- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:1.1260a-1.1260b
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
The author discusses the distinction of virtue between rulers and the ruled, mapping it to the rational and irrational parts of the soul, and explains the differing capacities of slaves, women, and children before concluding that their education must be aligned with the state's constitution.
ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δʼ εἶναι διαφοράς, (ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων). καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν·1 ἐν ταύτῃ γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δʼ ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλʼ ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλʼ ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλʼ ἀτελές. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν διανοητικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων),2 τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλʼ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδʼ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δʼ ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων· "γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει," ἀλλʼ ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε διʼ ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἆρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ διʼ ἀκολασίαν ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἢ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας·
For if he is licentious and cowardly, he will perform none of his duties. It is clear, then, that while both must share in virtue, there are differences in this virtue, just as there are among those who are by nature ruled. And this is immediately indicated by the facts concerning the soul; for in this there is by nature a ruling part and a ruled part, whose virtue we say is different, for example, that of the part possessing reason and that of the irrational part. It is clear, then, that the same relation holds in other cases as well, so that there are by nature several ruling and ruled parts. For the free rules the slave in one way, the male the female in another, and the man the child in another, and in all of them the parts of the soul are present, but they are present in different ways. For the slave does not possess the deliberative part at all, while the female possesses it but it lacks authority, and the child possesses it but it is incomplete. Therefore, the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in completeness (for the work is absolutely that of the master-craftsman, and reason is the master-craftsman), but each of the others must possess it in such measure as falls to their share. We must suppose, then, that the same necessity applies to the moral virtues: all must share in them, but not in the same way, but only as much as is required for each to perform his own work. Hence it is clear that there is a moral virtue belonging to all those mentioned, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor are their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is ruling courage and the other is serving courage, and similarly with the other virtues. This also becomes clear to those who examine the matter in detail; for those who speak generally deceive themselves by saying that virtue is a good state of the soul, or right action, or anything of the kind. For those who enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias did, speak much better than those who define them in this way. Therefore, we must think of all as the poet has spoken concerning the woman: ’Silence brings ornament to a woman,’ but this is no longer the case for a man. And since the child is incomplete, it is clear that his virtue too is not relative to himself alone, but to his completion and to his leader; and similarly, that of the slave is relative to his master. But we laid down that the slave is useful for necessary things, so that it is clear that he needs only a small amount of virtue, and only so much as will prevent him from failing in his duties through licentiousness or cowardice. One might raise the question, if what has just been said is true, whether artisans will also need to have virtue; for they often fail in their duties through licentiousness. Or does this differ in the highest degree? For the slave is a partner in life, but the artisan is more remote, and shares in virtue only as much as he shares in slavery;
ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δʼ οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων.3 διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δʼ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δʼ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστʼ, ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.
for the vulgar craftsman has a certain defined slavery, and while the slave is among those who are by nature, no shoemaker is so, nor any of the other craftsmen. It is clear, then, that the master must be the cause of this kind of virtue in the slave, but not as merely possessing the art of teaching him his duties. Therefore, those who deprive slaves of reason and say that they should use only command speak not well; for slaves ought to be admonished even more than children. But let these matters be defined in this way. As for husband and wife, children and father, and the virtue concerning each of them, and their association with one another, what is good and what is not good, and how one must pursue the good and flee the bad, it is necessary to go into these matters in the discussions concerning constitutions. For since every household is a part of a city, and these are parts of a household, and the virtue of the part must look to the virtue of the whole, it is necessary to educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if indeed it makes any difference to the city being excellent that the children are excellent and the women are excellent. And it must make a difference; for women are half of the free population, and from the children come those who share in the constitution. So, since these matters have been defined, and the rest must be spoken of in other places, let us leave the present arguments as completed, and make another beginning and speak, and first let us examine those who have expressed opinions concerning the best constitution.
- 1260a4καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν
The subject of the verb ὑφήγηται (third-person singular perfect of ὑφηγέομαι, 'to guide' or 'to point the way') is the neuter plural phrase τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. According to classical Greek grammar, a neuter plural subject takes a singular verb. The clause is interpreted as 'and the facts concerning the soul immediately point the way.'
- 1260a16τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων
τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος is a genitive of possession, indicating that 'the work belongs absolutely to the master-craftsman.' The following clause ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων ('and reason is the master-craftsman') completes the analogy, explaining why the ruler must have perfect intellectual virtue: because the ruler's function is guided by reason, which plays the role of the master-craftsman in relation to subordinate activities.
- 1260b3ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων
The participle ἔχοντα (accusative masculine singular) modifies τὸν δεσπότην, which is the accusative subject of the infinitive εἶναι. This structure limits the master's role: the master must be the cause of the slave's moral virtue, and not merely by virtue of 'possessing the skill of teaching' him his practical duties (διδασκαλικὴν τῶν ἔργων).
