- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:2.1268b
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Criticism of Hippodamus's proposals regarding land and judicial voting. This leads to a broader philosophical inquiry into whether ancestral laws should be changed for better ones, presenting arguments in favor of change from other sciences.
καὶ τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὑτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. οὐ καλῶς δʼ οὐδʼ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα,1 τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται2 πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὀφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δʼ ὅσον ὁ δικαζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δʼ ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦσιν·3 οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δʼ οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲν ἐπιορκεῖν ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἁπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται, δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μηδὲν ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ, ὁ καταδικάσας, μὴ νομίζων ὀφείλειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὑρίσκουσί τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαί τινα τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλʼ εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχῃ, πολιτείας. ἐμπίπτει δʼ εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ᾖ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν, ἐνδέχεται δʼ εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν4 ἢ πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, ἔτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικήν,5 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δʼ ἂν γεγονέναι φαίη τις ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἁπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρʼ ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστί που νομίμων εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,
And for what reason will they not immediately obtain their maintenance for themselves and provide it for the fighters from the same land and the same allotments? All these things indeed involve great confusion. Nor is the law concerning judgment well framed, in requiring that one should judge by making distinctions when the charge is simply written, and that the judge should become an arbitrator. And this is possible in arbitration even for several people (for they communicate with one another about the judgment), but in the courts it is not possible; on the contrary, most of the legislators provide that the judges do not communicate with one another. Next, how will the judgment not be full of confusion, when the judge thinks that there is a debt, but not as much as the litigant claims? For one claims twenty minae, and the judge will decide on ten minae (or one more and another less), and another judge five minae, and another four, and in this manner it is clear that they will divide the sum; and some will condemn to the whole amount, and others to nothing. What, then, will be the method of counting the votes? Furthermore, nothing forces the one who simply acquits or condemns to commit perjury, if indeed the charge is simply written, provided he judges justly; for the one who acquits does not judge that nothing is owed, but rather that the twenty minae specifically are not owed; whereas he who has condemned, not believing that the twenty minae are owed, is the one who actually commits perjury. And concerning the law that there should be some honor for those who find something advantageous to the city, it is not safe to legislate, but only pleasant to hear; for it involves false accusations and, as it may happen, disturbances of the constitution. And it falls into another problem and a different inquiry; for some raise the question whether it is harmful or advantageous to cities to change ancestral laws, if there should be some other better one. Therefore, it is not easy to agree quickly with what has been said, if indeed it is not advantageous to change them, yet it is possible for some to introduce the dissolution of laws or of the constitution as a common good. But since we have made mention of it, it is better to distinguish a little further concerning it. For, as we said, it involves difficulty, and it might seem to be better to change them. In the other sciences, at any rate, this has been beneficial, as for instance medicine having been changed contrary to ancestral practices, and gymnastics, and generally all the arts and faculties; so that, since politics must be placed as one of these, it is clear that concerning this too it is necessary to hold in like manner. And one might say that a sign of this has occurred in the facts themselves; for the ancient laws are exceedingly simple and barbarian. For the Greeks used to carry iron weapons, and they bought their wives from one another, and whatever other ancient customs still remain anywhere are completely foolish.
- 1268bτὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα
The infinitive τὸ κρίνειν is an articular infinitive in apposition to ὁ νόμος. The participle διαιροῦντα is in the accusative, agreeing with the implied subject (the judge) of the infinitive, meaning 'requiring that one should judge by making distinctions.'
- 1268bὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται
The conjunction ὅπως with the subjunctive (here present subjunctive middle) introduces an object clause of effort or precaution depending on the verb παρασκευάζουσιν ('take care that' or 'provide that').
- 1268bκαὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦσιν
The phrase δῆλον ὅτι functions adverbially as 'evidently' or 'obviously,' modifying the future verb μεριοῦσιν (from μερίζω, third-person plural), whose implied subject is the judges.
- 1268bἐνδέχεται δʼ εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν
The infinitive phrase εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν functions as the subject of the impersonal verb ἐνδέχεται ('it is possible that...'). Here, τινας (accusative plural) is the subject of the infinitive, and λύσιν is its direct object.
- 1268bὥστʼ ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικήν
The verbal adjective θετέον implies the copula ἐστί, expressing necessity ('one must classify'). The accusative τὴν πολιτικήν serves as the object of this construction, and μίαν τούτων is the predicate ('one of these').
