Politics

​but either to seek to rule or to endure being ruled. From these things, therefore, it is clear which constitution is best, and for what cause; and as for the other constitutions, since we say that there are multiple democracies and multiple oligarchies, it is not difficult to see which one we must place as first, and second, and so on in succession, in that one is better and another worse, now that the best has been defined. For it is always necessary that the one nearest to this best is better, and the one further removed from the middle is worse, unless one judges with reference to a particular hypothesis. And I mean ”with reference to a hypothesis” because, although there is often another constitution more desirable, nothing prevents another constitution from being more advantageous for some. Next after what has been said, it is to be discussed which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what kind of constitution for what kind of people. First, then, we must grasp one and same general principle concerning all: for that part of the city which wishes the constitution to remain must be stronger than the part which does not wish it. And every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth; by quantity, the superiority of numbers of the multitude. And it is possible that quality belongs to one part of the parts from which the city is constituted, and quantity to another part; for example, that the ignoble are more numerous than the noble, or the poor than the rich, yet they do not exceed in quantity as much as they are surpassed in quality. Therefore, these must be compared with one another. Where , then, the multitude of the poor exceeds the aforesaid proportion, there a democracy naturally exists, and each form of democracy according to the superiority of each kind of common people; for example, if the multitude of husbandmen exceeds, the first democracy, and if that of mechanics and wage-earners, the last, and similarly also the others between these. But where the part of the well-off and notable exceeds more in quality than it is surpassed in quantity, there an oligarchy exists, and in the same way each form of oligarchy according to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude. And the legislator must always in the constitution include the middle class; for whether he establishes oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class, or whether democratic, he must bring these into the laws. And where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both of the extremes together or even only one of them, there a lasting constitution is possible.

​For there is no fear that the rich will ever agree with the poor against these; for neither will ever wish to be slaves to the other, and if they seek a more common one, they will find no other constitution than this. For they would not endure to rule in turn because of their distrust toward one another; and everywhere the arbitrator is most trusted, and the arbitrator is the middle class. And the better the constitution is mixed, so much more lasting it is. But many, even of those who wish to make aristocratic constitutions, make a mistake, not only in assigning more to the well-off, but also in deceiving the common people. For it is necessary that in time a true evil arises from false goods; for the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the common people. And there are five in number the devices which they practice in the constitutions against the common people for the sake of pretense, concerning the assembly, concerning the offices, concerning the courts, concerning possession of arms, and concerning gymnastic training. Concerning the assembly, that it is permitted for all to attend the assembly, but a fine is imposed on the well-off if they do not attend, either on them alone or a much greater one; concerning the offices, that those who have a property qualification are not permitted to excuse themselves on oath, while the poor are permitted; and concerning the courts, that there is a fine for the well-off if they do not serve as jurors, but impunity for the poor, or a large fine for the former and a small one for the latter, as in the laws of Charondas. And in some places, it is permitted for all who have registered to attend the assembly and to serve as jurors, but if they register and neither attend the assembly nor serve as jurors, heavy fines are imposed on them, so that through the fine they may avoid registering, and through not registering they may not serve as jurors nor attend the assembly. And in the same way they legislate also concerning the possession of arms and gymnastic training. For it is permitted for the poor not to possess arms, but for the well-off there is a penalty if they do not possess them; and if they do not train, there is no fine for the former, but a penalty for the well-off, so that the latter may participate because of the fine, and the former may not participate because they have no fear. These , then, are oligarchic devices of legislation; and in democracies they practice counter-devices against these. For they provide pay for the poor when they attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but they impose no fine on the well-off. So it is clear that if one wishes to mix justly, one must bring together the rules of both and provide pay for the former and a fine for the latter; for in this way all would share, whereas in the other way the constitution comes about for one of the two parties alone.