Politics

​And the king of the Persians frequently lopped off the Medes and Babylonians and others of the rest who had become high-spirited because of having once held the empire. But the problem is general concerning all constitutions, even the correct ones; for the deviate ones do this looking to their own private interest, but nevertheless it is the same way concerning those that look to the common good. And this is clear also in the case of the other arts and sciences; for neither would a painter allow the animal to have a foot exceeding the symmetry, not even if it excelled in beauty, nor would a shipbuilder allow a stern or any of the other parts of the ship to be disproportionate, nor indeed will a chorus director allow someone who sings louder and more beautifully than the whole chorus to sing along with them. So that because of this there is nothing to prevent monarchs from agreeing with the cities, if they do this when their own rule is beneficial to the cities. Therefore, in accordance with agreed-upon superiorities, the argument concerning ostracism has some political justice. It is better, then, for the legislator to construct the constitution from the beginning in such a way as not to need such medicine; but the “second voyage,” if it should happen, is to try to correct it with some such correction. This, however, was not what happened concerning the cities; for they did not look to the advantage of their own constitution, but were using ostracisms factiously. In the deviate constitutions, therefore, that it is privately advantageous and just is clear, and perhaps also that it is not simply just, this too is clear. But in the case of the best constitution, it presents a great difficulty—not concerning the superiority of the other goods, such as strength, wealth, and abundance of friends, but if someone should turn out to be outstanding in accordance with virtue, what must be done? For surely they would not say that one must expel and remove such a person; yet on the other hand, neither indeed should one rule over such a person; for that would be nearly as if they should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing the offices. It remains, therefore—as seems to be natural—that all obey such a person gladly, so that such persons are eternal kings in the cities. Perhaps, then, it is well after the arguments mentioned to pass over and examine kingship; for we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. And we must examine whether it is advantageous for a city and country that is to be well-governed to be under a king, or not, but some other constitution instead, or whether it is advantageous to some but not to others. We must indeed first divide whether there is some one genus of it, or whether it has several differences.