- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:1.1254a
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Based on the distinction between instruments of production and action, the slave is defined as a separable instrument of action. The text then begins discussing the universal principle of ruling and being ruled in nature.
τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον. ἔτι δʼ ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἴδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις, ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου1 ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἀλλʼ ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὤν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἄλλου δʼ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ2 ἄνθρωπος ὤν, κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν. πότερον δʼ ἔστι τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινι δουλεύειν ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἔστιν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δʼ ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων3 συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἕν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διῃρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δʼ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον·
Therefore, the so-called instruments are instruments of production, while a possession is an instrument of action. For from the shuttle, something else comes into being apart from its use, but from clothing and a bed, only the use. Furthermore, since production and action differ in kind, and both need instruments, these instruments also must of necessity have the same difference. And life is action, not production; therefore, the slave also is an assistant in things relating to action. And a possession is spoken of in the same way as a part. For a part is not only a part of another thing, but also belongs absolutely to another thing; and likewise also a possession. Therefore, the master is only master of the slave, but does not belong to him; but the slave is not only the slave of the master, but belongs wholly to him. What, then, the nature of the slave is and what his capacity, is clear from these considerations; for he who by nature is not his own but belongs to another, while being a human being, this person is by nature a slave; and a human being belongs to another who, while being a human being, is a possession, and a possession is an instrument of action and separable. But whether there is any one who is by nature of this sort or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave or not, but all slavery is contrary to nature, must next be considered. And it is not difficult both to perceive it by reason and to learn it from what actually happens. For ruling and being ruled are not only among necessary things but also among beneficial things, and immediately from birth some things are distinguished, some for being ruled, others for ruling. And there are many kinds both of rulers and of ruled (and the rule over better subjects is always better, for example, rule over a human being rather than a beast; for the work accomplished by better subjects is a better work; and where one rules and another is ruled, there is some work of these jointly); for in all things which are constituted from several parts and become some one common whole, whether from continuous parts or from discrete ones, the ruling and the ruled element appear, and this is present in animate things as a result of the whole of nature; for even in things which do not share in life there is a certain ruling principle, as in harmony. But these things belong perhaps to a rather external inquiry; and the living creature is constituted first from soul and body, of which the former is by nature the ruling element and the latter the ruled. But we must consider what is by nature rather in things that are in a natural state, and not in corrupted ones; therefore we must observe a human being who is in the best condition both in body and in soul, in whom this is clear.
- 1.1254aἄλλου
The genitive ἄλλου denotes possession or belonging. Combined with ἁπλῶς (absolutely, simply), it expresses a complete, unconditional belonging to another, implying a lack of independent existence.
- 1.1254aὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ
ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ is a conditional relative clause with the subjunctive ᾖ and particles ἄν, meaning 'whoever is a possession.' The participle ἄνθρωπος ὤν (being a human) has a concessive force ('although being a human'), syntactically reflecting the dual nature of the slave as both human and property.
- 1.1254aὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων
In the clause starting with ὅσα γὰρ..., the antecedent is omitted, corresponding to ἐν ἅπασιν in the main clause. It designates 'in all cases' where a whole is formed from multiple parts.