notice in whatever any of the subjects happens to say or do, but to have spies, like the so-called “bringers of news” in Syracuse, and those “eavesdroppers” whom Hiero used to send out wherever there was any gathering or assembly (for they speak less freely, fearing such people, and even if they do speak freely, they escape notice less); and to slander one another and set friends at variance with friends, and the people with the notables, and the rich with themselves. And it is tyrannical to make the subjects poor, so that a guard cannot be maintained, and being occupied with daily necessities, they may have no leisure to conspire. An example of this is the pyramids in Egypt, and the votive offerings of the Cypselids, and the building of the Olympieum by the Peisistratidae, and the Polycratean works around Samos (for all these have the same effect, lack of leisure and poverty of the subjects); and the levying of taxes, as in Syracuse (for in five years under Dionysius it turned out that they had paid in their entire property). And the tyrant is also a warmonger, so that indeed they may have no leisure and may continue being in need of a leader. And kingship is preserved through friends, but it is tyrannical to distrust friends most of all, on the ground that while all wish to destroy him, these are most able to do so. And the things that happen in ultimate democracy are all tyrannical, both the rule of women in the households so that they may report against their husbands, and the indulgence of slaves for the same cause; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants, and when they fare well they must be well-disposed both to tyrannies and to democracies; for the people also wish to be a monarch. Wherefore also the flatterer is held in honor by both, the demagogue among democracies (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and those who associate in a lowly manner among tyrants, which is the work of flattery.

​For because of this, tyranny is a lover of the wicked; for being flattered they rejoice, and no one would do this who has a free spirit, but the decent love, or at least do not flatter. And the wicked are useful for wicked things; for “peg by peg,” as the proverb says. And it is tyrannical to rejoice in no one who is dignified or free (for the tyrant claims to be the only one of this kind, and he who conducts himself with dignity and free spirit deprives the tyranny of its superiority and its mastery; so they hate them as if they were destroying the rule); and to use foreigners rather than citizens as companions at meals and in daily life is tyrannical, on the ground that the latter are enemies while the former do not compete. These and such things are tyrannical and preservative of the rule, but they lack nothing of wickedness. But all these may be said to be encompassed in three classes. For tyranny aims at three things: first, that the subjects should have a small mind (for no one with a small mind would conspire); second, that they should distrust one another (for a tyranny is not destroyed before some people trust one another; wherefore also they fight against the decent as being harmful to the rule, not only because they do not claim to be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal both to themselves and to others, and do not denounce either themselves or others); third, lack of power for action (for no one attempts the impossible, so that they do not even attempt to destroy a tyranny if power is not present). Into which limits, then, the designs of tyrants are reduced, these happen to be three; for one would reduce all tyrannical measures to these hypotheses, some that they may not trust one another, others that they may not have power, others that they may have a small mind. The one way, then, through which preservation happens to tyrannies is of this kind; but the other has its care almost from the opposite of the things mentioned. And it is possible to grasp it from the destruction of kingships. For just as one way of destruction of kingship is to make the rule more tyrannical, so the preservation of tyranny is to make it more kingly, guarding only one thing, power, so that he may rule not only over those who wish but also over those who do not wish. For in abandoning this, he also abandons being a tyrant. But this must remain as a hypothesis, while in other things he should do some and seem to do others by playing the kingly part well. First, to seem to care for the public funds,