Politics

​The first-mentioned difficulty makes nothing so clear as that correctly established laws should be sovereign, and that the ruler, whether one or more, should be sovereign over those matters about which the laws are completely unable to speak precisely, because it is not easy to make general definitions about all things. What kind of laws, however, the correctly established ones ought to be is not yet clear, but the long-standing difficulty still remains. For it is necessary that, along with and in the same way as the constitutions, the laws also are either bad or good, and just or unjust. Except that this much at least is clear, that the laws must be established with view to the constitution. But if this is so, it is clear that those in accordance with correct constitutions are necessarily just, while those in accordance with deviated ones are not just. Since in all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good is especially in the most sovereign of all, and this is the political capacity, and the political good is justice, which is the common interest, it is indeed held by all that justice is a certain kind of equality, and up to a point they agree with the philosophical discussions in which ethical matters have been defined (for they say that justice is a certain thing and for certain people, and that it must be equal for equal people); but we must not fail to notice in what sort of things there is equality and in what sort of things there is inequality. For this involves a difficulty and political philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that according to superiority in any good, offices should be distributed unequally, even if they differ in no other respect but happen to be similar; for to those who differ, justice and what is according to merit are different. But indeed, if this is true, there will be a certain advantage in political rights for those who excel in color, in stature, or in any good whatsoever. Or is this falsehood superficial? It is clear in the case of the other sciences and capacities; for among flute-players who are equal in their art, one must not give an advantage in flutes to those who are of nobler birth (for they will not play any better), but one must give the superiority in instruments to the one who excels in the performance. If what is being said is not yet clear, it will become still more manifest as we advance it further. For if there were someone who excelled in flute-playing, but was far inferior in noble birth or beauty, even if each of those is a greater good than flute-playing (I mean both noble birth and beauty), and they excel flute-playing proportionally more than he excels in flute-playing, nevertheless to him must be given the superior flutes.