- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis De arte poetica liber. Kassel, Rudolf, editor. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1965 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg034.humanitext-grc2:25.1-25.16
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Various criticisms (problems) in poetry and their corresponding solutions are presented, discussing the three objects of imitation (what was/is, what is said/thought, what ought to be) and the unique standards of correctness in poetic art.
περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ ποίων εἰδῶν ἐστιν, ὧδ’ ἂν θεωροῦσιν1 γένοιτ’ ἂν φανερόν.
Concerning problems and solutions, from how many and what kinds they are, would become clear to those who investigate them in the following way.
ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων2 τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ.
For since the poet is an imitator, just like a painter or any other image-maker, he must of necessity always imitate one of three things: either things as they were or are, or things as they are said and seem to be, or things as they ought to be.
ταῦτα δ’ ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἐν ᾗ καὶ γλῶτται καὶ μεταφοραὶ καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστι·
And these are expressed in diction, in which there are rare words, metaphors, and many modifications of diction;
δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.
for we grant these to the poets. In addition to these, there is not the same standard of correctness in politics and in poetry, nor in any other art and in poetry.
αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὑτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
But within poetry itself there is a double error: one essential, the other accidental.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι... ἀδυναμίαν,3 αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία· εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ἅμ’ ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα, οἷον τὸ κατ’ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν, οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτήν.
For if he chose to imitate [correctly but failed] through inability, the error is of poetry itself; but if he chose incorrectly—for instance, representing a horse throwing forward both right legs at once—or if the error is in respect to each particular art, such as medicine or any other art whatsoever, it is not an error of poetry itself.
ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην· ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται·
Therefore, one must solve the censures in the problems by examining them from these points. First, those concerning the art itself: if impossible things have been represented, there is an error;
ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς4 (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται), εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις.
but it is correct, if it achieves its own end (for the end has been stated), if in this way it makes either that part or another part more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example.
εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἧττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτῆσθαι.
If, however, the end could have been achieved either more or not less in accordance with the art concerning these things, it is not correct; for, if possible, there should be no error at all.
ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ᾔδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν.
Furthermore, to which of the two does the error belong: to the art itself, or to some other accidental feature? For it is a lesser error not to know that a female deer has no horns, than to represent it unimitatively.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ’ ἴσως ὡς δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον.
In addition to these, if it is censured because it is not true, but perhaps as it ought to be—as Sophocles himself said that he represented people as they ought to be, but Euripides as they are—in this way it should be solved.
εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν·
And if in neither way, that ‘so people say’, as in the things concerning the gods.
ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ’ οὖν φασι.
For perhaps it is neither better to speak thus, nor true, but even if it might be just as it happened in Xenophanes’ case; but at any rate, so they say.
τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἶχεν, οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ’ ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος· οὕτω γὰρ τότ’ ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί.
In other cases, perhaps it is not better, but it was so, as in the things concerning the weapons: ‘and their spears stood upright on their spikes’; for so they were accustomed then, just as the Illyrians are even now.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς εἰ εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται, οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν,5 οἷον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται.
Concerning whether something has been said or done well or not well by anyone, one must not only look at the deed or word itself to see if it is noble or base, but also at the person acting or speaking, to whom, or when, or by what means, or for what purpose, as for instance, whether to bring about a greater good or to avoid a greater evil.
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττῃ τὸ οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον· ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, ὅς ῥ’ ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον.
Other things one must solve by looking at the diction, as for instance, by a rare word (glotta), as ‘first the mules (ourehas)’; for perhaps he does not mean mules but the guards. And of Dolon, ‘who was indeed bad in form (eidos)’, not that his body was asymmetrical, but that his face was ugly, for the Cretans call a handsome face ‘eueides’. And ‘mix it stronger (zoroteron)’ not as for drunkards but quicker.
- 1460bὧδ’ ἂν θεωροῦσιν
The present participle θεωροῦσιν is dative plural (acting as a dative of reference or conditional participle). It can be taken as 'to those who look at it in this way' or as a condition 'if one investigates in this way'.
- 1460bτριῶν ὄντων
Genitive absolute construction ('there being three things'). It limits the following ἕν τι ('always some one of them').
- 1460b15προείλετο μιμήσασθαι . . . ἀδυναμίαν
A lacuna is assumed in the manuscripts between μιμήσασθαι and ἀδυναμίαν. It is generally restored to mean 'he chose to imitate correctly, but failed through inability'.
- 1460b20τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὑτῆς
The verb τυγχάνει takes the genitive object τοῦ τέλους. The genitive reflexive pronoun αὑτῆς refers back to the poetic art (ποιητική/τέχνη) mentioned in the context.
- 1461a5πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν
A parallel series of relative expressions indicating circumstances: πρὸς ὃν (to whom, prep. + acc.), ὅτε (when, adverb), ὅτῳ (to/for whom or by what means, dative), and οὗ ἕνεκεν (for the sake of what, genitive + prep.). This dense structure demands a multi-aspectual evaluation of the poetic action.