Politics

It remained for us to speak about tyranny, not because there is much to be said about it, but so that it may receive its share of our inquiry, since we also posit this as a certain part of constitutions. Now, concerning kingship we made our definitions in our first discussions, in which we made our investigation concerning the kingship most properly so called, whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous to cities, and what sort of person, from what source, and how one must establish it; but we distinguished two forms of tyranny in the course of our inquiry about kingship, because their power in some way overlaps with kingship, owing to both of these offices being in accordance with law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchs with absolute power, and in ancient times among the early Greeks there arose certain monarchs in this manner, whom they called aesymnetes); and these have certain differences from one another, being on the one hand kingly because of being in accordance with law and because of monarchical rule over willing subjects, but on the other hand tyrannical because of ruling masterfully and according to their own judgment. And there is a third form of tyranny, which is thought to be tyranny in the highest degree, being the counterpart to absolute kingship. It is necessary for such a tyranny to be a monarchy which, being irresponsible, rules over all those who are equal and better, for its own advantage and not for that of the ruled. Wherefore it is involuntary; for no one of free men willingly endures such a rule. These and this many, then, are the forms of tyranny for the reasons mentioned. But what is the best constitution and what is the best life for most cities and most human beings, for those who measure neither by a virtue that is beyond ordinary individuals, nor by an education that requires natural talent and fortunate resources, nor by a constitution that comes about according to wish, but rather by a life that most are able to share in common and a constitution in which most cities can participate? For even those called aristocracies, of which we have just spoken, in some respects fall outside the scope of most cities, and in other respects border upon the so-called constitution (wherefore we must speak of both as one). And indeed, the judgment concerning all of these depends on the same elements. For if it was well said in the *Ethics* that the happy life is one that is unimpeded in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a mean, the middle life must necessarily be best, that middle life which it is possible for each to attain. And it is necessary for these same limits to apply also to the virtue and vice of a city and of a constitution; for a constitution is a certain life of a city.